The Shadow Welfare State of Kinship
Abstract
In 2025, according to the joint study by AARP and the National Alliance for Caregiving, 63 million Americans, about one adult in four, were providing ongoing unpaid or partly paid care to a relative or friend with a chronic condition, a disability or the frailties of old age. Their number had risen by some 20 million, or 45 percent, in a decade. Nearly a quarter provided forty hours of care or more each week; almost half described their care as high-intensity; a third had been caregiving for five years or more. The average caregiver was 51 years old and lived with the person cared for. With the oldest baby boomers turning 80 in 2026, the number will continue to rise. Policy discussion of this phenomenon focuses on the burden it imposes on caregivers, the gaps in long-term care, the costs to employers and the need for paid leave, tax credits and respite services.
This article approaches family caregiving as an anthropological object: a vast, largely invisible system of exchange, obligation and meaning through which American society cares for its dependent members. Drawing on Marcel Mauss on reciprocity, David Schneider on American kinship, Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon on the genealogy of dependency, Viviana Zelizer on money and intimacy, Micaela di Leonardo on “kin work”, Eva Kittay on dependency work, Janelle Taylor on dementia and recognition, and Arnold van Gennep on rites of passage, it makes five claims. First, family caregiving constitutes a shadow welfare state of kinship, the largest long-term care system in the country, financed by the unpaid labour of relatives. Second, it is shaped by an ideology of the non-burden, a distinctively American dread of dependence that leads the old to refuse the very care on which they rely. Third, the growth of programmes paying relatives to care marks the emergence of a new figure, the kin-worker, who blurs the boundary between gift and wage. Fourth, in the care of people with dementia, caregivers act as guardians of personhood, sustaining through daily rituals of recognition the social existence of those who can no longer sustain it themselves. Fifth, caregiving is a passage without rites: a profound change of status that society neither marks nor ends, leaving millions in a prolonged and unacknowledged liminality.
Keywords: care, kinship, dependency, reciprocity, ageing, dementia, gender, United States
1. Introduction: one in four
The scenes are familiar to millions of Americans and almost invisible to everyone else. A woman in her fifties drives to her mother’s house every morning before work to give her pills, help her dress and prepare her breakfast, then returns in the evening to make dinner and put her to bed. A man in his sixties has stopped working to care for his wife, whose dementia now requires constant supervision; he has learned to bathe her, to manage her moods, to sleep in short shifts. A couple in their forties with two teenage children have moved the husband’s father into the converted den, and their household now revolves around his medical appointments, his meals and his falls. A young man in his twenties, an only child, manages the care of a father with multiple sclerosis while trying to finish college. None of these people would describe themselves as workers. Most would not even use the word “caregiver” until someone suggested it. They would say that they are helping their mother, looking after their wife, taking care of their dad.
The AARP and National Alliance for Caregiving study, Caregiving in the US 2025, gave this phenomenon its numbers. Some 63 million Americans had provided ongoing care in the past year to an adult or child with a complex medical condition or disability. The vast majority, around 59 million, cared for adults, and 70 percent of those cared for were 65 or older. Caregivers were increasingly diverse in race, income and generation; a third were under 50. Most remained unpaid, though some 11 million received some form of compensation. Many reported poor health, financial strain and isolation. The report’s authors spoke of a “crisis point” and of care as “a daily reality that 63 million Americans shoulder every day”.
The policy literature on family caregiving is extensive and its conclusions are well established. Caregivers save the public and private health systems enormous sums; AARP has estimated the economic value of their unpaid labour in the hundreds of billions of dollars a year. They suffer physical and psychological harm. Many reduce their working hours or leave employment, with consequences for their own incomes and retirement security. They lack training for the medical tasks they perform. They need respite, workplace flexibility, financial support and integration into the health system. Policy proposals follow: caregiver tax credits, paid family leave, Medicaid payment for family caregivers, training programmes, respite services.
This article takes these findings for granted and asks a different set of questions. What kind of social institution is family caregiving? What exchanges, obligations and meanings structure it? How does it reflect, and how does it transform, American kinship? What does it reveal about the place of dependency in American culture? These questions are anthropological in the classic sense: they treat a familiar practice as something to be explained rather than assumed.
