Decoded

Becoming Chinese: Chinamaxxing, Reverse Exoticism and the Mirror of the Other

Decoded analysis cover: Becoming Chinese: Chinamaxxing, Reverse Exoticism and the Mirror of the Other
Anthropology of Contemporary China | Article 10 of 10

Abstract

In January 2026, a Chinese American TikTok creator told her followers: “Tomorrow you are turning Chinese.” Within weeks, millions of young Westerners were posting videos of themselves drinking hot water, wearing house slippers, cooking congee, practising baduanjin qigong and soaking their feet, often captioned “you met me at a very Chinese time in my life”. Chinese state media hailed “Becoming Chinese” as proof of rising soft power; Chinese American creators greeted it with a mix of pride and suspicion.

This final article of the series turns the anthropological gaze around. Drawing on Edward Said on Orientalism, Marcel Mauss on techniques of the body, Pierre Bourdieu on habitus, Rey Chow on self-ethnography and Xiaomei Chen on Occidentalism, it makes five claims. First, “Chinamaxxing” is a therapeutic exoticism: it desires China not as a mystery to be mastered but as a remedy. Second, it adopts not Chinese ideas or politics but Chinese techniques of the body, and in doing so turns habitus, which is normally unconscious, into a costume. Third, it is above all a mirror, in which Western youth express their own fatigue with costly, unstable lives. Fourth, seen from China, it is read as soft power, yet it celebrates a domestic order that Chinese youth themselves associate with their parents and, in part, with the past. Fifth, set against the nine previous articles, it reveals what the outside gaze does not see: the precarity, solitude and improvisation of China’s own young.

Keywords: exoticism, Orientalism, techniques of the body, habitus, soft power, social media, China and the West

1. Introduction: “you are the chosen one”

On 5 January 2026, Sherry Zhu, a 23-year-old Chinese American creator, posted a short video. “I’m gonna let you in on a little secret, OK? Tomorrow you are turning Chinese,” she said. “And I know that sounds intimidating, but there is no point in fighting it now. Because you are the chosen one.” The video reached 2.7 million views (NBC News via NBC San Diego). Her tips were simple: drink hot water, wear house slippers, and, as she put it, “look good, feel good and manifest good things in the new year” (The Straits Times via Asia News Network).

What followed has been called “Becoming Chinese” or “Chinamaxxing”. It built on an older meme, “you met me at a very Chinese time in my life”, a parody of the closing line of the film Fight Club, first posted in April 2025 (China News Service). By late January, Chinese state media reported that related topics had drawn hundreds of millions of views abroad (Xinhua via Yangtse Evening Post).

The previous nine articles of this series examined Chinese social life from the inside: solitary deaths, paid children, simulated offices, nostalgia, bride prices, examinations, temples, task partners and digital ancestors. This final article examines China from the outside, or rather examines the outside looking at China. Anthropology has long studied how societies imagine others. Chinamaxxing is an unusually pure case, because it is not about knowledge of China but about the desire to borrow from it.

A note on method

The article is interpretive and documentary. It draws on international and Chinese press coverage, including Chinese official media, and on the self-presentation of creators as reported there. It does not rest on fieldwork with participants. The trend is recent and fast-moving, and its scale is measured mostly by view counts, which indicate attention rather than practice.

2. The phenomenon: a checklist for becoming Chinese

The repertoire

Reporting on the trend describes a remarkably stable checklist, posted and repeated by creators:

  • a glass of warm or hot water in the morning, often with goji berries;
  • house slippers indoors;
  • a warm breakfast: congee, bone broth, steamed buns;
  • herbal drinks such as boiled-apple tea, soups with snow fungus, jujube dates;
  • baduanjin or other qigong exercises, walking in the sun, foot soaking before bed, going to bed early;
  • for the Lunar New Year of 17 February 2026, red clothes and red nails, and “shedding” bad habits and relationships before the Year of the Snake ended.

Sources: NBC News via NBC Washington; The Straits Times via Asia News Network; China News Service.

One American health influencer thanked the “becoming Chinese community” for persuading him to drink warm water every morning, saying his gut health had never been better (The Straits Times via Asia News Network).

