The Leverage Machine: How Thames Water Turned a Monopoly into a Debt Vehicle
How a regulatory model that paid returns far above the cost of debt let Thames Water borrow against almost all of its assets, and what the 19 billion pound debt now means for customers.
Pricing the Way Back: A Quantitative Audit of Britain’s European Options
Ten years after the referendum, a synthetic control puts UK GDP 6.5 to 11.3 per cent below its counterfactual, with the gap still widening. An SPS agreement would recover about 0.4 per cent of GDP and a customs union about 1.4 per cent; only single market arrangements recover most of the loss.
The Gigawatt Question: What Britain’s Data Centre Ambition Really Asks of the Grid
Data centre requests to connect to Britain's grid exceed 70 gigawatts, against 2.4 connected. Taken literally, the queue would consume more electricity than the whole country. The official forecast assumes only one requested gigawatt in twelve is built; a probabilistic analysis puts 2035 demand well above the official view.
Guns, Gilts and Growth: The Domestic Multiplier of Britain’s Rearmament
Britain plans to raise defence spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035 and presents rearmament as an engine of growth. One hundred and fifty years of British data put the defence multiplier at only 0.2 to 0.3: rearmament may be necessary for security, but if financed by borrowing it will not pay for itself.
Following the Money North: The Fiscal Geography of England’s Devolution Experiment
From 2027 and 2028 English mayors will keep a share of business rates and income tax. Twenty-six years of regional public finance data show that income tax growth has followed existing wealth: without strong equalisation, tax retention would have moved money toward London and exposed poorer regions to new fiscal risks.
Taxing the Shock Absorber: Who Really Pays Britain’s Bank Surcharge?
The 2027 doubling of the bank surcharge reopens an old debate: do banks pass the tax on to borrowers? Seventeen years of Bank of England data, two natural experiments and placebo tests show that interest rates cannot answer the question: even full pass-through would be several times smaller than the ordinary noise in bank margins.
Britain’s Gas Beta: Measuring the Economy’s Exposure to the 2026 Gas Shock
British household energy prices have barely moved while European gas prices doubled in 2026. The delay is a product of the price cap, not of lower exposure: Britain's long-run gas beta is among the highest in Europe, and about 19 per cent of further energy price increases are already locked in for January and April 2027.
The Slow Fuse: Mapping Britain’s Mortgage Refinancing Wall, 2026 to 2029
Britain's mortgage stock reprices at only about 28 per cent a year, so the 2026 rate rises will reach household budgets mainly in 2028 and 2029. A second hike would add 3 to 4.5 billion pounds a year to interest bills, concentrated on borrowers who fixed for five years in 2021, whose payments rise by close to 40 per cent.
The Supply-Shock Trap: Why the Bank of England Is Tightening into a Weak Economy
The Bank of England raised rates to 4 per cent in November 2026 to fight an energy-driven rise in inflation. State-dependent local projections, a sign-restricted VAR and wage equations show that second-round effects are three to nine times weaker than in 2022 because the labour market is loose: the first hike is defensible, the second much harder to justify.
The Missing Buyer: Pension Funds, Term Premia and the Repricing of Britain’s Long Debt
Britain's 30-year gilt yield crossed 6 per cent in 2026. Using Bank of England curves, DMO issuance records and an affine term structure model, this study shows the rise is almost entirely term premium, now at its highest since 1997, and that the end of leveraged pension hedging, quantitative tightening and US spillovers, not public debt, explain it.