The article proceeds in six steps. Section 2 describes family caregiving as a shadow welfare state of kinship. Section 3 analyses the American ideology of the non-burden. Section 4 examines the emergence of paid kin care and the figure of the kin-worker. Section 5 turns to dementia and the guardianship of personhood. Section 6 considers caregiving as a passage without rites. Section 7 concludes.
2. The shadow welfare state of kinship
2.1 The largest care system in the country
Every society must care for those of its members who cannot care for themselves: infants, the sick, the disabled, the frail old. The ways in which it does so are among its most fundamental institutions. Anthropologists have long recognised that, in most human societies throughout history, this care was provided primarily by kin, organised by rules of descent, marriage and residence. The modern welfare state transferred part of this burden to public institutions: hospitals, pensions, nursing homes, home-care services. Comparative social policy distinguishes welfare regimes by the extent of this transfer. The Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen described “familialist” regimes, such as those of southern Europe, in which the family remains the primary provider of care, and “de-familialised” regimes, such as those of Scandinavia, in which the state assumes much of it.
The United States is usually classified as a liberal welfare regime, in which the market plays the leading role. In the domain of long-term care, however, this classification is misleading. Medicare, the public health programme for the elderly, does not pay for long-term custodial care. Private long-term care insurance covers only a small fraction of the population. Medicaid, the programme for low-income Americans, pays for nursing homes and some home care, but only after people have exhausted their assets. Paid home-care workers, a workforce of several million, are expensive for families paying out of pocket and chronically scarce. In practice, the overwhelming majority of long-term care for older and disabled Americans is provided by relatives, unpaid.
In this domain, then, the United States is not a liberal regime but a familialist one, in disguise. Its long-term care system is, to a large extent, its families. The 63 million caregivers identified in 2025 constitute the largest care workforce in the country, many times larger than the paid home-care and nursing-home workforce combined. They perform not only personal care, such as bathing, dressing and feeding, but increasingly medical tasks, such as managing medications, wound care, injections and the operation of medical equipment, which in earlier decades would have been performed by nurses.
2.2 How the shadow system works
The phrase “shadow welfare state” has been used by political scientists to describe the hidden ways in which American social provision operates through tax breaks and private benefits rather than public programmes. Family caregiving extends this idea into the domain of kinship. It is a welfare state financed not by taxes but by time, not administered by officials but by relatives, and not governed by law but by the obligations of kinship.
Like any welfare system, it has its rules of eligibility and allocation, though they are unwritten. Who cares for whom is determined by kinship relations, residence, gender, employment and the history of the family. Spouses care first, if they are able. Then adult children, with daughters more likely than sons to become primary caregivers, and the child who lives closest, or who is unmarried, or who has the most flexible job, often taking on the role. Siblings negotiate, sometimes explicitly, often through unspoken expectations and resentments, the distribution of the burden. More distant relatives, friends and neighbours provide occasional help.
Like any welfare system, it also has its inequalities. Families with more members, more resources and more flexible employment can distribute the burden and purchase supplementary help. Families with few members, low incomes and rigid jobs concentrate the burden on one person, who may be forced to leave work and fall into poverty. The shadow welfare state of kinship reproduces, and often deepens, the inequalities of the society in which it operates.
2.3 The geography of care
The shadow welfare state of kinship also has a geography, and it is here that the transformations of American mobility discussed in the first article of this series become relevant. A care system based on kinship requires kin to be near. For decades, the dispersal of American families across the continent made this difficult: the daughter in California could not bathe her mother in Ohio. Long-distance caregivers, who manage care by telephone, coordinate paid helpers and travel frequently, have long been a significant fraction of caregivers, and they describe a particular form of strain: guilt at not being present, exhaustion from travel, dependence on strangers they cannot supervise.
The decline in mobility and the re-kinning of migration change this geography. When adult children move to be near ageing parents, or bring parents to live with or near them, the shadow welfare state gains capacity. The Caregiving in the US 2025 finding that the average caregiver lives with the person cared for reflects, in part, this re-concentration of kin. But the same forces that bring families together also concentrate the burden. A household that takes in an ageing parent becomes, in effect, a small care institution, with all the costs and conflicts that implies.
