Decoded

The House Without a Shield

Decoded analysis cover: The House Without a Shield
Anthropology of Contemporary America | Article 8 of 10

Abstract

Between 2018 and 2023, according to a staff report of the Senate Budget Committee, large insurers declined to renew nearly two million American homeowners’ policies, and in more than two hundred counties the non-renewal rate tripled or more. National home insurance premiums rose by more than 40 percent between 2020 and 2024, far faster than inflation. In California, the state’s insurer of last resort, the FAIR Plan, more than doubled its policies in three years, to over 600,000 at the end of 2025, and covered nearly half of all homes in the highest-risk ZIP codes. The Consumer Federation of America estimated that one homeowner in thirteen, some six million households, had no insurance at all, a share twice as high among those earning under 50,000 dollars. Debate about this “insurance crisis” turns on its causes: climate change, according to the Senate committee and environmental groups; or, according to industry economists, rising construction costs, litigation, rate regulation and the growth of building in hazardous places.

This article sets aside the question of causes to ask what happens to the social fabric when the house, the central asset and symbol of American middle-class life, becomes difficult or impossible to insure. Drawing on François Ewald on insurance as a technology of solidarity, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky on risk and culture, Bronisław Malinowski on magic and uncertainty, Viviana Zelizer on the moral history of insurance, Kai Erikson and Rebecca Solnit on disaster communities, and Elizabeth Marino on climate relocation, it makes five claims. First, non-renewal is a form of excommunication from an invisible community of risk, and the fine-grained pricing of catastrophe models is dissolving the solidarity that insurance once embodied. Second, climate risk scores and hazard maps are becoming a new cosmology of purity and danger attached to land, fiercely contested because they reclassify the value and moral standing of homes. Third, “going bare”, living without insurance, marks a return to a pre-actuarial relation to fortune, in which providence, luck and kin replace the policy. Fourth, the hardening of homes against fire and wind is producing a new household ritual of protection, a material culture of defence comparable to the apotropaic practices of other societies. Fifth, the uninsurable home forces a choice between rootedness and safety, and makes the state, through buyouts and relocation, the arbiter of where society may live.

Keywords: risk, insurance, solidarity, disaster, place, property, climate, United States

1. Introduction: the letter in the mailbox

For many American homeowners, the crisis arrives in an envelope. It is a notice from the insurance company, informing them that their policy will not be renewed at the end of its term. The letter is usually brief and impersonal. It may cite the company’s “exposure management”, its “underwriting guidelines” or the “risk characteristics” of the area. It may recommend contacting an agent to seek coverage elsewhere. For a homeowner who has paid premiums for twenty years without a claim, the letter can be shocking. “It actually is coming through your mail slot,” said Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, at a hearing in December 2024, “in the form of insurance cancellations, insurance nonrenewals and dramatic increases in insurance costs.”

The committee’s investigation, which gathered county-level data from 23 large insurers representing about two-thirds of the national market, produced the first national picture of non-renewals. It found that nearly two million policies had not been renewed between 2018 and 2023; that non-renewal rates had risen in most states; that in more than two hundred counties they had tripled or more; and that the counties with the highest rates were concentrated in coastal and wildfire-prone areas of Florida, Louisiana and California, though inland counties in states such as Oklahoma and Montana also showed rising rates. Other data told a consistent story about prices: national homeowners’ premiums rose by 12.7 percent in 2023 and 10.4 percent in 2024, and by more than 40 percent over five years.

California became the emblem of the crisis. After devastating wildfire seasons from 2017 onward, several of the state’s largest insurers stopped writing new policies or reduced their exposure; State Farm’s announcement in 2023 that it would stop accepting new homeowners’ applications was widely reported. Homeowners who could not find coverage turned to the California FAIR Plan, a pool created in 1968 and funded by the insurers operating in the state, which offers basic fire coverage at higher cost and with fewer protections. The FAIR Plan’s policy count rose from around a quarter of a million in 2022 to more than 600,000 by the end of 2025. In December 2020, about 2 percent of California’s single-family homes were covered by the FAIR Plan; by March 2026, about 5 percent were, and in the riskiest ZIP codes nearly half. The Los Angeles wildfires of January 2025, which destroyed thousands of homes in Pacific Palisades and Altadena, intensified the crisis, though by 2026 state regulators reported that FAIR Plan growth was slowing as insurers returned under new rules allowing them to use catastrophe models and pass on reinsurance costs. In Florida, the state-backed Citizens Property Insurance Corporation grew into the largest home insurer in the state before a deliberate effort to shift policies back to private companies.

