Decoded

The Nation That Stopped Leaving

Decoded analysis cover: The Nation That Stopped Leaving
Anthropology of Contemporary America | Article 1 of 10

Abstract

For most of its history the United States was a nation of movers. In the early 1950s, one American in five changed residence every year. By the most recent Current Population Survey tables, the annual mover rate had fallen below 8 percent, the lowest since measurement began in 1948. Renters, the traditional engine of American mobility, move at less than half their 1988 rate; homeowners move less than at any time on record. In 2026 the New York Fed’s housing survey found that Americans’ expected probability of moving within three years had dropped to about one in five, against one in three a decade earlier. Economists explain the decline through housing costs, zoning, an ageing population and the “lock-in” of low pandemic-era mortgage rates. Historians, notably Yoni Appelbaum, have read it as the breakdown of the engine of American opportunity.

This article does not dispute these explanations. It asks a different question: what does it mean, for a society whose founding myths are myths of departure, to stop leaving? Drawing on Ghassan Hage’s concept of “stuckedness” and existential mobility, Annette Weiner’s theory of inalienable possessions, David Schneider’s analysis of American kinship, Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner on rites of passage, Liisa Malkki’s critique of “sedentarist metaphysics” and Keith Basso’s ethnography of place, it makes five claims. First, the United States is moving from a culture of restlessness to a condition of stuckedness, in which the desire to move persists while the body stays put. Second, the sub-4 percent mortgage has become an inalienable possession that binds households to places, a literal “dead pledge” that holds the living. Third, mobility has changed class: once the recourse of the poor, it is becoming a luxury of the well-off. Fourth, migration is being re-kinned: Americans who still move increasingly move toward relatives, eroding the neolocal norm on which the American nuclear family was built. Fifth, the stalled move has stalled a rite of passage, prolonging the liminal phase of young adulthood and producing new liminal spaces, of which the self-storage unit is the emblem.

Keywords: mobility, place, kinship, rites of passage, housing, stuckedness, inalienable possessions, United States

1. Introduction: the nation that stopped leaving

In nineteenth-century New York, the first of May was Moving Day. Leases expired together, and on a single morning a large share of the city’s tenants loaded their furniture onto carts and exchanged homes. Visitors described the spectacle as a carnival of displacement: streets jammed with wagons, mattresses balanced on heads, mirrors and stoves passed from hand to hand. Yoni Appelbaum, whose 2025 book Stuck opens with this scene, called it “an astonishing festival of mobility”. Alexis de Tocqueville, travelling through the young republic in the 1830s, had observed the same restlessness at a national scale: an American, he wrote, would build a house to spend his old age in and sell it before the roof was on.

Moving Day has long disappeared, and so, increasingly, has the restlessness it celebrated. The Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) began asking Americans in 1948 whether they had lived at the same address a year earlier. That year, 20.2 percent had not. The rate peaked at 21.2 percent in 1950 to 1951, when about one American in five moved every year. It has declined through every decade since, through booms and recessions, through high and low interest rates, through the suburban expansion and the urban revival. The CPS registered a new record low in 2016, then again in 2021 (8.4 percent), and the latest historical tables put it below 8 percent, less than half its postwar level. The larger American Community Survey, which uses a different method and gives somewhat higher figures, tells the same story: about 11.8 percent of the population moved in 2024, down from 15.4 percent in 2010, with the decline continuing almost every year. Interstate migration, the long-distance moves that redistribute population across the continent, fell to 2.1 percent in 2024.

The decline is broad, but it is sharpest among those who once moved most. In 1988, when the CPS first published mobility by tenure, 35.2 percent of renters moved in a year; recent tables put the figure around 16 percent. Homeowners, always more settled, have reached the lowest rate the survey has measured, around 4 percent. And expectations are falling faster than behaviour. In the 2026 edition of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Survey of Consumer Expectations housing module, the average expected probability of moving within three years fell to 21.7 percent. For renters, it dropped from 57.5 percent in 2016 to 36.6 percent in 2026. For households over fifty, from 19.6 to 12.9 percent. A private survey published by Storable in February 2026 found that more than half of respondents had already turned down, or said they would turn down, a job that required relocation.