The geography of care also includes the young. One caregiver in three, according to the 2025 study, is under 50, and a growing literature documents “young carers”, adolescents and young adults who care for parents or grandparents. For these young people, caregiving collides with the life stages of education, first employment and the formation of their own households. The prolonged liminality of young adulthood, discussed in the first article of this series, is compounded when the young adult is also a caregiver. Their passage into adulthood is shaped, sometimes delayed, by obligations their peers do not share.
2.4 Why it stays in the shadow
The question is why this system remains largely invisible. Part of the answer lies in American kinship ideology. David Schneider, in his classic analysis of American kinship, argued that the family is understood as the domain of “diffuse, enduring solidarity”, governed by love rather than by contract or exchange. What family members do for one another is not work but love; it is not counted, paid or recognised in the way that market labour is. The language of caregivers themselves reflects this: they are not “working” but “helping”, not “employed” but “taking care of Mom”.
This ideology has consequences. Because family care is understood as love, it is not recognised as labour, and its costs are borne privately. Because it is not recognised as labour, it does not enter the national accounts, the employment statistics or, until recently, the political agenda. And because it is not visible, the public systems that depend on it can continue to assume it will be there. The shadow welfare state is kept in the shadow by the very cultural meanings that sustain it.
This is the first claim of this article: family caregiving constitutes a shadow welfare state of kinship, the largest long-term care system in the United States, financed by the unpaid labour of relatives and governed by the unwritten rules of kinship. Its invisibility is not an accident but a product of American kinship ideology, which classifies family care as love rather than labour.
3. The ideology of the non-burden
3.1 “I don’t want to be a burden”
Ask older Americans what they fear most about ageing, and many will give a version of the same answer: not death, not pain, but dependence. “I don’t want to be a burden on my children” is perhaps the most common sentence in American conversations about old age. It appears in surveys, in clinical encounters, in end-of-life planning, in the decisions people make about where to live and what care to accept. Physicians and social workers report that fear of being a burden is among the most frequent reasons older patients give for refusing help, delaying care or choosing to move into institutions rather than relatives’ homes.
This fear is not universal. In many societies, dependence in old age is expected, legitimate and even honoured. In Confucian traditions, filial piety obliges children to care for their parents, and an elder who is cared for by his children has achieved a culturally valued status. In many African and South Asian societies, elders who live with and are supported by their descendants occupy positions of authority. The anthropologist Lawrence Cohen, in his study of old age in India, showed how the frail body of the elder became a site of family obligation and moral reflection. Dependence in these contexts is not a failure but a phase of life, the reverse side of the dependence of children on parents.
3.2 The genealogy of dependency
The American dread of dependence has a history. The political theorists Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, in a celebrated essay on the “genealogy of dependency”, traced how the meaning of the word changed in Anglo-American culture. In preindustrial society, dependence was a normal condition: most people were dependent on a lord, a master or a household head, and dependence carried no stigma. With the rise of industrial capitalism and wage labour, independence came to be defined by the wage: the man who earned his own living was independent, and those who did not, wives, children, paupers, were dependent. Over the twentieth century, as women entered the labour force and the welfare state expanded, dependence was increasingly stigmatised as a personal and moral failure, associated with welfare recipients and the “undeserving”. By the late twentieth century, Fraser and Gordon argued, dependency had become a term of abuse, and the ideal citizen was the fully independent individual.
This ideology is reinforced by American kinship norms. Schneider’s analysis showed that the American family, organised around the neolocal nuclear household, values the independence of each generation. Children are raised to leave and establish their own households; parents are expected to remain self-sufficient in old age, financially and physically. The reciprocity between generations is understood as flowing in one direction: parents give to children, who in turn give to their own children. The idea that children owe a debt to their parents, to be repaid in care, sits uneasily with this model.
3.3 The refusal of the return gift
Marcel Mauss’s theory of the gift helps to understand the cultural logic here. In many societies, intergenerational relations are understood as a long cycle of reciprocity: parents give life, nurture and resources to their children, and children return the gift by caring for their parents in old age. The care of elders is a return gift, the completion of a cycle, and receiving it is not a humiliation but a fulfilment. The elder is not a burden but a creditor collecting a debt.