Some homeowners have stopped buying insurance altogether. Those who have paid off their mortgages are free to “go bare”, and a growing number do. Estimates vary, but the Consumer Federation of America found in 2024 that 7.4 percent of homeowners, about 6.1 million households, were uninsured, with the share rising to 15 percent among those earning under 50,000 dollars a year, and concentrated in rural areas, in climate-exposed cities such as Miami and Houston, and in states such as Mississippi and New Mexico.

The causes of the crisis are contested. The Senate committee and environmental organisations attribute it primarily to climate change, which increases the frequency and severity of wildfires, hurricanes, floods and convective storms. Industry representatives and some economists point to other factors: the rising cost of construction materials and labour, which increases the cost of claims; litigation and fraud, particularly in Florida before its reforms of 2022 and 2023; state rate regulation that prevented insurers from charging prices commensurate with risk; and the continued growth of population and building in hazardous areas, at the wildland-urban interface and on vulnerable coasts. At the Senate hearing, one industry economist insisted that “the insurance industry is not in the midst of a climate-driven crisis”. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and the relative weight of each is a matter for actuaries and economists.

This article does not adjudicate this debate. It asks a different question, which the debate tends to leave aside: what does insurance mean in American social life, and what happens when it is withdrawn? Anthropology has long recognised that the ways in which societies manage misfortune, through magic, religion, kinship, mutual aid or contract, are among their most revealing features. Insurance is one of the great modern institutions of misfortune. Its retreat from a growing share of American homes is not only a financial event but a social and cultural one.

The article proceeds in six steps. Section 2 analyses insurance as a community of risk and non-renewal as excommunication. Section 3 examines climate risk scores as a cosmology of purity and danger. Section 4 turns to going bare and the return of providence. Section 5 considers the household rituals of hardening. Section 6 examines the choice between staying and leaving. Section 7 concludes.

2. The invisible community of risk

2.1 Insurance as solidarity

The French philosopher François Ewald, a student of Michel Foucault, argued in his history of the welfare state that insurance is not merely a financial product but a technology of solidarity. By pooling risks, insurance creates a community: each member contributes a premium, and the fund compensates those who suffer misfortune. The community is abstract and invisible; its members do not know one another. But it embodies a moral principle: that misfortune should not fall entirely on the individual who suffers it, but be shared by all who are exposed to it. In Ewald’s account, the generalisation of insurance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating in social insurance and the welfare state, transformed the way modern societies thought about responsibility. Accidents, illnesses and disasters ceased to be matters of individual fault or providential punishment and became risks, statistically predictable and collectively borne.

Viviana Zelizer, in her history of life insurance in the United States, showed that this transformation was not automatic. In the early nineteenth century, many Americans regarded life insurance as morally suspect, a sacrilegious wager on death and an interference with providence. Insurers had to persuade the public that buying insurance was not a gamble but a duty, an act of love and responsibility towards one’s family. Insurance thus acquired a moral meaning: the insured man was a good husband and father who had provided for his dependants.

Homeowners’ insurance acquired a similar moral meaning. In the postwar United States, it became a near-universal condition of homeownership, required by mortgage lenders and regarded by owners as a basic responsibility. The insured house was a protected house; the responsible owner was an insured owner. Homeowners rarely thought of themselves as members of a community of risk. But that is what they were: millions of households in a given state or region, contributing premiums to pools from which the few who suffered fire, wind or theft were compensated.

2.2 The granularity of risk

The solidarity of the insurance pool depends on a degree of averaging. If every household paid a premium exactly proportional to its own risk, there would be no transfer between the safe and the exposed, and the pool would cease to be a form of solidarity; it would become a collection of individual savings accounts. Historically, insurers lacked the information to price risks with great precision. They classified properties into broad categories, by construction type, location and protection class, and charged similar premiums within each category. The safe subsidised the less safe within each class, and the system mutualised a substantial part of the risk.

Two developments have eroded this averaging. The first is the catastrophe model: sophisticated computer simulations, developed since the 1980s and increasingly refined, that estimate the probability and severity of losses from hurricanes, wildfires, floods and earthquakes at the level of individual properties. The second is the regulatory shift, in states such as California, towards allowing insurers to use these models in setting rates, as a condition of persuading them to return to high-risk markets. The result is an ever finer granularity of risk. Premiums increasingly reflect not the broad class to which a house belongs but its specific location, slope, vegetation, distance from the coast, roof type and construction.