There is no shortage of explanations. Economists point to an older population, since the old move less than the young; to the rise of dual-career couples, whose relocations must satisfy two labour markets at once; to the convergence of wages across regions, which reduces the gains from moving; to remote work, which allows a job to change without a body changing place; and above all to housing. Home prices relative to incomes have reached the levels of the mid-2000s. Rents in high-opportunity metropolitan areas are prohibitive for workers who would once have moved there to earn more. And since mortgage rates rose sharply in 2022, millions of homeowners holding loans at 3 percent or less have found that selling would mean borrowing at twice that rate. Research at the Federal Reserve has attributed a large share of the post-2022 decline in homeowner mobility to this “lock-in” effect, and a study published through the National Bureau of Economic Research estimated that higher rates reduced mobility among mortgage holders by about 16 percent in 2022 and 2023. Appelbaum’s Stuck adds a political history: the gradual construction, since the early twentieth century, of zoning codes, building rules and local vetoes that allowed the established and the propertied to close their neighbourhoods to newcomers.

These analyses are valuable, and this article draws on them. But they share a limitation: they treat mobility as a quantity, a rate that rises or falls in response to prices and rules. They ask why Americans move less; they rarely ask what moving meant, and therefore what is lost, transformed or invented when it stops. For anthropology, a change of residence is never only an economic transaction. It is a social act that separates people from some relations and attaches them to others; a ritual that marks the passage between stages of life; a way of telling a story about oneself; and, in the American case, the enactment of a national myth. A society that stops moving does not simply lose labour-market efficiency. It changes the way it reproduces kinship, the way it marks adulthood, the way it relates to property, and the way it imagines the future.

This article reads the great American settling-down through five lenses. Section 2 situates mobility in the American mythology of departure and introduces Ghassan Hage’s distinction between physical and existential mobility. Section 3 analyses the locked-in mortgage as an inalienable possession. Section 4 examines the inversion of mobility’s class meaning. Section 5 turns to kinship and the erosion of the neolocal norm. Section 6 considers the stalled rite of passage and the liminal spaces it produces. Section 7 concludes on what a sedentary America might become.

2. From restlessness to stuckedness

2.1 A mythology of departure

Every society tells itself stories about where its people came from and why they are where they are. Many of these stories are stories of rootedness: the people sprang from the soil, the ancestors are buried here, the land and the lineage are one. Liisa Malkki, in a classic essay on the “rooting of peoples”, described the pervasive tendency of modern thought to imagine nations and cultures as plants, attached to particular territories, and to regard displacement as a pathology. She called this “sedentarist metaphysics”.

The United States is the great exception to this pattern, or at least it imagined itself to be. Its founding narratives are narratives of uprooting. The Pilgrims leave England; the immigrants leave Europe, then Asia and Latin America; the pioneers leave the eastern seaboard; the Okies of The Grapes of Wrath leave the Dust Bowl; some six million African Americans leave the rural South in the Great Migration between 1910 and 1970. When Frederick Jackson Turner, in 1893, proposed that the frontier had formed the American character, he made movement itself the crucible of the nation: Americans became American by going West, by repeatedly leaving settled society for the edge of the wild. The Constitution does not mention a right to move, but the Supreme Court found one implicit in national citizenship, and American popular culture has celebrated the open road from Walt Whitman to Jack Kerouac to the country songs of the interstate.

In this mythology, departure is not loss but opportunity. The person who leaves is not an exile but an aspirant. “Go West, young man” was advice, not banishment. The American Dream has always had a spatial grammar: one improves one’s lot by going somewhere else, to the city, to the suburb, to the boom town, to the Sun Belt. Appelbaum’s historical argument is that this grammar described a real mechanism: in every period, those who moved did better economically than those who stayed. For anthropology, the point is that the mechanism was also a meaning. Moving was how Americans enacted their freedom, demonstrated their initiative, and narrated their lives. A biography without a move was, in the American imagination, a biography without a turning point.

2.2 Physical and existential mobility

The anthropologist Ghassan Hage, working with Lebanese migrants, proposed a distinction that is useful here. Physical mobility is the movement of bodies through space. Existential mobility is the sense that one’s life is “going somewhere”, that one is moving forward, improving, advancing towards a better position. The two are related but not identical. People migrate physically, Hage argued, because they feel existentially stuck at home; they hope that moving in space will restore a sense of moving in life. Conversely, one can travel constantly and feel stuck, or stay in one place and feel one’s life advancing.

