Decoded, Economics & finance

The Absorption Trap: How Much of Germany’s EUR 500 Billion Infrastructure Fund Becomes Construction Inflation Rather Than Capital

The Absorption Trap: Germany infrastructure fund
The German Economy in 2026 | Analytical Series, Paper 1

Executive Summary

Germany’s Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality (Sondervermögen Infrastruktur und Klimaneutralität, SVIK) is the largest public investment programme in the history of the Federal Republic. Its EUR 500 billion borrowing authority, spread over twelve years, was designed to close two decades of under-investment in roads, rail, bridges, schools, grids and digital networks. By the autumn of 2026 it has also become the single most important driver of German growth. The German Chamber of Commerce and Industry raised its 2026 forecast to 1 percent in November while stating plainly that debt-financed public spending is doing most of the work. The question that matters for the next decade is therefore not whether the money is being spent, but what it is buying.

This paper argues that the public debate has been asking the wrong question. Commentators have focused on the disbursement gap: in 2025, only EUR 24 billion of the planned EUR 37.2 billion actually left the fund, and by the end of April 2026 only 28 percent of that year’s planned federal outflow had been paid. That gap is real, but it is closing. Our run-rate analysis shows that the monthly outflow almost doubled between the first four months of 2026 (EUR 2.8 billion per month) and May to July (EUR 5.3 billion per month). If the May to July pace holds, the entire EUR 500 billion would be exhausted by the middle of 2033, roughly three years earlier than the statutory horizon.

That acceleration is precisely the problem. As cash flows faster than the construction sector can expand its capacity, a growing share of each euro is absorbed by higher prices rather than by more physical capital. We call this the absorption trap. Three original measurements document it.

First, we construct an excess-price leakage ratio from the monthly turnover statistics of the main construction trades (Bauhauptgewerbe). It measures the share of nominal turnover growth explained by construction inflation above a 2 percent background rate. Excluding one anomalous month, the ratio rose steadily from about 10 percent in April 2026 to 23 percent in June, 28 percent in July and 29 percent in August. In other words, the fraction of new spending that disappears into prices has roughly tripled within four months, exactly as the fund’s outflow accelerated.

Second, we show that road construction prices, the most fund-sensitive price index Destatis publishes, compounded at 7.9 percent a year between 2020 and 2025, more than double the 3.5 percent of 2015 to 2020 and four times the 1.9 percent of 2000 to 2015. In August 2026 the index was rising at 6.9 percent year on year, against consumer price inflation of 2.9 percent.

Third, we combine the leakage evidence with the range of published estimates on budgetary substitution (the shifting of ordinary investment from the core budget into the fund) in a Monte Carlo simulation of 200,000 draws. The median result is striking: each euro borrowed through the fund adds only about EUR 0.38 of genuinely additional real public capital. The 80 percent confidence band runs from EUR 0.24 to EUR 0.56, and in 81 percent of simulations the real yield is below one half. By implication, the Federal Ministry of Finance’s estimate that the fund lifted GDP by around 0.5 percentage points requires a real yield of about 0.84 per euro, a value that lies outside nine-tenths of our distribution for 2025.

The consequences are concrete. At the median yield, the full EUR 500 billion would deliver roughly EUR 190 billion of additional real capital at today’s prices, not EUR 500 billion. At a ten-year Bund yield of about 3.25 percent, the effective financing cost of each euro of genuinely new real capital is about 8.5 percent a year. The fund is still worth having, because Germany’s infrastructure deficit is real and the growth impulse is real. But its value depends on reforms that the current debate barely mentions: binding additionality rules, multi-year framework contracts that let construction firms invest in capacity, procurement that rewards productivity rather than speed of spending, and a deliberate smoothing of outflow to the pace the sector can absorb. Our scenario analysis shows that combining a ministry-level additionality rule with outflow smoothing would raise the median real yield from 0.38 to 0.67, adding about EUR 140 billion of real public capital from the same EUR 500 billion of borrowing.

Key findings.

  1. The fund could run dry by 2033. The monthly outflow rose from EUR 2.8 billion (January to April 2026) to EUR 5.3 billion (May to July 2026). At the latter pace the EUR 500 billion envelope would be exhausted around mid-2033, three years before its statutory horizon.
  2. Price leakage tripled in four months. The share of nominal construction growth absorbed by excess inflation rose from about 10 percent in April 2026 to 29 percent in August 2026.
  3. Road construction prices are compounding at crisis rates. 7.9 percent a year from 2020 to 2025, against 1.9 percent from 2000 to 2015; 6.9 percent year on year in August 2026, against 2.9 percent consumer inflation.
  4. Each borrowed euro buys about 38 cents of new real capital. Median of 200,000 Monte Carlo draws combining budgetary substitution and price leakage; 81 percent probability that the yield is below one half.
  5. The effective financing cost of real capital is about 8.5 percent. A 3.25 percent Bund yield divided by a 0.38 real yield.
  6. Two reforms could add EUR 140 billion of real capital at no extra cost. A ministry-level additionality rule plus outflow smoothing would raise the median real yield to 0.67.

1. Introduction: From a Spending Problem to an Absorption Problem

In March 2025 the outgoing Bundestag amended the Basic Law to exempt a EUR 500 billion borrowing authority for infrastructure and climate neutrality from the debt brake. The legislation establishing the fund (the SVIKG) was promulgated in October 2025 and applied retroactively from 1 January 2025. Its architecture has three pillars. The federal government controls EUR 300 billion for its own investment programmes. The Länder and their municipalities receive EUR 100 billion, with until 2043 to disburse their allocations as long as projects are agreed by 2036. A further EUR 100 billion is channelled to the Climate and Transformation Fund (KTF).

The political promise was simple: decades of deferred maintenance would finally be reversed, and Germany would combine higher potential growth with a short-term demand stimulus at a time of industrial weakness. By the second half of 2026 the short-term part of that promise appears to be working. GDP grew by 0.2 percent in the third quarter of 2026 after 0.3 percent in the second, despite an energy shock from the Iran war, an auto industry crisis and US tariffs. The government expects growth of 1.3 percent in 2026, after three years of contraction or stagnation.