The American ideology of the non-burden breaks this cycle. It refuses the return gift. The elder who insists that he does not want to be a burden is saying, in effect, that the care he gave his children created no debt that they should repay. He prefers to pay strangers for care, or to enter an institution, rather than to receive care from his children as the completion of a reciprocal relationship. This refusal is often experienced as generosity, as a gift to the children of their freedom. But it also expresses the American conception of the self as an independent being whose worth depends on not needing others.
The paradox is that the refusal is largely unrealisable. The shadow welfare state of kinship described in Section 2 exists precisely because most older Americans, despite their wishes, end up depending on relatives. The ideology of the non-burden does not prevent dependence; it makes dependence shameful when it comes. Elders who need care experience it as a defeat, and caregivers who provide it must manage not only the practical tasks but the emotional work of minimising their parents’ sense of being a burden: pretending it is no trouble, concealing their own exhaustion, framing their help as voluntary and pleasurable.
This emotional work has costs. Caregivers report that they cannot express their own difficulties without hurting the person they care for. Elders report that they conceal their needs to avoid imposing. The result is a pattern of mutual concealment that impoverishes the relationship and delays necessary decisions. Clinicians working with families describe the moment when an elder finally accepts that he needs help as one of the most difficult in the course of ageing, precisely because it requires abandoning a lifelong identity as an independent person.
This is the second claim of this article: American family caregiving is shaped by an ideology of the non-burden, a culturally specific dread of dependence that leads older Americans to refuse the return gift of care from their children. This ideology does not prevent dependence, which is nearly universal at the end of life, but it makes dependence shameful and burdens caregivers with the emotional work of concealing it.
4. The kin-worker
4.1 Paying relatives to care
One of the most significant, and least discussed, developments in American caregiving is the spread of programmes that pay relatives to care. Every state Medicaid programme now pays family caregivers through at least one home-care programme, according to a 2026 analysis by KFF. Most do so through “self-directed” programmes, in which the person receiving care is given a budget and may hire a caregiver of his or her choice, including a relative. Some states operate “structured family caregiving” programmes that pay a stipend to a relative living with the care recipient. The Department of Veterans Affairs operates a programme of stipends for family caregivers of seriously injured veterans. Some states have created programmes for people who do not qualify for Medicaid. The Caregiving in the US 2025 study found that some 11 million family caregivers received some form of compensation.
The rules governing these programmes are revealing. Federal Medicaid law, in certain programmes, prohibits payment to “legally responsible relatives”, principally spouses and parents of minor children, on the grounds that they already have a legal duty to provide care. Other programmes, through waivers, allow such payment. States differ widely in whom they allow to be paid, at what rates, and under what conditions of training and supervision. The pandemic led several states to expand payment to spouses and parents temporarily, and some made these changes permanent.
4.2 Hostile worlds
The sociologist Viviana Zelizer, in The Purchase of Intimacy (2005), challenged what she called the “hostile worlds” view of money and intimate relations: the view that money corrupts intimacy and intimacy should be kept free of money. In practice, Zelizer showed, people constantly mix money and intimacy, but they do so carefully, using different forms of payment and different meanings to mark different kinds of relationships. A gift of money from a parent to a child is not the same as a wage; an allowance is not the same as a salary; a dowry is not the same as a purchase. People “earmark” money to distinguish relationships, and the ways they do so reveal the moral structure of their social world.
Paid family caregiving is a site of intense earmarking. The relative who receives payment for care is neither an employee in the ordinary sense nor an unpaid family member. Caregivers who are paid often describe ambivalence about the arrangement: gratitude for the money, which allows them to continue caring without falling into poverty, mixed with discomfort at being “paid to love” their parent or spouse. Siblings may resent the paid caregiver, or feel relieved of their own obligations. The care recipient may feel more comfortable receiving care that is paid, because it reduces the sense of being a burden, or less comfortable, because it turns a family relationship into a commercial one.