Hage later coined the term “stuckedness” for a condition he saw spreading in many societies after the financial crisis of 2008: the experience of being unable to move forward, combined with the expectation that one should endure this immobility patiently, as a test of character. Stuckedness, in his account, is not simply immobility; it is immobility experienced under a norm of mobility. One feels stuck only where one believes one ought to be moving.

The American case fits this description with unusual precision. The norm of mobility remains intact in the culture. Americans still tell their children that they can go anywhere; career advice still assumes that one follows opportunity; political rhetoric still celebrates the striver who leaves a dying town for a growing one. What has changed is the practical possibility of acting on the norm. The Storable survey found that nearly half of Americans felt “trapped” in their homes by mortgage rates and housing costs, and that almost three-quarters of mortgage holders would consider moving if they could take their current rate with them. The New York Fed’s data show that the decline is concentrated not only in behaviour but in expectations: Americans increasingly do not expect to move, even as they continue to believe that moving is how one gets ahead.

This is the first claim of this article: the United States is passing from a culture of restlessness, in which physical mobility expressed and produced existential mobility, to a condition of stuckedness, in which the desire for existential mobility persists but has been detached from physical movement. The decline in mover rates is the visible part of this transformation. The invisible part is a change in how Americans experience time and possibility.

2.3 Where the desire goes

If the desire to move persists while the body stays, where does the desire go? Anthropology suggests that blocked aspirations are rarely extinguished; they are displaced into other channels. Three displacements are visible in contemporary American life.

The first is virtual mobility. Remote work, which expanded massively after 2020 and has persisted for a substantial minority of workers, allows a person to change employer, industry and even country of employment without changing address. Research by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis found that, among those who do relocate across state lines, commuters most often move for a job, while remote workers move mainly for housing or family. In the remote worker’s life, the job travels through the cable and the body stays home. The traditional American link between career advancement and change of residence, embodied in the corporate transfer and the relocation package, is being severed.

The second is aspirational mobility, the cultivation of imagined departures. The real-estate browsing that many Americans practise as a form of leisure, scrolling through listings in cities they will never move to, is a ritual of this kind: a rehearsal of a move that will not happen. So is the vast media genre of relocation fantasies, from television series about buying a house abroad to online videos about “the best places to live”. These are not trivial distractions. In anthropological terms, they are forms of what Arjun Appadurai called “the work of the imagination”: the practice by which people in a mobile world rehearse possible lives. In a stuck society, the imagination keeps the door open that the housing market has closed.

The third is existential mobility sought in place: the effort to feel that one’s life is advancing without moving. Home renovation, which boomed after 2020, is a striking example. When one cannot move to a better house, one remakes the house one has. The kitchen remodel and the finished basement become the domestic equivalents of the move to the suburbs. The house, instead of being a stage in a trajectory, becomes the trajectory itself.

These displacements explain why the decline in mobility has produced less overt protest than its scale might suggest. Americans have not stopped wanting to move forward; they have found ways to move forward while staying still. But the substitutes are imperfect, and the gap between the norm and the possibility generates the characteristic emotions of stuckedness: frustration, resentment, the feeling that the rules have changed without anyone announcing it.

3. The dead pledge: the mortgage as inalienable possession

3.1 An asset that cannot travel

The word mortgage comes from Old French: mort gage, a “dead pledge”. Medieval jurists explained the name in two ways. The pledge was dead to the debtor if he failed to pay, because he lost the land; and it was dead to the creditor once the debt was paid, because the claim on the land expired. The etymology has acquired, in the America of the 2020s, an unexpected third meaning. The low-rate mortgage contracted during the pandemic has become a pledge that binds the living to a place.

The economics are simple. Between 2020 and early 2022, tens of millions of American households bought homes or refinanced at fixed rates below 4 percent, many below 3. The thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage, an American peculiarity almost unknown elsewhere in the world, guarantees that rate for the life of the loan. When market rates doubled after 2022, these loans became valuable assets in their own right: the difference between a 3 percent loan and a 7 percent loan on a typical balance amounts to hundreds of dollars a month. But the asset has a peculiar property. In most cases it cannot be transferred. It belongs to a specific house. If the household sells, the cheap loan dies; if it buys elsewhere, it must borrow at the new, higher rate. The only way to keep the asset is to stay.