The tone

Like much of the youth culture examined in this series, Chinamaxxing is half-serious. Its founding meme was, in the words of the online database Know Your Meme, “ultimately meaningless and purposefully absurd” (NBC News via NBC Washington). Yet participants adopt the habits in earnest, track their results and recommend them to others. Irony and sincerity coexist, as they did in the young Chinese temple visitors of the seventh article.

Mixed feelings among Chinese Americans

Chinese American reactions have been ambivalent. Some welcomed the trend as a reversal of a long history of contempt. “For a long time, Chinese culture was stereotyped as poor, rude, uneducated, smelly or loud,” said one Chinese Italian TikTok user; now, she said, people were seeing it as a culture with centuries of history and wisdom (NBC News via NBC Boston). Others were wary. A 24-year-old Chinese American worried that people were using a culture they had spent their lives mocking “just to get your 15 seconds”, and that “it almost makes it feel like we’re the laughingstock again” (NBC News via NBC Washington). Memories of anti-Asian attacks during the pandemic shadowed the celebration.

3. Orientalism inverted? Therapeutic exoticism

Said’s Orient

Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) argued that Western representations of the East were not innocent curiosities but a system of knowledge bound up with imperial power. The Orient was constructed as the West’s opposite: irrational, sensual, despotic, timeless. To know it was to dominate it. Chinese culture was long subjected to a version of this gaze, oscillating between the exotic, the decadent and the threatening, the “yellow peril”.

What is different now

Chinamaxxing borrows some of the old repertoire: ancient wisdom, timeless habits, mysterious energy. Critics have pointed out that it turns China into a wellness fantasy that ignores its real contradictions (88tumble). Yet three features distinguish it from classic Orientalism.

First, its object is not a dominated society but a peer and rival power. China in 2026 is the world’s second economy and a technological competitor. Exoticism here does not express domination; if anything, it expresses a sense that the other side may be doing something right.

Second, its desire is therapeutic rather than cognitive or erotic. Classic Orientalism wanted to know, possess or consume the East. Chinamaxxing wants to be healed by it: to sleep better, digest better, feel calmer. China appears not as a mystery to be mastered but as a remedy to be taken.

Third, its brokers are often Chinese themselves. The trend was launched and guided by Chinese American creators, who explain, curate and joke about their own culture for non-Chinese audiences.

Self-ethnography and its risks

Rey Chow described a phenomenon she called self-ethnography: members of a culture that has been exoticised by others staging their own culture for external viewers, sometimes reproducing the very images imposed on them. Chinese American creators in the Chinamaxxing trend occupy this position with self-awareness. They present habits from their own families, hot water, slippers, soups, with affection and irony, turning what was once the target of mockery into a mark of distinction. In doing so, they reclaim the old stigma, but they also risk fixing Chinese identity in a set of domestic clichés.

One might call the result therapeutic exoticism: an exoticism without empire, organised around the body and the household, in which the other is valued for its capacity to soothe the self.

4. Habitus as costume: borrowing the techniques of the body

Mauss’s techniques

In a famous lecture of 1934, Marcel Mauss proposed that every society has its own techniques of the body: ways of walking, sleeping, swimming, sitting, eating and resting, learned so early that they feel natural. He noticed, for example, that French nurses in a hospital had begun to walk like the American women they saw in films. Techniques of the body, he concluded, are transmitted by imitation of prestigious others.

Pierre Bourdieu later built on this idea with the concept of habitus: the durable, embodied dispositions through which a social group’s history becomes second nature in its members. Habitus is, by definition, mostly unconscious. One does not choose to sit or to eat in a particular way; one simply does.

What exactly is borrowed

The striking feature of Chinamaxxing is the level at which it borrows. It does not adopt Chinese philosophy, religion or politics. It adopts techniques of the body: what to drink, what to wear on the feet, how to start the day, how to stretch, how to warm the body before sleep. These are precisely the domain Mauss described, the most ordinary, least ideological layer of culture. Mauss’s nurses imitated the prestigious walk of Hollywood actresses. Western youth in 2026 imitate the prestigious calm, or perceived health, of Chinese households.