The prohibition on paying spouses in some programmes reflects the hostile worlds view in law. It assumes that marriage entails an unpaid obligation of care, and that paying a spouse would corrupt the relationship or represent an unjustified use of public funds for something that should be done for free. The gradual relaxation of these prohibitions in some states marks a shift in the moral boundary: the state increasingly recognises that even the most intimate obligations of care can be labour deserving of payment.
4.3 A new figure
The result is the emergence of a new social figure, which this article calls the kin-worker: a person who provides care to a relative within the obligations of kinship, and who is paid for doing so by the state or another institution. The kin-worker is not new in human history; many societies have recognised forms of compensated care within kinship. But in the American context, the figure is new and its status uncertain. The kin-worker is trained, registered, sometimes supervised, and receives a wage, often low. But the kin-worker’s employer, in the self-directed model, is the very person cared for, and the relationship that structures the work is not a contract but a kinship tie.
The anthropologist Elana Buch, in her ethnography of home-care workers in Chicago, showed how paid caregivers who are not relatives work to create forms of quasi-kinship with their clients, to make the work meaningful. The kin-worker faces the opposite problem: preserving kinship within a relationship that has become, in part, employment. Kin-workers describe struggling to separate the hours they are paid for from the hours they would provide anyway; to maintain their own identity as a daughter or husband rather than an aide; to negotiate with siblings who regard them as having a job rather than a burden.
The spread of the kin-worker represents a partial de-familialisation of care, in Esping-Andersen’s terms, but of an unusual kind. The state does not take over care; it pays the family to continue providing it. The shadow welfare state of kinship is partly brought into the light, given a budget and subjected to rules, without ceasing to be a system of family care. This hybrid model may become the dominant form of long-term care in the United States as the baby boom generation ages and the paid care workforce fails to keep pace.
4.4 The two economies of care
The kin-worker exists alongside another figure: the paid home-care aide who is not a relative. This workforce, numbering several million, is predominantly female, disproportionately composed of women of colour and immigrants, and among the lowest paid in the American economy. The sociologist Arlie Hochschild described the “global care chains” through which women from poorer countries migrate to care for the families of richer ones, leaving their own children in the care of relatives at home. Elana Buch’s ethnography of home-care workers in Chicago showed how these workers sustain the independence of their elderly clients, the very independence that the ideology of the non-burden values, at the cost of their own economic insecurity.
The two economies of care, the unpaid or partly paid care of kin and the low-paid care of strangers, are linked. When families can afford paid help, the burden on kin is reduced; when paid help is scarce or expensive, kin must fill the gap. The chronic shortage of home-care workers, which industry groups and states describe as a crisis, pushes more of the burden back onto families. Programmes that pay kin can be read, in part, as a response to this shortage: if the state cannot recruit enough paid strangers, it pays relatives instead. The kin-worker thus emerges at the intersection of a cultural shift in the meaning of family care and a structural failure of the paid care labour market.
This is the third claim of this article: the growth of programmes paying relatives to care marks the emergence of the kin-worker, a new figure who blurs the boundary between the gift of family care and the wage of paid labour. The moral and legal debates around this figure, especially concerning spouses, reveal shifting boundaries between intimacy and money in American culture.
5. Guardians of personhood
5.1 “Does she still recognise you?”
Among the people cared for by American families, those living with dementia occupy a special place. More than seven million Americans aged 65 and older are estimated to live with Alzheimer’s disease, according to the Alzheimer’s Association, and many more with other forms of dementia. Most live at home, cared for by relatives. Dementia care is, by most measures, the most demanding form of family caregiving: it lasts for years, requires increasing supervision, involves behavioural as well as physical challenges, and gradually transforms the person cared for.
The anthropologist Janelle Taylor, in an essay drawn from her experience of caring for her mother, examined the question that friends and acquaintances repeatedly asked her: “Does she still recognise you?” The question, Taylor observed, assumes that the moral worth of the relationship, and perhaps of the person, depends on cognitive recognition. If the mother no longer knows her daughter’s name, the relationship is assumed to be over, and the mother, in some sense, to be gone. Taylor rejected this assumption. Her mother, she argued, continued to be a person and to participate in a relationship, through gestures, moods, responses to touch and voice, even when she could no longer name her daughter. The relationship was sustained not by recognition from the mother but by the care of the daughter.