Yet the composition of this recovery should worry anyone interested in its durability. The chamber of commerce described the expansion as driven largely by debt-financed public spending, and its chief executive warned that Germany is still a long way from self-sustaining growth. Private investment remains weak. Consumer confidence is at minus 30.8 points. Manufacturing employment continues to fall. In this configuration, the quality of public spending is no longer a technical question for auditors. It is the question on which the medium-term trajectory of the German economy depends.

Most of the commentary on the fund has been organised around two issues. The first is speed: is the money leaving the fund fast enough? The second is additionality: is the fund financing new investment, or merely relabelling investment that would have happened anyway out of the core budget? Both are important, and we take them seriously below. But they share a blind spot. They treat the euro as the unit of account. A euro that leaves the fund on time, and that genuinely adds to public investment, is counted as a success.

That accounting is incomplete. A euro spent is not a euro of capital installed. Between the two sits the construction sector, with its finite stock of workers, machines, engineering capacity and planning approvals. When public demand for that sector rises faster than its capacity, the gap is closed by prices. The money is spent, the project is booked, the GDP statistics record nominal investment, and yet the number of kilometres of rail renewed, bridges replaced or schools refurbished rises far less than the headline suggests.

This paper is an attempt to measure that gap. Our central hypothesis is that Germany is moving from a spending problem, visible in 2025 and early 2026, to an absorption problem, visible from mid-2026 onwards. The faster the fund pays out, the more of its value leaks into construction inflation. If the hypothesis is correct, the policy debate needs to change direction: pressing ministries to spend faster, as the finance minister has done, would raise the nominal flow while lowering the real return.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reconstructs the fund’s disbursement path and projects three scenarios for the end of 2026 and for the exhaustion of the fund. Section 3 documents the state of the construction sector: orders, turnover, employment, utilisation and backlog. Section 4 measures construction price dynamics over a 26-year horizon. Section 5 introduces the excess-price leakage ratio, our first original indicator. Section 6 quantifies budgetary substitution. Section 7 combines leakage and substitution in a Monte Carlo model of the real yield per euro borrowed. Section 8 recalculates the GDP effect and the effective financing cost of real capital. Section 9 draws the policy implications, and Section 10 concludes. A methodological annex sets out data sources, assumptions and limitations.

2. The Disbursement Path: A Gap That Is Closing Faster Than Expected

2.1 What the official monitoring shows

The first monitoring report of the Federal Ministry of Finance, presented to the Budget Committee of the Bundestag and made public on 1 June 2026, set the tone of the debate. Of the EUR 37.2 billion planned for 2025, only about EUR 24 billion had actually been paid out, a disbursement rate of roughly 65 percent. The ministry itself rated the fund’s average progress and impact indicator at 54 percent, a “partial achievement of objectives”. The Bundestag’s own summary of the 2025 budget outturn shows that the undrawn EUR 8.3 billion made up most of the EUR 13.3 billion of underspending recorded for the fund that year.

The ministry offered a reasonable explanation. The 2025 federal budget was only adopted in the autumn, after a long period of provisional budget management that lasted until early October 2025. The fund itself became legally operational in October. In practice, therefore, the EUR 24 billion of 2025 was paid out in about one quarter, which implies a monthly outflow of around EUR 8 billion in the last three months of the year. That figure is inflated by year-end bunching and by back-dated items, but it already hints at the speed the system can reach once the administrative machinery is running.

The 2026 economic plan of the fund foresees outflows of EUR 58.9 billion, against EUR 37.3 billion planned in the previous year. Transport infrastructure is the dominant item, with EUR 21.3 billion, of which EUR 16.3 billion is earmarked for the maintenance of the rail network. The roll-out of the European Train Control System is to receive EUR 2.5 billion.

2.2 Reconstructing the 2026 run rate

Three public data points allow us to reconstruct the monthly profile of 2026. The first monitoring data showed that by 30 April 2026 only EUR 11.2 billion had been disbursed, 28 percent of the EUR 39.7 billion planned for the year in the reported perimeter. By the end of July, according to the finance ministry, cumulative outflows since the start of the fund had reached EUR 51.1 billion, roughly 10 percent of the total envelope. Adding the EUR 24 billion of 2025, the cumulative path is therefore EUR 24.0 billion at the end of 2025, EUR 35.2 billion at the end of April 2026 and EUR 51.1 billion at the end of July 2026.

Table 1 converts these stocks into flows.

Table 1. SVIK outflow by period and implied monthly run rates.

Period Cumulative outflow (EUR bn) Flow in period (EUR bn) Months Monthly run rate (EUR bn)
Oct to Dec 2025 24.0 24.0 3 about 8.0 (year-end bunching)
Jan to Apr 2026 35.2 11.2 4 2.8
May to Jul 2026 51.1 15.9 3 5.3
Required average, Oct 2025 to Dec 2036 500.0 500.0 135 3.7

Source: Federal Ministry of Finance monitoring and press statements; author’s calculations.

The pattern is unambiguous. The early-2026 pace of EUR 2.8 billion per month was well below the EUR 3.7 billion per month needed to exhaust the fund by the end of 2036. The May to July pace of EUR 5.3 billion per month is 43 percent above that requirement. In a few months the fund moved from under-spending relative to its legal horizon to over-spending relative to it.

2.3 Three paths to the end of 2026

Figure 1 projects three paths for the remaining five months of 2026. Path A assumes the system falls back to the January to April pace. Path B assumes the May to July pace continues. Path C assumes the May to July pace for two months, followed by a repeat of the 2025 year-end pattern of roughly EUR 8 billion per month in the final quarter.

304050607080Dec 25Feb 26Apr 26Jun 26Aug 26Oct 26Dec 26EUR bn, cumulativePlan: 24.0 + 58.9 = 82.9 bnReported cumulative outflowPath A: Jan to Apr pacePath B: May to Jul pacePath C: year-end bunching
Figure 1. SVIK cumulative outflow and three end-2026 paths. Source: Federal Ministry of Finance; author’s calculations.

Table 2. End-2026 cumulative outflow under three paths. Author’s calculations.

Path Assumption Cumulative end-2026 (EUR bn) Gap to plan of 82.9 (EUR bn)
A Jan to Apr pace (2.8 per month) 65.1 minus 17.8
B May to Jul pace (5.3 per month) 77.6 minus 5.3
C May to Jul pace, then 2025-style year-end bunching 85.7 plus 2.8

Author’s calculations.