Economists describe this as a friction, an increase in the cost of moving. Anthropology offers a richer description. Annette Weiner, in her study of exchange in Oceania, distinguished between ordinary goods, which circulate, and inalienable possessions: objects that are kept out of circulation because they embody the identity and continuity of a group. Inalienable possessions, she argued, are not opposed to exchange; they are what exchange revolves around. The art of social life is “keeping-while-giving”: circulating some things so that others can be kept. The heirloom, the sacred object, the ancestral land are kept precisely because they cannot be replaced. To lose them is to lose oneself.

The low-rate mortgage has acquired, in American households, some of the properties of an inalienable possession. It cannot be sold separately from the house. It cannot be reproduced: no bank will offer it again. It is associated with a particular moment of good fortune, the window of 2020 to 2021, and households that obtained it speak of it with the language of luck and prudence, as something they “locked in” or “secured”. It is valued not for what it can be exchanged for but for what it protects: the household’s monthly margin, its sense of safety, its ability to absorb other costs. And like all inalienable possessions, it demands to be kept. In the Storable survey, 73 percent of mortgage holders said they would consider moving if they could transfer their rate; 31 percent said they would move immediately. The asset, not the house, is what holds them.

3.2 Keeping-while-giving in the American household

Weiner’s concept also illuminates the strategies households devise to keep the possession while meeting needs that would once have required a move. Rather than selling the starter home when a child is born, families add a room or convert a garage. Rather than relocating for a better job, workers commute farther, negotiate remote arrangements or accept the job and leave the family behind for part of the week. Rather than moving into a smaller house in retirement, older owners stay in the large one, sometimes renting rooms or hosting adult children. Rather than selling when they do move, some owners keep the house and rent it out, preserving the loan as an investment. Each of these strategies is a form of keeping-while-giving: the household circulates time, money, comfort or proximity in order to keep the one thing it cannot replace.

These strategies have social consequences beyond the household. Each kept house is a house that does not come onto the market. Industry estimates published in early 2026 put the average tenure of American homeowners at around 8.6 years, the longest since the early 2000s. Fewer listings mean higher prices, which raise the cost of entry for first-time buyers, who then remain renters longer, which in turn keeps rents high. The inalienable possession of one generation of owners becomes the locked door for the next generation of buyers. In Weiner’s Oceania, the keeping of inalienable possessions created hierarchy: those who held the sacred objects ranked above those who did not. In the American housing market of the 2020s, the cheap mortgage has created something similar, a cleavage between those who hold the pledge and those who arrived too late.

3.3 From transferable to territorial wealth

There is a deeper shift at work. Postwar American homeownership was conceived as a portable form of wealth. The ideal household bought a starter home, built equity, sold, and bought a larger home elsewhere, carrying its accumulated value across moves. The house was a stepping stone, and its value lay in its exchangeability. The system of long-term fixed-rate mortgages, created with federal support in the 1930s and 1940s, was designed to make this circulation possible for the middle class.

The rate shock of 2022 revealed that a significant part of household wealth had become territorial, attached to a specific place and destroyed by departure. This is the opposite of the American model. In many societies, the most valuable forms of wealth have always been territorial: the farm that cannot be sold outside the lineage, the house that must stay in the family, the land that belongs to the ancestors. Such wealth binds people to places and makes them guardians rather than traders. The American middle class, without intending it, has acquired a form of wealth with similar properties. It behaves less like a population of mobile investors and more like a population of stewards of inherited positions.

This is the second claim of this article: the locked-in mortgage is not only a financial friction but an inalienable possession, whose logic of keeping reorganises household strategies and creates a new hierarchy between those who hold it and those who do not. The dead pledge, in the most literal sense, holds the living in place.

4. The inversion of mobility’s class meaning

4.1 When the poor moved

In the classic American story, mobility was the recourse of those with little to lose. The poor farmer moved West to claim land; the immigrant crossed the ocean in steerage; the Black sharecropper boarded the train to Chicago or Detroit; the Dust Bowl family loaded its possessions onto a truck and drove to California. The rich had less reason to move: they were already where the opportunities were, and their wealth, in land, businesses and social networks, was rooted in place. Mobility was, in effect, a substitute for capital. Those who lacked wealth could bring their labour to where it was best paid.