5.2 Social death and its refusal
Anthropologists and sociologists have used the term social death for the condition of people who are still biologically alive but no longer treated as full members of society. The concept has been applied to slaves, prisoners and the dying in hospitals. People with advanced dementia are at risk of social death: they may be spoken about rather than to, excluded from decisions, treated as bodies to be managed rather than persons to be engaged. The phrase “the long goodbye”, widely used for Alzheimer’s disease, expresses the idea that the person is lost before the body dies.
Family caregivers often resist this social death. Their daily practices of care, as described in ethnographic and memoir literature, include many that serve no strictly practical purpose: dressing the person in the clothes he used to like, playing her favourite music, telling stories about the family, celebrating birthdays and holidays, maintaining the rituals of the household. These practices are rituals of recognition, in which the caregiver recognises the person on his or her behalf. They sustain the social existence of the person cared for: the person continues to be a father, a wife, a grandmother, because the caregiver continues to treat him or her as one.
The philosopher Eva Kittay, writing from her experience as the mother of a daughter with severe cognitive disabilities, argued that human dignity cannot rest on cognitive capacities alone, since many humans lack them. It rests rather on being “some mother’s child”, on being embedded in relationships of care. The person who cannot claim recognition receives it through the care of others. Kittay used the term “dependency work” for the labour of caring for those who cannot care for themselves, and argued that a just society must support those who perform it.
5.3 Care as the making of persons
In anthropological terms, this means that personhood is not simply a property of individuals but a social achievement, produced and maintained by others. Marilyn Strathern, in her work on Melanesian personhood, described persons as composed of relations, made by the actions of those around them. The American cultural model of the person, by contrast, emphasises individual autonomy, rationality and self-possession, the very capacities that dementia destroys. Under the American model, the person with advanced dementia is a person diminished. Under a relational model, the person is sustained as long as the relations that compose him or her are maintained.
Family caregivers of people with dementia thus perform, often without articulating it, a relational model of personhood that runs counter to the dominant American model. They are guardians of personhood, keeping alive through their care the social existence of someone who can no longer sustain it alone. This is not only an emotional or moral task; it is a form of cultural work that challenges, from within American families, the identification of personhood with autonomy.
This is the fourth claim of this article: in the care of people with dementia, family caregivers act as guardians of personhood, sustaining through daily rituals of recognition the social existence of those at risk of social death. In doing so, they enact a relational model of the person that contradicts the dominant American identification of personhood with autonomy.
6. A passage without rites
6.1 Becoming a caregiver
Van Gennep showed that every significant change of social status is marked, in most societies, by a rite of passage: birth, initiation, marriage, death. The rites serve to separate the person from the old status, to guide him or her through a liminal period, and to incorporate the person into the new status, with its rights and obligations recognised by the community.
Becoming a family caregiver is a profound change of status. It transforms a person’s daily life, relationships, identity and often employment. It may last for years. It changes the relationship with the person cared for, inverting the roles of parent and child or transforming the relationship of spouses. Yet it is marked by no rite. There is no ceremony when one becomes a caregiver, no announcement, no recognition by the community. The transition is usually gradual: one helps with shopping, then with medications, then with bathing, and only later realises that one has become a caregiver. Many people never adopt the term at all. Caregiver organisations report that one of their chief difficulties is reaching people who do not identify themselves as caregivers.
6.2 Prolonged liminality
The absence of rites leaves caregivers in a state of prolonged liminality. They are no longer simply sons, daughters or spouses, but not quite workers either. They occupy a status that society does not name, with responsibilities that are not defined and rights that are not recognised. Victor Turner described liminal persons as “betwixt and between”, invisible in the ordinary structure of society. Family caregivers often describe precisely this experience: invisibility at work, where their responsibilities are unknown; invisibility among friends, who drift away; invisibility in the medical system, where they perform crucial tasks but are rarely consulted.