Under Path B the 2026 shortfall would shrink to about EUR 5 billion, small relative to the political noise it would generate. Under Path C, which is the empirically most likely pattern given German budgetary practice, the fund would slightly exceed its 2026 plan. The disbursement problem, in other words, is in the process of solving itself.

2.4 When would the fund run dry?

A more revealing calculation asks how long the remaining EUR 448.9 billion would last at each pace. At the January to April run rate, the fund would be exhausted around the end of 2039, three years after its statutory horizon. At the May to July run rate, it would be exhausted around mid-2033, three years before that horizon.

This result has not, to our knowledge, appeared in the public debate, and it reverses the usual framing. The binding constraint on the fund is shifting from the administrative capacity of ministries to pay, towards the physical capacity of the economy to build. Every euro that leaves the fund faster than the construction sector can expand its real output must be absorbed somewhere. The rest of this paper shows where.

3. The Construction Sector Under a Demand Shock

3.1 Orders: the largest monthly jump since 1991

The demand impulse is now unmistakable in the order books. In August 2026 real, seasonally and calendar-adjusted orders in the main construction trades rose by 23.0 percent from July, the largest month-on-month increase since the series began in 1991, according to Destatis. Civil engineering (Tiefbau), the segment most exposed to the fund, rose by 31.6 percent on the month and by 36.4 percent on the year, while building construction (Hochbau) fell by 1.7 percent year on year. Several large contracts drove the result.

Monthly order data are volatile, so the three-month comparison matters more. Between June and August 2026, orders were 7.6 percent higher than in the previous three months, with civil engineering up 13.8 percent and building construction up only 0.6 percent. The orders index stood at 111.0 in August (2021 = 100), compared with an annual average of 92.8 in 2025.

Table 3. Real orders in the main construction trades, year-on-year change.

Month (2026) Total orders, real, y/y (%) Civil engineering, real, y/y (%) Building construction, real, y/y (%)
April +0.6 +7.4 minus 6.5
May +3.5 +1.2 +6.7
June +11.3 +17.8 +4.3
July minus 1.9 minus 2.2 minus 1.5
August +17.3 +36.4 minus 1.7

Source: Destatis press releases 217, 264, 304, 338 and 375 of 2026.

The divergence between the two segments is itself evidence of the fund’s footprint. Building construction depends mainly on private and housing demand, which is held back by higher interest rates and financing costs. Civil engineering depends overwhelmingly on public clients, and above all on the federal rail and road programmes now financed through the fund.

3.2 Turnover: volume grows, but prices grow faster

Orders translate into turnover with a lag, and turnover is where the split between volume and price becomes visible. Destatis publishes, for each month, the change in turnover in both nominal and real (price-adjusted) terms.

Table 4. Turnover in the main construction trades.

Month (2026) Nominal turnover, y/y (%) Real turnover, y/y (%) Nominal level (EUR bn)
April +6.3 +3.6 10.0
May +2.4 minus 2.1 10.1
June +11.5 +6.6 11.2
July +9.4 +4.6 12.1
August +10.1 +4.9 10.9

Source: Destatis.

Over the five months, nominal turnover grew on average by 7.9 percent a year, real turnover by 3.5 percent. More than half of the nominal expansion, in other words, was price. The construction industry federation reported that for the first half of 2026 real orders rose by 1.8 percent while real turnover still fell by 0.7 percent. The sector was being paid more for doing roughly the same amount of work.

3.3 Capacity: tight, but not yet at its limit

The supply side helps explain why. Employment in the main construction trades rose by about 1.5 percent year on year, to around 545,000 to 548,000 people in firms with 20 or more employees. Capacity utilisation was reported at 73.5 percent in spring 2026, 2.1 points higher than a year earlier. The order backlog stood at EUR 58.2 billion, equivalent to 4.6 months of work. Average hourly wages in the sector were rising by about 3.9 percent, with a collective agreement providing for staged increases of 6 percent through the end of 2026, plus scarcity premiums in specialised trades.

These figures describe a sector that can grow, but only slowly. With employment growing by 1.5 percent and productivity growth historically weak, the realistic expansion of real capacity is in the range of 2 to 3 percent a year. Set this against the scale of the fund’s ramp-up. Moving from EUR 24 billion in 2025 to EUR 58.9 billion in 2026 represents an additional EUR 34.9 billion of planned demand. The annual turnover of the main construction trades, extrapolated from 2026 monthly data, is roughly EUR 126 billion. Not all fund spending reaches this sector, since some goes to equipment, digital networks, energy and transfers. But even under conservative assumptions the planned ramp corresponds to an increase in potential demand of the order of 20 to 28 percent of sector turnover within one year. No construction sector in an advanced economy can expand real output at that speed.

3.4 Where the money goes, and where the pressure lands

The pressure is not evenly spread. The 2026 economic plan concentrates the fund’s federal pillar on a small number of highly specialised activities. Of the EUR 58.9 billion planned, EUR 21.3 billion is for transport infrastructure, and within that EUR 16.3 billion is for maintenance of the existing rail network, mostly the general renovation of high-performance corridors. EUR 2.5 billion is for the European Train Control System, EUR 3.25 billion for the maintenance of bridges and tunnels on federal trunk roads, and EUR 1.4 billion for the conversion and construction of climate-neutral district heating networks.

Table 4b. Selected SVIK programme lines in the 2026 economic plan and their supply constraints.

Programme line (2026 plan) EUR bn Main supply constraint
Transport infrastructure, total 21.3 Specialised civil engineering, track possessions
of which rail network maintenance 16.3 Track-laying machinery, signalling engineers, line closures
European Train Control System 2.5 Signalling engineers, certification
Federal trunk road bridges and tunnels 3.25 Bridge engineers, steel and concrete specialists, planning approval
Climate-neutral heating networks 1.4 Pipe-laying firms, municipal utilities’ planning staff

Source: Bundestag, Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie; constraints: author’s assessment.

These are precisely the segments where supply is least elastic. A general building contractor can shift workers from a stalled housing project to a school refurbishment within weeks. A rail corridor renovation, by contrast, requires heavy track machinery that is produced by a handful of manufacturers, signalling engineers whose training takes years, and possession windows on an operating network that are themselves rationed. Bridge replacement requires structural engineers and planning approvals that cannot be accelerated by money alone.