This pattern was never absolute. The professional classes moved too, especially in the postwar decades, when large corporations routinely transferred managers across the country. But the core of American mass mobility, the movement that filled the industrial cities and then the Sun Belt, was a movement of people seeking a better life because their current one was precarious.

4.2 When mobility becomes a luxury

The data of the 2020s suggest that this relationship is reversing. In the New York Fed’s survey, the expected probability of moving within three years fell most sharply among lower-income households: from 32.3 percent in 2016 to 19.0 percent in 2026 for those earning under 60,000 dollars, against a smaller decline, from 29.9 to 24.5 percent, for those earning more. A decade ago, the less affluent expected to move more than the affluent. Today they expect to move less. Among those who do move across state lines, the profile has shifted towards the educated: an analysis of Census data for Texas, the leading destination for interstate migrants, found that more than half of new arrivals in 2024 held at least a bachelor’s degree.

The reasons are not mysterious. Moving has become expensive. It requires a deposit and first month’s rent, often a credit check, sometimes a guarantor; it may require selling a house in a slow market or breaking a lease; it involves the costs of transport and the loss of informal support networks. The places where wages are highest are the places where housing is most expensive, so that the gain from moving is often consumed by rent. For a low-wage worker in a declining town, moving to a booming metropolis may mean earning more and living worse. The economists Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag documented this pattern in the 2010s: the historical convergence of incomes across American regions, driven by the movement of workers from poor to rich areas, stalled as housing costs in rich areas rose, so that moving to opportunity became a strategy available mainly to skilled workers.

For anthropology, the point is that mobility has changed its class meaning. Pierre Bourdieu showed that the same practice can carry opposite meanings depending on who performs it and how. A practice that marks necessity among one group can mark distinction among another. Mobility in the United States is undergoing this kind of semantic reversal. The move, once a sign of need, is becoming a sign of means. The family that relocates to Austin or Raleigh for a better job, a better school district, a lower tax rate or a better climate is performing a privilege. The family that stays in a declining town because it cannot afford to leave is performing a constraint.

4.3 The new geography of staying

This inversion transforms the moral geography of American places. In the older pattern, the declining town was a place people left; its population was renewed by the departure of the ambitious and the arrival of no one. Today, the declining town is increasingly a place people cannot leave. Its residents are not those who chose to stay but those who could not go. The anthropology of deindustrialised places, from the Rust Belt to the coalfields of Appalachia, has documented the sense of abandonment that this produces: the feeling that the nation has moved on while one’s community has been left behind.

At the same time, the affluent movers are reshaping their destinations. In the Sun Belt and Mountain West cities that receive them, they bring wages and expectations formed elsewhere, raise house prices and rents, and sometimes displace the local working class, which then faces the same impossibility of moving. The result is a society divided not only by income but by motility, the sociologist Vincent Kaufmann’s term for the capacity to be mobile. Some Americans possess a high motility: the resources, skills and networks that make movement possible and profitable. Others possess almost none.

This is the third claim of this article: mobility in the United States is changing its class meaning, from a recourse of the poor to a privilege of the well-off. The decline in average mobility conceals an increasing inequality in the capacity to move. The American Dream’s spatial grammar, “go where the opportunities are”, still describes the strategy of the affluent. For many others, it has become a story about a country that no longer exists.

5. The re-kinning of migration

5.1 The neolocal norm

Anthropologists classify societies by their rules of post-marital residence. In patrilocal societies, a married couple lives with or near the husband’s family; in matrilocal societies, near the wife’s. In neolocal societies, the couple establishes a new, independent household, separate from both families. Neolocality is relatively rare in the comparative record. It is, however, the dominant norm of modern Western societies, and above all of the United States.

David Schneider, in his landmark study American Kinship (1968), argued that American kinship is organised around two symbolic domains: the order of nature, expressed in “blood”, and the order of law, expressed in marriage and the “code for conduct”. The nuclear family, in this culture, is a unit defined by love, and the transition to adulthood is defined by leaving one’s family of origin to found one’s own. The independent household is not just a practical arrangement; it is a moral achievement. The adult who still lives with parents, or who lives near them because he depends on them, has failed to complete the passage.