From the actuarial point of view, this is progress: prices that reflect risk send signals that encourage mitigation and discourage building in dangerous places. From the point of view of Ewald’s analysis, it is the dissolution of solidarity. As risk is individualised, the transfers between safe and exposed within the pool diminish, and those whose risks are highest face prices that may exceed their capacity to pay, or are excluded altogether.

2.3 Excommunication

Non-renewal, in this light, is a form of excommunication. The household is expelled from the community of risk to which it belonged, often after decades of membership. The letter in the mailbox announces, in bureaucratic language, that the household is no longer part of the pool. It must seek admission to another community, the residual market of the FAIR Plan or Citizens, which is explicitly a community of the excluded: households that no private insurer will accept. Or it must accept exclusion altogether.

The emotional response of homeowners to non-renewal reflects this meaning. Many describe feelings of betrayal: they had kept their side of the bargain, paying premiums year after year, and the company had abandoned them precisely when they might need it. The language of loyalty, betrayal and abandonment, so frequent in their testimony, reveals that they understood their relationship with the insurer not merely as a contract but as a membership. The non-renewal breaks a bond that the homeowner believed to be reciprocal.

This is the first claim of this article: insurance is, in Ewald’s sense, an invisible community of risk, and the non-renewal of homeowners’ policies is a form of excommunication from that community. The increasing granularity of risk pricing, made possible by catastrophe models, dissolves the averaging on which insurance solidarity depended, and leaves the most exposed households in residual communities of the excluded.

3. A cosmology of purity and danger

3.1 Risk as culture

Mary Douglas and the political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, in Risk and Culture (1982), argued that the selection of risks for public concern is never simply a matter of objective danger. Every society faces countless potential dangers; which ones it fears, and how it responds, depends on its social organisation and values. Risk perception is culturally shaped, and the attribution of danger is bound up with moral judgements about who is responsible, who is innocent and who is to blame. Douglas’s earlier work, Purity and Danger (1966), had shown that classifications of the pure and the impure, the safe and the dangerous, are systems of social order: they mark boundaries, assign places and define what belongs where.

The insurance crisis has produced a new system of classification for American land, and with it a new cosmology of purity and danger. Maps of wildfire hazard zones, flood zones and hurricane exposure, produced by state agencies, federal agencies and private firms, sort every parcel of land into categories of risk. Since 2020, private firms such as First Street have assigned scores to individual properties for flood, fire, wind and heat risk, on scales from one to ten, and real estate websites began displaying these scores on listings. A house is now not only three bedrooms and two bathrooms; it is a “7” for fire and a “4” for flood.

3.2 The contested score

These classifications have proved intensely contested. In September 2024, Zillow, the largest real estate listing platform in the country, began displaying First Street’s climate risk scores on more than a million listings, citing research showing that most buyers considered climate risk in their decisions. Just over a year later, in late 2025, Zillow removed the scores from its listings after objections from the California Regional Multiple Listing Service, which questioned the accuracy of the flood models, and from real estate agents, who argued that the scores discouraged buyers. Homeowners had protested that their properties were mislabelled, with no way to challenge the ratings. One couple in New York sued, claiming that a high flood score had made their home “materially unsellable” at its market value. A retired government hydrologist reported that his hilltop house, which had never come close to flooding in twenty-five years, was rated a seven out of ten. First Street defended its methods as peer-reviewed science and noted that its maps had flagged as high or extreme risk the great majority of homes ultimately destroyed in the Los Angeles fires. A Redfin experiment found that showing flood-risk ratings led buyers to favour lower-risk homes and reduced the sale prices of high-risk homes by about one percent.

The controversy is revealing precisely because it is not only about accuracy. Douglas would recognise in it the characteristic struggle over classification that occurs when a new system of purity and danger is imposed. The risk score does not merely describe a property; it reclassifies it, moving it from the category of safe and valuable to the category of dangerous and devalued. It attaches a stigma to land, and through the land to its owners. The owner of a high-risk home becomes, in a sense, the owner of a polluted property, which buyers avoid and insurers refuse. The resistance of homeowners and agents to the scores is a resistance to this stigma, and the demand for a right to challenge the scores is a demand for a voice in the classification of one’s own place.