This concentration has a direct implication for the leakage estimates in Section 5. The turnover deflator we use covers the entire main construction trades, including housing and commercial building, where demand is weak and price pressure moderate. The price leakage in the specific segments financed by the fund is almost certainly higher than the sector average. Our central leakage value of 28 percent is therefore a conservative estimate for the fund’s own projects.

4. A Quarter Century of Construction Prices

4.1 The long view

To understand whether current price dynamics are unusual, we need a long series. Destatis publishes price indices for construction work at the building site, including VAT, on a base of 2021 = 100. Combining the annual national values reported in the statistical offices’ long-run tables with the latest quarterly releases gives the profile in Figure 4.

6080100120140160200020052010201520202025Index, 2021 = 100Aug 2026Road constructionResidential buildings
Figure 4. German construction price indices, 2000 to August 2026. Source: Destatis, Thuringian statistical office.

Table 5. Compound annual growth of the German road construction price index.

Period Road construction, compound annual growth (%)
2000 to 2015 1.9
2015 to 2020 3.5
2020 to 2025 7.9
August 2025 to August 2026 6.9

Source: Destatis and Länder statistical offices; author’s calculations.

For fifteen years, from 2000 to 2015, road construction prices rose by less than 2 percent a year, broadly in line with general inflation. Between 2015 and 2020, as public investment began to recover, the rate almost doubled. Between 2020 and 2025, under the combined effect of the pandemic, the energy shock of 2022 and rising wages, it doubled again, to almost 8 percent. By 2025 the road construction index stood at 139.3, compared with 133.9 for residential buildings, meaning that civil engineering prices had outpaced building prices since the 2021 base.

4.2 The 2026 re-acceleration

The critical observation is what happened next. After 2023 most observers expected construction inflation to normalise. In 2025, the Saxon statistical office reported road construction price increases of 3.4 percent for the year as a whole. Instead, prices re-accelerated in 2026. In May 2026 road construction prices were 6.2 percent higher than a year earlier, and in August 6.9 percent higher, taking the index to 149.3. Over the same period consumer prices rose by 2.9 percent. Residential construction prices, which reflect a sector with weak demand, also accelerated (to 5.5 percent), but less.

Part of the 2026 re-acceleration has nothing to do with the fund. The Iran war pushed up energy, bitumen and transport costs from March 2026 onwards, and wage settlements were negotiated before the energy shock. But two features of the data point to a demand-pull component specific to public civil engineering. First, the acceleration is concentrated in the segment where the fund’s money flows. Second, it coincides with the sharp rise in civil engineering orders and with the doubling of the fund’s monthly run rate. Neither of these would be expected if the price increase were purely a cost-push phenomenon common to all construction.

4.3 The relative price as a fingerprint of the fund

A cleaner way to isolate the fund’s footprint is to compare two construction price indices that face the same cost shocks but different demand shocks. Road construction and residential building both use concrete, steel, diesel and construction labour. Both were hit by the 2026 energy shock and by the same collective wage agreement. What differs is demand: residential construction faces weak private demand held back by financing costs, while road construction faces a surge of public orders.

Table 5b. Road construction versus residential building prices.

Reporting month Road construction, y/y (%) Residential buildings, y/y (%) Spread (pp)
February 2026 not reported in source 3.3 not available
May 2026 6.2 5.0 1.2
August 2026 6.9 5.5 1.4
Cumulative, 2021 to 2025 (index level) 139.3 133.9 5.4 index points

Source: Destatis; author’s calculations.

The spread is positive, widening and consistent with the timing of the fund’s acceleration. In a difference-in-differences logic, common cost shocks cancel out and the residual reflects the demand shock specific to public civil engineering. A spread of 1.2 to 1.4 percentage points a year may look modest, but applied to the fund’s annual civil engineering spending it represents a transfer of several hundred million euros a year from the public purse to construction margins and wages, before any additional capacity is created. If the spread were to widen to the levels seen during the 2018 to 2019 public investment upswing, when road construction prices in Thuringia, for example, rose by about 10 percent a year against about 5 percent for residential buildings, the transfer would reach the low billions annually.

5. The Excess-Price Leakage Ratio: A New Indicator

5.1 Construction

The monthly turnover data in Table 4 contain more information than is usually extracted from them. If nominal turnover grows at rate n and real turnover at rate r, the implied deflator of construction output grows at d = (1 + n) / (1 + r) minus 1. In normal times, part of d simply reflects the economy’s background inflation, which we set at 2 percent, the European Central Bank’s target and roughly the pre-war norm. The remainder, d minus 2 percent, is excess construction inflation.

We define the excess-price leakage ratio (EPLR) as the share of nominal turnover growth that is absorbed by excess construction inflation:

EPLR = (d minus 2 percent) / n

An EPLR of zero means that all nominal growth beyond background inflation becomes additional real output. An EPLR of 50 percent means that half of nominal growth disappears into excess prices. The indicator is simple, observable monthly, and directly relevant to the fund: it measures how much of any additional euro spent in the sector ends up as price rather than volume.

5.2 Results

-202468Apr 2026May 2026Jun 2026Jul 2026Aug 2026% y/yReal turnover growthImplied construction deflator
Figure 2. Splitting Bauhauptgewerbe turnover into volume and price. Source: Destatis; author’s calculations.

Table 6. Implied construction deflator and excess-price leakage ratio. Author’s calculations from Destatis turnover data.

Month (2026) Implied deflator, y/y (%) Excess over 2% (pp) Excess-price leakage ratio (%)
April 2.6 0.6 9.6
May 4.6 2.6 not meaningful (real turnover negative)
June 4.6 2.6 22.6
July 4.6 2.6 27.5
August 5.0 3.0 29.3

Author’s calculations from Destatis turnover data.

010203040AprJunJulAug% of nominal growth10%23%28%29%May excluded: real turnover negative
Figure 3. Excess-price leakage ratio, April to August 2026. Source: Destatis; author’s calculations. May excluded because real turnover was negative.

May is excluded from the trend because real turnover fell while nominal turnover barely rose, which makes the ratio arithmetically unstable. For the remaining four months the trajectory is clear and monotonic: from under 10 percent in April to almost 30 percent in August. In other words, the share of nominal construction growth absorbed by excess prices tripled in four months.