American mobility was, in large part, the spatial expression of this norm. The young adult who moved away for college or work, the couple who settled in a new city, the family that relocated for a job without considering where grandparents lived, were all enacting neolocality. Distance from kin was not merely tolerated; it was a sign of independence. The Thanksgiving journey home, the busiest travel period of the American year, ritualised the separation: kin were people one returned to on holidays, not people one lived among.

5.2 Moving towards kin

The migration data of the 2020s show a striking change in the reasons Americans move. Analyses of recent Census and survey data indicate that strengthening family ties has become the most common reason for interstate moves, ahead of jobs. Family reasons already led among all movers a decade ago (about 27 percent of moves in 2016, against about 20 percent for employment), but local moves are dominated by family and housing; for long-distance moves across state lines, the job had long been the leading motive. The rise of remote work has reinforced this shift: as the St. Louis Fed found, remote workers who move do so mainly for family or housing, not for a job. And the ageing of the baby boom generation has produced a growing flow of moves in the opposite direction: retirees relocating to be near their adult children and grandchildren.

Several forces drive this re-kinning. The first is the cost of childcare, which in many American cities rivals the cost of rent. Grandparents nearby can provide care that would otherwise cost thousands of dollars a year; young parents move to be near them, or persuade them to move near. The second is the cost and scarcity of elder care: as parents age, adult children move closer to manage their needs, or bring them closer. The third is the cost of housing itself, which has driven a growth in multigenerational households and in moves back into parental homes. The fourth is subtler: in a society where many traditional institutions of support, from churches to unions to civic associations, have weakened, the family has become the default safety net, and a safety net works only if it is near.

5.3 Toward a soft ambilocality

The anthropological significance of this shift is considerable. The United States is not becoming patrilocal or matrilocal; there is no rule specifying which family a couple must live near. But it is drifting from strict neolocality towards something anthropologists might call a soft ambilocality: an arrangement in which couples choose to live near one family or the other, on the basis of practical considerations, especially the availability of care. The choice is often negotiated, and the negotiations reveal a new set of kinship calculations. Which grandparents are healthier? Which can provide more childcare? Which family’s town has cheaper housing? Who will need care first?

This shift reverses the symbolic economy that Schneider described. In the older model, distance from kin signified autonomy, and proximity signified dependence. In the emerging model, proximity is reframed as a resource. Living near one’s parents becomes a sensible strategy rather than a failure of independence; moving back to one’s hometown becomes a choice for “family values” rather than a retreat. The cultural vocabulary is adapting: the “village” needed to raise a child is invoked to justify returns home, and the language of “intergenerational support” replaces the language of dependence.

The re-kinning of migration also has a gendered dimension. Much of the care that drives these moves, the care of grandchildren and the care of ageing parents, is performed by women. When a couple chooses which family to live near, the choice often follows the wife’s kin, because it is her mother who will provide childcare and she who will care for her parents. Anthropologists of kinship have long noted that in societies with flexible residence rules, the “uterine” ties between mothers and daughters tend to structure residential choices. The American case may be following the same pattern.

This is the fourth claim of this article: American migration is being re-kinned. Fewer Americans move, and those who do move increasingly move towards kin rather than away from them. The neolocal norm, which made distance from family a sign of adulthood, is eroding into a soft ambilocality governed by the logistics of care. The decline in mobility and the rise of kin-oriented moves are two faces of the same transformation: the return of the extended family as an organising principle of American residence.

6. The stalled rite of passage

6.1 Moving out as separation

Arnold van Gennep, in The Rites of Passage (1909), showed that transitions between social statuses follow a common three-part structure: separation from the previous status, a liminal or threshold phase in which the person is “betwixt and between”, and incorporation into the new status. Victor Turner later elaborated the liminal phase, describing it as a time of ambiguity, suspension and potential, in which ordinary rules are relaxed and new identities are formed.

In the United States, the transition to adulthood has long been organised around a spatial separation: moving out. The departure for college, often to another state, is the paradigmatic American rite of separation, complete with its ritual objects (the packed car, the dormitory room, the parental farewell). The first apartment, the first job in a new city, the first move made without parents, mark the subsequent stages. The liminal phase of the college years, with its relaxation of rules and its experimentation with identity, corresponds closely to Turner’s description. Incorporation into adulthood is marked by establishing one’s own household: the lease signed in one’s own name, the house bought, the family founded.