That the imitation passes through the body helps to explain its ease. Adopting a technique requires no belief. Hot water can be drunk by anyone, without accepting any theory of qi. The body offers a way of “becoming” another culture without committing to it intellectually or politically.

The paradox of conscious habitus

Yet something changes when habitus is borrowed. A habit that Chinese families practise unthinkingly, slippers at the door, a thermos of hot water, is adopted by Western creators deliberately, filmed, labelled and displayed. What was second nature becomes a performance. Habitus becomes a costume.

The costume is not necessarily inauthentic. Mauss’s point was precisely that techniques of the body are always acquired by imitation, and that today’s affectation may be tomorrow’s second nature. Some participants may continue drinking warm water long after the trend has passed. But for now, Chinamaxxing displays a culture in the form of a checklist, a body regime that one can put on and take off, which is the opposite of how habitus normally works.

Chinese wellness among Chinese youth

There is an irony here that only becomes visible from inside China. The practices celebrated abroad, warm water, goji berries, foot soaking, early nights, are associated in Chinese popular culture with middle age and with parents. Young Chinese have for years joked about “punk wellness” (朋克养生): staying up late and then drinking goji tea, or putting goji berries in beer. What young Westerners adopt as an aspirational regimen is, for many young Chinese, the habitus of their parents, half-mocked and half-practised.

5. The mirror: what Western youth say about themselves

A protest in slippers?

Anthropologists have long observed that images of others are often more revealing about those who produce them than about those they depict. Chinamaxxing is, above all, a mirror.

Chinese state media offered one reading of what it reflects. A commentary on CGTN argued that the trend expresses Western youth’s deep dissatisfaction with their governments, their anxiety over shrinking opportunities, rising education costs and housing prices, and their disgust with polarisation, gun violence and isolation; it called the trend “an online protest by Western youth” (CGTN). This interpretation is self-serving, but it is not baseless. Many Western commentators made related points, if in less political terms.

Cheap care in expensive societies

A more modest reading starts from what is actually adopted. The Chinamaxxing checklist consists almost entirely of practices that cost nothing or very little: hot water, slippers, rice porridge, soup, stretching, sleep. It is a regimen of preventive self-care accessible to anyone.

For young people in the United States in particular, where health care is expensive and many feel exhausted and anxious, the appeal of such a regimen is easy to understand. It offers the promise of feeling better without a prescription, a subscription or a gym membership. In this sense, Chinamaxxing may be read less as an embrace of China than as a search for affordable care, projected onto an imagined Chinese household where someone has always already prepared the soup.

The fantasy of order

A third reading concerns order. The travel videos and livestreams that preceded the trend presented Chinese cities as clean, safe, technologically advanced and well organised: smooth high-speed trains, digital payments, robots. Chinese media celebrated this shift in perception (China News Service). The Chinamaxxing household, with its warm water and early nights, is the domestic counterpart of that public image: a life with structure and rhythm, in contrast to the disorder many young Westerners report in their own lives.

The mirror also shows a political shift. A poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs released in October 2025 found that 53% of Americans favoured engagement and cooperation with China, up from 40% in 2024 (NBC News via NBC San Diego). Chinamaxxing did not cause this change, but it expresses, in the language of the body and the meme, a generation less afraid of China than its parents were.

6. Seen from China: soft power and Occidentalism

The official reading

Chinese official media embraced the trend quickly. Xinhua explained it as the product of China’s growing economic presence, from fashion to electric vehicles, and of rising soft power, noting that the 2026 Global Soft Power Index had ranked China as the only country in the top ten whose position had improved; it also cited the global success of the film Ne Zha, the game Black Myth: Wukong and the Labubu toys, as well as visa-free travel policies (Xinhua via Yangtse Evening Post). The overseas edition of People’s Daily described it as a prism reflecting the attraction of Chinese culture (People’s Daily Overseas Edition via China News Service). A foreign ministry spokesperson welcomed international interest in Chinese daily life (Wikipedia summary of press reports).

Commentary in outlets close to official views went further, presenting the trend as evidence that foreign audiences were moving beyond symbols such as pandas and the Great Wall towards the deeper texture of Chinese culture, through “cultural resonance” rather than mere “cultural export” (Huanqiu).