5.3 Interpretation and robustness

Three caveats apply. First, the series is short, because the fund only became fully operational in late 2025; four observations cannot establish a statistical trend in the formal sense. Second, the turnover deflator covers all construction in the main trades, not only fund-financed projects, so it understates the leakage in civil engineering, where prices are rising faster than the average. Third, the 2 percent background assumption is a choice. If background inflation is set at the 2.9 percent consumer price rate observed in August, the August leakage ratio falls to about 20 percent; if it is set at the pre-war norm of 1.5 percent, it rises to 34 percent.

None of these caveats alters the direction of the finding. Under every reasonable assumption, the share of construction spending that turns into price rather than volume rose markedly as the fund accelerated. That is exactly what one would expect from a demand shock meeting a supply curve that is steep in the short run. We use the range of observed values, from 10 to 45 percent with a central value of 28 percent, as the price-leakage parameter in the simulation in Section 7.

5.4 A calibrated supply curve for German construction

The four usable months also allow a first calibration of the short-run supply curve of the sector. If real capacity grows at about 2.5 percent a year and background inflation is 2 percent, then any nominal demand growth above 4.5 percent must be met either by extra output beyond normal capacity growth or by excess prices. Regressing the excess deflator on this demand gap across the four months gives a slope of 0.43, with a correlation coefficient of 0.89: each percentage point of nominal demand growth above 4.5 percent adds about 0.43 points of excess construction inflation. The slope is the same whether capacity growth is set at 2, 2.5 or 3 percent; only the intercept moves.

This simple relationship is the core of the absorption trap, and Figure 6 makes it visible. The leakage ratio is not constant: it rises with the speed of spending. At nominal demand growth of 8 percent, about a fifth of spending leaks into prices. At 15 percent, about 30 percent. At the 20 percent or more implied by the fund’s planned ramp, if even half of it reached the main construction trades, the ratio would approach 35 to 40 percent. Doubling the sector’s capacity growth to 5 percent, through the supply reforms discussed in Section 9, would lower the whole curve by several points at every level of demand.

01020304051015202530Leakage ratio, %Plan-implied demand growthCapacity growth 2.5% (current)Capacity growth 5% (with supply reforms)Observed 2026 months (dots)Nominal demand growth in construction, % y/y
Figure 6. Calibrated leakage curve: how faster spending raises the price share. Source: author’s calibration on Destatis data.

The calibration is fragile, resting as it does on four observations, and it should be updated monthly as Destatis publishes new data. Its value lies less in the precise coefficient than in the shape it reveals. The relationship between spending speed and price leakage is convex at low growth rates and flattens only slowly. A government that wants more infrastructure, rather than more spending, must therefore care about the pace of outflow as much as about its level.

6. Budgetary Substitution: How Much Is Really Additional?

6.1 The legal safeguard and its limits

The constitutional amendment requires that the fund finance additional investment. The implementing law operationalises this with a single rule: the share of investment in the federal core budget must remain above 10 percent of total spending. The German Council of Economic Experts has pointed out that, beyond this quota for the core budget, there are no institutional safeguards ensuring that money from the fund is spent additionally. A ministry can reduce investment financed from its own budget, move the same projects into the fund, and still comply with the quota, as long as the overall share stays above 10 percent.

6.2 What the budgets show

The evidence that such shifting has occurred is substantial. According to calculations by the ifo Institute, the 2025 budget of the Federal Ministry of Transport saw net spending reductions of around EUR 11 billion, most of which reappear in the fund. The construction industry federation documented the same pattern for 2026: maintenance subsidies for the existing rail network were moved entirely from the core budget into the fund from 2025 onwards, leaving only around EUR 2.6 billion of rail investment in the core budget in 2026. The federal motorway company’s resources from the core budget also fell compared with 2024, because part of them was moved into the fund and the defence budget.

6.3 The range of estimates

Estimates of additionality vary enormously, and the dispersion itself is informative.

Table 7. Published estimates of SVIK additionality.

Source Estimated additional share Nature of estimate
Federal Ministry of Finance 95% (over a longer period) Fiscal accounting, official
Study cited in October 2025 47% Budget comparison
Range of published assessments 20% to over 60% Various methods
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) about 50% Budget comparison

Sources: as cited in the reference list.

The finance ministry’s own figure is an outlier on the upside. The government stated in October 2026 that investment had risen by more than EUR 12 billion because of the fund, a figure that sits comfortably with partial, not full, additionality given that EUR 51 billion had been paid out by then. For our purposes, the most defensible approach is not to choose one number but to model the whole range.

6.4 The Länder pillar and the municipal channel

Substitution is not confined to federal ministries. The EUR 100 billion Länder pillar, paid at a rate of about EUR 8.3 billion a year, flows into a level of government that is in acute financial distress. German municipalities recorded a deficit of almost EUR 32 billion in 2025, the largest in their history, and a further EUR 20.1 billion in the first half of 2026 alone. The Bertelsmann Stiftung reports that municipalities are already responding by cutting investment and voluntary services, and their umbrella associations project deficits of close to EUR 30 billion a year until the end of the decade.

In this environment the fund’s municipal money is very likely to replace investment that municipalities would otherwise have cut, rather than to add to a stable baseline. The order data are consistent with this reading: orders for public building construction (schools, administrative buildings, sports facilities, mostly municipal) were reported 12.5 percent lower year on year in April 2026, even as federal civil engineering orders surged. Uptake by the Länder is also uneven. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, for example, had approved just under a quarter of its allocation (about EUR 458 million of EUR 1.925 billion) by the autumn of 2026.

From the perspective of the national capital stock, money that prevents a municipal investment collapse is valuable. But it is not additional in the sense promised by the constitutional amendment, and it is invisible in the federal additionality debate, which focuses on the 10 percent quota for the federal core budget. A complete assessment of the fund’s real yield must therefore treat the Länder pillar as having lower additionality than the federal pillar, which reinforces the conservative calibration used in Section 7.

7. The Real Yield of One Borrowed Euro: A Monte Carlo Model

7.1 The model

We define the real yield of the fund (RY) as the amount of genuinely additional real public capital, measured at constant prices, created by each euro borrowed. It is the product of two shares:

RY = A x (1 minus L)

where A is the additionality share (the fraction of each fund euro that is not a substitute for core-budget investment) and L is the excess-price leakage share (the fraction of additional spending absorbed by construction inflation above the background rate). A fund with perfect additionality and no price leakage would have RY = 1.