Each of these stages involved a move. The American life course was punctuated by changes of address, and the address served as a public marker of status. The decline of mobility disrupts this sequence. The separation still occurs for those who leave for college, though a growing share of students attend institutions near home or study online. But the subsequent stages are delayed or compressed. Young adults return home after college in large numbers; they remain in their parents’ households or in shared rentals for longer; they buy their first homes later. In the National Association of Realtors’ surveys, the median age of first-time homebuyers has risen sharply in recent years, reaching record highs above 35. The moment of incorporation, the establishment of an independent household, recedes.

6.2 The prolonged threshold

The consequence is a prolonged liminality. Young adults occupy for years the threshold position that was meant to be temporary: no longer children, not yet fully independent, living in spaces that are not quite their own. Sociologists have described this as “emerging adulthood”, a new life stage between adolescence and adulthood. Anthropology adds a dimension: liminality is not only a stage but an experience, and prolonged liminality produces characteristic forms of culture.

Turner observed that liminal groups develop what he called communitas: an intense egalitarian solidarity among those who share the threshold condition. Prolonged liminality in contemporary America has produced forms of communitas that are visible in generational culture: the shared irony about “adulting” (the word itself treats adult tasks as performances rather than identities), the collective humour about living with parents or roommates into one’s thirties, the solidarity of a generation that sees itself as locked out of the life course its parents followed. Turner also noted that liminality is a fertile ground for critique: those suspended between statuses see the structure from outside. The political radicalisation of young Americans on housing questions, from rent control movements to “yes in my back yard” campaigns, can be read in this light.

The decline of mobility does not only delay incorporation; it changes its meaning. When an independent household was the normal outcome of one’s twenties, its achievement was unremarkable. When it becomes difficult, it becomes a marker of privilege, often dependent on parental help with a deposit. The rite of passage becomes a rite of distinction, and incorporation into adulthood is increasingly mediated by family wealth. This connects the stalled rite to the re-kinning described above: when one cannot leave the family to found a new household without the family’s money, the family’s role in the passage to adulthood grows rather than diminishes.

6.3 Liminal spaces: the storage unit

Every rite of passage has its spaces. The liminal phase requires places of seclusion where the transforming person can be “betwixt and between”: the initiation hut, the novitiate, the dormitory. The stalled mobility of contemporary America has produced its own liminal spaces, and the most revealing of them is a peculiarly American institution: the self-storage unit.

The United States has more self-storage space than any other country, and the industry has grown rapidly. In the Storable survey of 2026, 16 percent of Americans said they had rented self-storage because they could not move to a home that fit their needs, and a further 25 percent said they were considering it. The storage unit, in these cases, is not a place for surplus possessions but a place for possessions in waiting: the furniture of a home not yet acquired, the belongings of a household not yet formed, the objects of a life on hold.

The anthropologist Daniel Miller, in his studies of material culture and domestic life, showed that possessions are not external to the self but constitutive of it; people make themselves through the objects they keep, arrange and display. The storage unit is a space where this process is suspended. The objects are kept but not used, owned but not lived with. They are in a liminal condition, separated from their previous home but not yet incorporated into a new one. The rented unit in an industrial park, behind a roll-up door, accessed with a code, is a kind of secular reliquary: a place where the material traces of past and future selves wait for a passage that has been postponed.

The storage unit is also a revealing commentary on the American relationship between possessions and mobility. A mobile society travels light, or at least carries its possessions with it. A stuck society accumulates, and when the home cannot expand, the accumulation spills into rented space. The self-storage industry thus monetises the gap between the life people have and the life they expected to have.

This is the fifth claim of this article: the decline of mobility has stalled the American rite of passage into adulthood, prolonging its liminal phase and making incorporation dependent on family wealth. Its emblematic space is the storage unit, where the possessions of postponed lives wait for a move that has not come.