Occidentalism in reverse

Xiaomei Chen’s study of Occidentalism showed how post-Mao Chinese discourse constructed images of “the West” for domestic purposes, sometimes as a model, sometimes as a foil. The official reception of Chinamaxxing is a new chapter in this history. Here the West is used as a witness: its young people’s admiration is taken as proof of China’s attractiveness and of the correctness of its path. The meme becomes a mirror in which China sees itself admired.

The domestic gap

The official reading has a blind spot, which the rest of this series makes visible. The Chinese life that Western youth imitate is a life of domestic rhythm and calm: warm water at dawn, soup at noon, early nights. The Chinese youth examined in the previous articles live in a different China. They live alone in rented rooms and install apps to report that they are still alive. They are paid by their parents to stay at home, or pay strangers to pretend to go to work. They queue by the million for examinations with a ratio of nearly a hundred to one, burn incense for job offers and dream of 2008.

In a further irony, the image of China that Western youth admire overlaps with the image of China that Chinese youth mourn. Chinese dreamcore, examined in the fourth article, is full of the same domestic scenes: the family at home on a weekend morning, the mother’s voice, the warm and ordered household. Western youth idealise the Chinese household in the present; Chinese youth idealise it in the past. Both are looking at a picture of security that, for many young Chinese, belongs to their parents’ generation.

7. The infrastructure of fascination

Chinamaxxing did not arise from nowhere. Chinese reporting places it at the end of a chain of encounters that began in 2025 (China News Service; People’s Daily Overseas Edition via China News Service):

  1. The RedNote migration. In January 2025, as a ban on TikTok loomed in the United States, many American users moved to the Chinese app Xiaohongshu, known abroad as RedNote, producing a sudden and largely friendly exchange with Chinese users (NBC News via NBC Washington).
  2. Travel and livestreams. Expanded visa-free travel made China easier to visit, and foreign influencers such as the American streamer known in China as “Jiakang ge” (IShowSpeed) livestreamed high-speed trains, robots and city life to vast audiences.
  3. The meme and its curators. The “very Chinese time” meme, first posted in April 2025, gave non-Chinese users a playful formula for identifying with Chinese things, and Chinese American creators turned it into a guide to daily life.

This infrastructure matters anthropologically because it shows that the trend is a product of contact, not only of imagination. Classic Orientalism was produced largely by people who never met the people they described, or met them in relations of domination. Chinamaxxing emerged from a period of unusually direct, if mediated, contact between ordinary young people on both sides: comment threads, livestreams, travel videos. Its images are still selective, but they are the images of what Mary Louise Pratt called a contact zone rather than of a library.

The contact is nonetheless asymmetrical. Western users saw curated Chinese daily life on platforms; they did not see, and could not easily see, the pressures that Chinese users discussed among themselves. The infrastructure of fascination transmits surfaces efficiently. It transmits the depth of a society’s difficulties much less well.

8. The series in the mirror: what Chinamaxxing does not see

This article closes a series of ten. It is worth setting the Western image of “becoming Chinese” beside what the nine previous articles found.

ArticleWhat young Chinese are doingWhat the Chinamaxxing image shows instead
1. Dying aloneLiving alone and paying an app to report that they are still aliveA household where someone is always home
2. Full-time childrenBeing paid by parents to stay at home while waiting for workDomestic harmony and family meals
3. Pretend officesPaying to sit at a desk so as to look employedA calm daily rhythm
4. DreamcoreMourning the childhood of 2008 and the future it promisedThe present as stable and ordered
5. Bride pricesNegotiating costly, contested marriage paymentsTradition as harmony
6. Civil-service feverCompeting at nearly 100 to 1 for state postsSecurity as a given
7. TemplesBurning incense for job offers, with ironySpiritual calm
8. DaziBuilding light, obligation-free companionshipWarm, dense family life
9. Digital ancestorsKeeping the dead present through AIContinuity with ancestors as wisdom

The contrast is not a reproach to the young Westerners drinking hot water. Every society’s image of another is selective, and the selection here is generous rather than hostile. But the table shows something important about both sides.