Both parameters are uncertain, so we draw them from triangular distributions calibrated on the evidence in Sections 5 and 6:

Table 8. Parameter distributions for the Monte Carlo simulation.

Parameter Minimum Mode Maximum Calibration
Additionality A 0.20 0.47 0.95 Range of published estimates; mode at the October 2025 study; maximum at the finance ministry’s figure
Price leakage L 0.10 0.28 0.45 Observed EPLR range in 2026, with an allowance for faster civil engineering inflation

We run 200,000 draws with independent sampling of the two parameters. Treating them as independent is, if anything, conservative: in reality, faster disbursement probably raises both substitution (ministries reach for projects already in the pipeline) and leakage (more pressure on capacity), which would fatten the lower tail.

7.2 Results

0.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.8P10 0.24Median 0.38P90 0.56Real additional public capital per euro borrowed
Figure 5. Monte Carlo distribution of the real yield of one SVIK euro. Source: author’s simulation, 200,000 draws.

Table 9. Monte Carlo results for the real yield of the SVIK. Author’s calculations.

Statistic Real yield per euro borrowed
Mean 0.39
10th percentile 0.24
Median 0.38
90th percentile 0.56
Probability that the yield is below 0.50 81%

Author’s calculations.

The median euro borrowed through the fund creates about 38 cents of additional real public capital. In four out of five simulations, less than half of the headline sum becomes genuinely new physical investment. Only in the most optimistic tenth of outcomes does the yield exceed 56 cents.

The sensitivity grid in Table 10 shows how the result depends on the two parameters. The striking feature is the asymmetry. Even with near-perfect additionality, a price leakage of 40 percent pulls the yield down to about 0.56. Conversely, even with no leakage at all, the median additionality caps the yield below one half. Neither problem alone explains the outcome; it is their combination that turns a EUR 500 billion headline into a much smaller real programme.

Table 10. Real yield per euro borrowed under combinations of additionality (rows) and price leakage (columns).

Additionality / Leakage 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.50
0.20 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10
0.35 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18
0.50 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.25
0.65 0.62 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.38 0.32
0.80 0.76 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.47 0.40
0.95 0.90 0.82 0.73 0.65 0.56 0.48

7.3 What EUR 500 billion really buys

Applied to the full envelope, the median yield implies that EUR 500 billion of borrowing would add roughly EUR 190 billion of real public capital at 2026 prices. If outflows slow back to the early-2026 pace, so that only about EUR 400 billion is spent by the end of 2036, the figure falls to roughly EUR 150 billion. This does not mean that the other EUR 310 billion is wasted. The substituted part finances investment that would otherwise have been financed from the core budget, which frees fiscal space for other uses, including consumption spending and tax relief. The leaked part raises incomes in the construction sector. But neither of these is what the public was promised: an additional EUR 500 billion of infrastructure.

7.4 Four regimes for the next decade

The same model can be used to evaluate reforms. We compare four regimes. In the status quo, both parameters keep their current distributions. Under an additionality rule, a binding ministry-level requirement to maintain core-budget investment shifts the additionality distribution to a range of 0.60 to 0.95 with a mode of 0.80. Under outflow smoothing, a deliberate plateau of disbursements at the pace consistent with the statutory horizon, combined with multi-year framework contracts, lowers the leakage distribution to a range of 0.05 to 0.25 with a mode of 0.15, in line with the leakage curve in Figure 6 at moderate demand growth. The fourth regime combines both.

Table 12. Real yield and real capital under four policy regimes. Author’s calculations, 200,000 draws per regime.

Regime Median real yield 10th to 90th percentile Real capital from EUR 500 bn (EUR bn)
Status quo 0.38 0.24 to 0.56 190
Additionality rule only 0.56 0.47 to 0.67 282
Outflow smoothing only 0.45 0.29 to 0.65 223
Both reforms 0.67 0.57 to 0.76 333

Author’s calculations, 200,000 draws per regime.

0100200300Status quoAdditionality ruleOutflow smoothingBoth reformsEUR bnEUR 190 bnEUR 282 bnEUR 223 bnEUR 333 bn
Figure 7. Median real capital from EUR 500 bn under four policy regimes. Source: author’s simulation.

The difference between the status quo and the combined reform regime is about EUR 140 billion of real public capital, at no additional borrowing cost. To put the figure in perspective, it is larger than the entire 2026 federal core-budget investment programme. The additionality rule is the more powerful of the two reforms, because it acts on the larger leak. But outflow smoothing is the cheaper one politically, because it only requires the government to stop pressing for faster spending.

8. Growth Effects and the Cost of Real Capital

8.1 Re-estimating the GDP effect

The finance ministry estimates that, in the short run, GDP was about 0.5 percentage points higher in 2025 because of the fund. We can test the internal consistency of this claim. With nominal GDP of roughly EUR 4,450 billion and a standard public investment multiplier of about 1.1, an outflow of EUR 24 billion can only raise GDP by 0.5 percent if the real yield is about 0.84. That value lies above the 90th percentile of our distribution.

Using the full Monte Carlo distribution of the real yield, combined with a multiplier drawn from a triangular distribution between 0.8 and 1.5 (mode 1.1), we obtain the estimates in Table 11.

Table 11. Re-estimated GDP level effects of SVIK outflows. Author’s calculations.

Year Outflow (EUR bn) GDP effect, median (pp) 10th to 90th percentile (pp)
2025 24.0 0.23 0.14 to 0.35
2026 (Path B) 53.6 0.51 0.32 to 0.78

Author’s calculations.

For 2025, our median estimate is less than half the official one. For 2026, the much larger outflow brings the median to about half a percentage point, which is consistent with independent assessments: Scope Ratings, for example, estimated an average growth contribution of 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points a year over 2026 to 2030. The fund is therefore a meaningful source of demand. But the 2026 effect is achieved by more than doubling the outflow, and Section 5 shows that the marginal euro is the one most exposed to price leakage.

8.2 The effective financing cost of real capital

A second implication has not, to our knowledge, been quantified elsewhere. The fund is financed by federal borrowing, and German ten-year yields reached their highest level since 2009 in September 2026, at 3.64 percent on 28 September according to the Bundesbank, before easing to about 3.25 percent in early November. At a nominal borrowing cost of 3.25 percent, and a median real yield of 0.38, the annual interest cost per euro of genuinely additional real capital is 3.25 / 0.38, or roughly 8.6 percent. At the 10th percentile yield it rises to about 13.5 percent; at the 90th percentile it falls to about 5.8 percent.