7. Conclusion: a sedentary America?

7.1 Losses and gains

What kind of society is a sedentary America? The literature on declining mobility, from economics to Appelbaum’s history, tends to emphasise loss: of productivity, of opportunity, of dynamism. These losses are real. A labour force that cannot move to where it is most productive is a less productive labour force; a population that cannot leave declining places is a population exposed to concentrated decline. Appelbaum goes further, linking the end of mobility to the atrophy of American civic life over the past half century.

The anthropological perspective developed here suggests a more ambivalent assessment. The decline of mobility is also, in part, a return of place. Keith Basso, in his ethnography of the Western Apache, showed how a people’s moral and intellectual life could be woven into the landscape: place names that encode stories, stories that teach how to live, so that “wisdom sits in places”. Yi-Fu Tuan coined the term topophilia for the affective bond between people and place. A highly mobile society has difficulty forming such bonds: places become interchangeable, stages in a trajectory rather than homes. The French anthropologist Marc Augé described the “non-places” of supermodernity: airports, motorways, chain hotels, spaces of transit without history or identity. The America of constant mobility was, to a considerable extent, a civilisation of non-places.

A more settled America may rediscover the value of place. The return of kin networks, the longer tenure of households, the renewal of interest in local history and community, can be read as the beginnings of a more rooted culture. There is evidence of this in the growth of local food movements, in the revival of neighbourhood associations in some cities, in the attachment many remote workers feel to the communities they chose. Stuckedness, in other words, is not the only possible experience of immobility. Some Americans are discovering that staying can be a choice, and that rootedness has its own rewards.

7.2 The politics of the rooted

But the return of place also has a darker side, and it is here that Malkki’s critique of sedentarist metaphysics becomes relevant again. When a society imagines itself as rooted, it tends to see newcomers as threats to the soil. The politics of local exclusion that Appelbaum documents, the zoning rules and community vetoes that keep neighbourhoods closed, are the institutional expression of a sedentarist outlook: the established residents, who are rooted, defend their place against those who would arrive. As more Americans become long-term stakeholders in specific places, and as their wealth becomes territorial in the sense described in Section 3, the incentive to defend those places against change grows stronger. Immobility breeds territoriality.

The paradox, then, is that the decline of mobility may reinforce itself. The less people move, the more their interests are tied to particular places; the more their interests are tied to places, the more they resist the construction of housing for newcomers; the more they resist, the harder it becomes for others to move. Breaking this cycle requires more than economic policy. It requires a cultural renegotiation between two American values that have always been in tension: the freedom to move and the freedom to belong.

7.3 What remains of the myth

The American mythology of departure has not disappeared. It survives in the culture, in the advice given to the young, in the stories the nation tells about itself. But it is increasingly a mythology of the past, describing a world that fewer Americans inhabit. The gap between the myth and the reality is the space of stuckedness: the experience of a people that still believes it should be moving and finds that it cannot.

The great question for the coming decades is whether the United States will close this gap by restoring mobility, through housing reform, portable mortgages and the other measures that economists and Appelbaum propose, or by revising the myth, learning to value rootedness and finding new ways to move forward in place. Both paths are possible. What is not possible is to continue indefinitely with a mythology of departure in a society that has stopped leaving. A people that cannot move and still believes it must will eventually ask why the road has closed, and the answers it gives to that question will shape its politics as much as its economy.

References

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Malkki, Liisa. 1992. “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees.” Cultural Anthropology 7 (1): 24-44.

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About this series. This article belongs to a ten-part series on the anthropology of contemporary America published by Global Strategy Files. Each study reads a recent social phenomenon in the United States through the tools of anthropology: ritual, kinship, exchange, the body and the sacred.

Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files

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About Driss Effina

Dr. Driss Effina is a distinguished economist, prolific author, and geopolitical strategist ‎whose work explores the intersections of power, economics, governance, and global ‎transformation. Holder of a PhD in Economic Sciences, an Engineering Degree in ‎Statistics, and a Master's in Capital Markets, he has dedicated more than two ‎decades to advancing economic research, shaping public policy, and producing works ‎of strategic analysis that have reached readers in over 40 countries.‎ As the founder of Global Strategy Files LLC an independent American publishing ‎house headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico Dr. Effina has built one of the ‎most ambitious multilingual geopolitical publishing catalogs of the 2020s, with titles in ‎English, French, Spanish, and German spanning topics from the Gulf monarchies and ‎the Kennedy assassination files to the future of the American economy.‎