The Chinese life that Chinamaxxing imitates is largely the life of an earlier generation: the household of parents who had stable jobs, owned their apartments and could afford to keep a thermos warm for everyone. It is the life that Chinese young people remember from childhood, and that many of them are now struggling to reproduce. The “very Chinese time in my life” that Western youth celebrate is, for many young Chinese, their parents’ time.

Seen this way, Chinamaxxing and Chinese dreamcore are two halves of one image. Both are nostalgic for the same ordered household. One locates it in another country, the other in another decade. Neither describes the present of China’s young, which is the subject this series has tried to document.

9. Conclusion: the mirror and the window

Chinamaxxing is a small, playful phenomenon that will probably fade with the next turn of the meme cycle. But it offers a precise lesson in how societies see each other.

  • It is a therapeutic exoticism, an exoticism without empire that seeks in China not knowledge or possession but a remedy.
  • It borrows techniques of the body, not ideas, and in doing so turns habitus into a costume that can be put on and taken off.
  • It is above all a mirror, reflecting Western youth’s fatigue, their search for cheap care in expensive societies, and their desire for order.
  • Chinese official media read it as soft power, a new chapter in Occidentalism in which Western admiration certifies China’s success.
  • It emerged from a contact zone of platforms, livestreams and travel, which transmits surfaces efficiently and difficulties poorly.
  • And it celebrates an ordered household that, for many young Chinese, belongs to their parents and to the past, the same household that Chinese dreamcore mourns.

Closing the series

Across ten articles, this series has followed a single process in many forms. Urban Chinese society is taking apart institutions that once delivered several goods together, kinship, care, work, marriage, friendship, mourning, and reassembling their pieces as separate, named and often priced functions: a witness at death, a salary for filial care, a desk without a job, a bride price as insurance, a state post as a sacred object, a deity as a higher bureaucracy, a companion without debt, an ancestor that answers back. In each case, the reassembly is ingenious, often ironic, and rooted in older Chinese forms. In each case, it reveals a generation improvising security in the absence of the guarantees its parents knew.

Chinamaxxing shows how that generation looks from far away: calm, warm and orderly. The anthropological task is to replace the mirror with a window, to see past the hot water and the slippers to the people who are, at this very Chinese time in their own lives, working out how to live.

Questions for fieldwork

  • Do participants in Chinamaxxing maintain the adopted habits after the trend fades?
  • How do Chinese users on RedNote and Douyin react to Western videos of “becoming Chinese”: with pride, amusement or irony?
  • Do Chinese American creators see their role as cultural brokers, entertainers or both, and how has the trend affected their own sense of identity?
  • Does the trend change participants’ views of China as a political actor, or does it remain confined to the domestic and the bodily?
  • How do young people in China who live the precarious lives described in this series respond to foreign idealisations of Chinese daily life?

References

Theoretical works

  • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1980. Le sens pratique. Paris: Minuit.
  • Chen, Xiaomei. 1995. Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Chow, Rey. 1995. Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Mauss, Marcel. 1936. “Les techniques du corps.” Journal de psychologie 32 (3-4).
  • Pratt, Mary Louise. 1992. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. London: Routledge.
  • Said, Edward W. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon.

Press, commentary and data sources

About this series. This article belongs to a ten-part series on the anthropology of contemporary China published by Global Strategy Files. Each study reads a recent social phenomenon through the tools of anthropology: ritual, kinship, exchange, the body and the sacred.

Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files

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About Driss Effina

Dr. Driss Effina is a distinguished economist, prolific author, and geopolitical strategist ‎whose work explores the intersections of power, economics, governance, and global ‎transformation. Holder of a PhD in Economic Sciences, an Engineering Degree in ‎Statistics, and a Master's in Capital Markets, he has dedicated more than two ‎decades to advancing economic research, shaping public policy, and producing works ‎of strategic analysis that have reached readers in over 40 countries.‎ As the founder of Global Strategy Files LLC an independent American publishing ‎house headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico Dr. Effina has built one of the ‎most ambitious multilingual geopolitical publishing catalogs of the 2020s, with titles in ‎English, French, Spanish, and German spanning topics from the Gulf monarchies and ‎the Kennedy assassination files to the future of the American economy.‎