This reframes the fiscal debate. A financing cost of about 3 percent for public infrastructure with a long-run social return of 5 to 8 percent looks like an excellent deal. An effective cost of 8.5 percent per unit of real capital looks much less obvious, and its justification depends heavily on the quality of the projects selected. The fiscal arithmetic of the fund is therefore more fragile than the headline borrowing rate suggests, and more sensitive to the European Central Bank’s tightening cycle, which lifted the deposit rate to 2.5 percent in September 2026.

8.3 Lessons from earlier large public investment pushes

Germany is not the first advanced economy to discover that large public investment programmes run into absorption limits. In the United States, the 2009 recovery programme was built on the promise of “shovel-ready” projects; its own architects later acknowledged that few projects were genuinely ready, and that infrastructure spending flowed much more slowly than transfers and tax measures. In Japan, the repeated public works packages of the 1990s supported construction employment but delivered disappointing growth effects, partly because projects were selected for speed of spending rather than for economic return.

Germany’s own recent history offers a closer parallel. The Municipal Investment Promotion Fund created in 2015, and extended in 2017 to cover school buildings, struggled for years with slow drawdowns, because municipalities lacked planning staff and the construction sector lacked capacity. The lesson of these episodes is consistent with our findings: when the bottleneck is administrative, money flows slowly; when the administrative bottleneck is removed without expanding physical capacity, money flows quickly but buys less.

8.4 The interaction with monetary policy and the Bund market

The absorption trap also interacts with the macroeconomic policy mix. Excess construction inflation feeds into measured investment deflators and, indirectly, into the inflation picture the European Central Bank is trying to stabilise after the Iran energy shock. The ECB raised its deposit rate twice in 2026, to 2.5 percent in September. Higher policy rates raise Bund yields, which raise the financing cost of the fund itself. A fund that leaks into prices therefore contributes, at the margin, to the tightening that makes it more expensive. This feedback loop is small in aggregate, because construction is a modest share of the euro area price index, but it adds to the case for smoothing outflows rather than accelerating them.

9. Policy Implications: Escaping the Absorption Trap

The analysis above does not argue against the fund. Germany’s infrastructure deficit is real, its rail network is visibly failing, and the short-term demand impulse has been valuable in a year of energy and trade shocks. The argument is that the fund’s design and management are optimised for the wrong metric. Ministries are judged on how much they spend; they should be judged on how much real capital they install. Five reforms follow.

First, introduce a binding additionality rule at ministry level. The 10 percent investment quota for the core budget is too blunt. Each ministry whose programmes are moved into the fund should be required to maintain its core-budget investment at least at its 2024 real level. Any reduction should automatically reduce the ministry’s allocation from the fund by the same amount.

Second, publish a real-output indicator alongside financial monitoring. The monitoring report already tracks euros paid and a progress index. It should add physical metrics (kilometres of track renewed, bridges replaced, square metres of school buildings refurbished) and a fund-specific price index for the contracts it finances. Without such data, neither Parliament nor the public can tell whether rising outflows mean more infrastructure or more inflation.

Third, smooth outflows to the sector’s absorption capacity. If the May to July pace persists, the fund will be exhausted around 2033. A deliberate plateau, for instance at the EUR 3.7 billion per month consistent with the statutory horizon, would reduce price leakage while preserving the full twelve-year profile. Faster is not better when the binding constraint is physical.

Fourth, use the fund’s long horizon to expand supply, not just demand. Construction firms will not invest in new machinery, training and digital planning capacity on the basis of one-year contracts. Multi-year framework agreements, covering for example the renewal of entire rail corridors over five to eight years, would give firms the certainty to expand capacity. Each percentage point of additional real capacity growth directly reduces the leakage ratio.

Fifth, reward productivity in procurement. German public procurement is still largely based on lowest price for given specifications. Allowing serial and modular construction, design-and-build contracts and productivity-linked incentives would raise output per worker, which is the only sustainable way to absorb a demand shock of this size without inflation.

10. Conclusion

The German special fund is often described as a test of whether Germany can still spend money on its own infrastructure. By autumn 2026 the answer to that question is yes: the monthly outflow has almost doubled within a year, and at its current pace the fund would be exhausted three years ahead of schedule. The more important test, and the one Germany is currently failing, is whether the money buys what it is supposed to buy.

Our evidence suggests that it buys much less. The share of nominal construction growth absorbed by excess prices tripled between April and August 2026. Road construction prices are rising at more than twice the rate of consumer prices. Budgetary substitution, documented by the ifo Institute and acknowledged in the structure of the federal budget, diverts a large share of the fund into financing what would have happened anyway. Combining both effects, the median euro borrowed adds only 38 cents of genuinely new real capital, and the effective financing cost of that capital is about 8.5 percent a year.

The original findings of this paper can be summarised in four numbers: a fund that could run dry by 2033; a price-leakage ratio that rose from 10 to 29 percent in four months; a real yield of 0.38 per borrowed euro; and an effective financing cost of real capital of about 8.5 percent. Together they describe an absorption trap. Escaping it does not require less ambition. It requires changing the question from how fast Germany can spend to how much Germany can build.

About this series. This paper is the first in a ten-part series on the German economy in 2026 published by Global Strategy Files. Forthcoming papers examine industrial energy elasticity in the second energy shock, the irreversibility threshold of German chemicals, a county-level map of the China shock in the automotive industry, rearmament and labour reallocation, the end of Bund scarcity, pension anxiety and household saving, the municipal fiscal crisis, the insolvency wave, and the Beveridge curve paradox of a shrinking workforce.

Annex A. Methodology

Data. Fund outflows are taken from the monitoring report of the Federal Ministry of Finance (June 2026), the Bundestag’s summary of the 2025 budget outturn (January 2026) and ministry statements on cumulative outflows to the end of July 2026. Construction orders and turnover are taken from Destatis press releases on the main construction trades (firms with 20 or more employees) for April to August 2026. Construction price indices (2021 = 100, including VAT) are taken from Destatis releases and from the long-run national tables published by the Thuringian statistical office. Capacity utilisation, backlog and wage data are taken from monthly construction monitors based on Destatis data.