Turner also noted that liminality can produce communitas, a bond among those who share the threshold condition. Caregiver support groups, online communities and advocacy organisations can be read in this light: as spaces in which liminal persons recognise one another and create, among themselves, the recognition that society denies. The language that circulates in these spaces, of “caregiver burnout”, “compassion fatigue” and “ambiguous loss”, is a vocabulary invented to name an experience the broader culture does not name.
6.3 Kin work and gender
Liminality is not equally distributed. Women make up the majority of family caregivers and the large majority of those providing the most intensive care. The anthropologist Micaela di Leonardo, in a classic essay, described “kin work”: the largely female labour of maintaining family ties through visits, letters, cards, telephone calls, gifts, the organisation of holidays and the care of the sick. Kin work, she argued, is real labour, essential to the reproduction of kinship, but it is invisible because it is classified as love and assigned to women as a natural extension of their roles.
Family caregiving is the most intensive form of kin work. It is assigned to women by the same cultural logic: daughters rather than sons, wives more than husbands, daughters-in-law sometimes more than sons. Men do provide substantial care, especially to spouses, and their share has grown. But the expectation that women will take on the role when a parent declines remains strong, and its costs, in lost earnings, reduced retirement savings and health, fall disproportionately on women. The passage without rites is, to a large extent, a female passage.
6.4 The end without rites
The absence of rites marks the end of caregiving as well as its beginning. Caregiving usually ends with the death of the person cared for, or with his or her move into an institution. At that point, the caregiver experiences a double loss: of the person, and of the role that has structured his or her life for years. The funeral, as described in the previous article of this series, marks the death; nothing marks the end of the caregiving. The former caregiver must return to a life that has continued without him or her: a career interrupted, friendships lapsed, a household reorganised around care that is no longer needed.
Grief researchers have noted that caregivers often begin grieving long before the death, in “anticipatory grief”, and that the end of caregiving can bring relief as well as sorrow, a mixture that many find difficult to acknowledge. Without a rite of incorporation, there is no socially recognised moment at which the former caregiver is welcomed back into ordinary life, thanked for the years of care, and released from the liminal status. Many former caregivers describe a period of disorientation, in which they do not know who they are without the role.
This is the fifth claim of this article: family caregiving is a passage without rites, a profound change of status that American society neither marks at its beginning nor closes at its end. Caregivers, predominantly women, live in a prolonged liminality, invisible in work, friendship and medicine, and find recognition mainly among themselves.
7. Conclusion: making care visible
Family caregiving is one of the largest social institutions in the United States, and one of the least seen. Some 63 million Americans perform it; they constitute the backbone of the nation’s long-term care system; their numbers will grow as the population ages. Yet their work remains classified as love rather than labour, and their status remains unmarked by any rite.
The anthropological perspective reveals the deep cultural roots of this situation. The shadow welfare state of kinship exists because American kinship ideology defines family care as love, and because public policy has relied on this definition to avoid assuming the costs of long-term care. The ideology of the non-burden, rooted in the American dread of dependence, makes care shameful to receive and difficult to give. The emergence of the kin-worker shows the strain on the boundary between intimacy and money. The guardianship of personhood in dementia care reveals a relational model of the person at odds with American individualism. And the passage without rites leaves caregivers in a liminality that society does not acknowledge.
Two paths lie ahead. One continues the present arrangement, in which families bear the costs of care with limited support, and caregivers absorb the consequences in their health, incomes and lives. The other recognises family caregiving as a central social institution, supports it with resources and rights, and gives it cultural visibility. The second path requires not only policy, such as paid leave, financial support, respite and training, but also a cultural change: a revaluation of dependence as a normal part of human life, and of care as a form of work and of citizenship.
There are signs of such a change. The spread of paid family caregiving, the growth of caregiver advocacy, the national strategy for family caregivers adopted by the federal government in 2022, and the increasing public discussion of care, all point towards greater visibility. Rituals of recognition are beginning to appear: caregiver appreciation events, employer programmes, public acknowledgement of caregivers in political speeches. These are small steps. But a society that learns to mark the passage into caregiving and out of it, to name the work and honour those who do it, will have taken a significant step towards making its shadow welfare state a recognised part of its social contract. And a culture that learns to see dependence not as failure but as a phase of life that every person will pass through may find that the burden is lighter when it is shared.
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Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files
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