Run-rate scenarios. Monthly rates are computed as differences between reported cumulative stocks divided by the number of months. The exhaustion date is the remaining envelope divided by the monthly rate, measured from the end of July 2026. The scenarios are mechanical extrapolations, not forecasts.

Excess-price leakage ratio. EPLR = ((1 + n) / (1 + r) minus 1 minus 0.02) / n, where n and r are nominal and real year-on-year turnover growth. Months with negative real growth are excluded because the ratio becomes unstable.

Monte Carlo. 200,000 independent draws, fixed random seed for reproducibility. Additionality: triangular (0.20, 0.47, 0.95). Leakage: triangular (0.10, 0.28, 0.45). Multiplier: triangular (0.8, 1.1, 1.5). Nominal GDP: EUR 4,450 billion. The 2026 outflow under Path B is EUR 53.6 billion (cumulative end-2026 of EUR 77.6 billion minus EUR 24.0 billion in 2025).

Limitations. The 2026 turnover series covers five months, so the leakage trend is indicative rather than statistically established. The turnover deflator covers all main construction trades, not only fund-financed projects. Additionality estimates differ in definition and method. The model treats price leakage as a loss of real capital to the public sector; from the perspective of the whole economy, part of it is a transfer to construction firms and workers. These limitations bias the results in different directions, and the qualitative conclusion, that the real yield is well below one half and has been falling as outflows accelerate, is robust to all of them.

Annex B. Data Tables

Table B1. Data used in this paper.

Indicator Value Date or period Source
SVIK total borrowing authority EUR 500 bn 2025 to 2036 SVIKG
Federal pillar / Länder pillar / KTF 300 / 100 / 100 EUR bn Total Federal government
Planned outflow 2025 EUR 37.2 bn 2025 BMF
Actual outflow 2025 EUR 24.0 bn 2025 BMF monitoring report
Undrawn funds within underspend EUR 8.3 bn of 13.3 bn 2025 Bundestag
Planned outflow 2026 EUR 58.9 bn 2026 Economic plan
Outflow to 30 April 2026 EUR 11.2 bn (28% of 39.7 bn) Jan to Apr 2026 BMF monitoring
Cumulative outflow EUR 51.1 bn to end July 2026 BMF
Road construction price index 149.3 (2021 = 100) August 2026 Destatis
Road construction prices +6.9% y/y August 2026 Destatis
Residential construction prices +5.5% y/y August 2026 Destatis
Consumer prices +2.9% y/y August 2026 Destatis
Construction orders, real +23.0% m/m; +17.3% y/y August 2026 Destatis
Civil engineering orders, real +36.4% y/y August 2026 Destatis
Orders index 111.0 (2025 average 92.8) August 2026 Destatis
Employment, main construction trades about 548,000 (+1.5% y/y) August 2026 Destatis
Capacity utilisation 73.5% Spring 2026 Construction monitor
Order backlog EUR 58.2 bn (4.6 months) Spring 2026 Construction monitor
Ten-year Bund yield 3.64% peak; 3.25% 28 Sep 2026; 6 Nov 2026 Bundesbank
ECB deposit rate 2.5% Since September 2026 ECB

Table B2. Long-run construction price indices for Germany.

Year Road construction index (2021 = 100) Residential buildings index (2021 = 100)
2000 60.5 60.9
2005 60.7 62.2
2010 72.0 70.8
2015 80.2 78.7
2020 95.3 91.6
2021 100.0 100.0
2025 139.3 133.9
August 2026 149.3 141.7

Source: Destatis, Thuringian statistical office.

Annex C. A Monthly Dashboard for the Absorption Trap

Because the evidence base is still thin, the most useful contribution this paper can make is to define what to watch. We propose six indicators, all published at least quarterly, that together signal whether Germany is escaping or deepening the absorption trap.

Table C1. Absorption-trap dashboard. Thresholds: author’s proposal.

Indicator Publication Warning threshold Current reading
Excess-price leakage ratio (this paper) Monthly, Destatis turnover data Above 25% for three consecutive months 27.5% (Jul), 29.3% (Aug): warning
Road minus residential construction price spread Quarterly, Destatis Above 2 pp 1.4 pp: watch
SVIK monthly run rate Monthly, BMF dashboard Above EUR 4.5 bn per month EUR 5.3 bn (May to Jul): warning
Civil engineering orders, three-month change Monthly, Destatis Above 10% 13.8% (Jun to Aug): warning
Construction employment growth Monthly, Destatis Below 2% while orders above 10% 1.5%: warning
Federal core-budget investment, ex fund Annual, budget Below 2024 real level Declining in transport: warning

Thresholds: author’s proposal.

Four of the six indicators were flashing warning signals in the autumn of 2026. The dashboard will be updated in future Global Strategy Files notes as new data become available.

References

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2026). Kommunaler Finanzreport 2026. Guetersloh, June 2026.

Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2026). Monitoringbericht zum Sondervermoegen Infrastruktur und Klimaneutralitaet. Berlin, June 2026.

Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2026). Investitionen der Bundessaeule. Berlin, September 2026.

Bundesregierung (2026). Investitionsoffensive fuer das ganze Land. Berlin, 19 October 2026.

Deutscher Bundestag (2026). Haushaltsabschluss 2025, hib 71/2026, 28 January 2026; Etat 2026: Wirtschaftsplan des Infrastruktur-Sondervermoegens.

Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer (2026). Autumn business survey, as reported by Reuters, 5 November 2026.

Destatis (2026). Press releases 217, 264, 304, 338 and 375 on orders and turnover in the main construction trades; press release 360 on construction prices, August 2026.

Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie (2026). Bundeshaushalt und Sondervermoegen Infrastruktur und Klima; press release 38/26, August 2026.

Sachverstaendigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2025). Jahresgutachten 2025/26, Chapter 2: Zusaetzlichkeit und Investitionsorientierung des Sondervermoegens verbessern.

Scope Ratings (2025). Germany: Ambitious 2025-26 Spending Plans Likely Delayed, Weighing on Near-term Growth. October 2025.

Thueringer Landesamt fuer Statistik (2026). Bauleistungspreise in Thueringen, Ausgabe 2026.

European Central Bank (2026). Monetary policy decisions, June and September 2026.

Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files

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