3.3 The moral map

The new maps of danger also carry moral meanings about responsibility. Those who live in high-risk zones may be judged, by others and sometimes by themselves, as having chosen to live dangerously: building in the forest, on the beach, in the floodplain. The debate about whether those who choose risky locations should bear the full cost of their choice, or whether society should share it, is a debate about the boundaries of solidarity, and it is framed in moral terms. Critics of subsidised insurance argue that it encourages building in dangerous places and makes the prudent pay for the imprudent. Defenders argue that many residents of risky areas did not choose their risk, which has increased since they bought their homes, and that they include the poor, the elderly and long-established communities who cannot easily move.

The moral map also intersects with older maps of inequality. Long-established coastal and rural communities, including historically Black communities in the South, Native communities and working-class towns, often occupy land now classified as high-risk, while new affluent developments may be built to higher standards and receive better scores. The reclassification of land by risk can thus reinforce existing hierarchies of value, or reshuffle them in unexpected ways, as when expensive coastal or hillside properties are suddenly classified as dangerous.

This is the second claim of this article: climate risk scores and hazard maps are producing a new cosmology of purity and danger for American land, in Mary Douglas’s sense. The intense contestation of these classifications reflects their power to stigmatise places and their owners, and the moral meanings they carry about who is responsible for risk and who should bear its cost.

4. Going bare: the return of providence

4.1 Life without a policy

The homeowner who goes bare, living without insurance in a house that is fully owned, has made a decision that would have been almost unthinkable for the postwar middle class. In some cases, the decision is forced: the premium is unaffordable, or no insurer will offer a policy at any price the household can pay. In others, it is chosen: the owner has calculated that the cost of insurance over a period of years exceeds the expected loss, or distrusts insurers who may not pay claims, or prefers to set aside savings. News reports from New England to South Florida describe homeowners who have “done the math” and concluded that going without is more manageable than paying.

The demographic profile of the uninsured is revealing. They are disproportionately low-income, elderly, rural and living in homes they have owned for a long time. The Consumer Federation of America found that homeowners earning under 50,000 dollars a year were twice as likely as the general population to be uninsured; other analyses found that nearly half of uninsured homeowners earned under 40,000 dollars. They are concentrated in rural counties and in states with high poverty rates as well as high climate exposure. Many are older owners who paid off their mortgages long ago and live on fixed incomes, for whom rising premiums represent a growing share of their budget.

4.2 Before risk

Ewald’s history of insurance describes a transformation in the way modern societies understood misfortune: from a world of providence, in which misfortune was the will of God, a punishment or a test, to be borne with faith; through a world of responsibility, in which misfortune was the fault of someone who could be held liable; to a world of risk, in which misfortune was a statistical regularity to be pooled and compensated. Insurance was the institution of the third world.

The homeowner who goes bare steps, in a sense, out of the world of risk and back into older ways of relating to misfortune. Without a policy, a household must find other grounds for confidence, and the cultural repertoire of American society offers several. One is providence, deeply rooted in American religious life: the trust that God will protect, or that what happens will be His will. Another is luck, or its secular cousin, the personal calculation of odds: the house has stood for decades without disaster, and the owner bets that it will continue to stand. A third is self-reliance, the conviction that one could rebuild with one’s own hands and savings, as earlier generations did. A fourth is kin and community: the expectation that, if the worst happens, family, church and neighbours will help. The reasoning that uninsured homeowners give in news reports, from “doing the math” to simply hoping for the best, draws on these registers in varying combinations.

4.3 Magic, uncertainty and the gap

Bronisław Malinowski, in his study of the Trobriand Islanders, observed that they used magic not for tasks whose outcome they could control through skill, but for tasks whose outcome was uncertain and dangerous, such as deep-sea fishing. In the safe lagoon, where fishing was reliable, they used no magic; on the open sea, where storms could kill, they performed elaborate rituals. Magic, Malinowski argued, filled the gap between human knowledge and the uncontrollable, offering confidence where technical means were insufficient.

Insurance, in modern societies, occupies the place that Malinowski assigned to magic: it addresses the uncontrollable dangers of fire, storm and flood, offering not control over the event but protection from its consequences. When insurance is withdrawn, the gap reopens. The uninsured homeowner faces the uncontrollable danger without the modern technology for managing it. The return of providence, luck, self-reliance and kinship in the discourse of the uninsured can be read as the return of older technologies of confidence into the space that insurance vacated.

The irony is that the uninsured household may end up relying on the very forms of collective support that insurance was designed to replace. After disasters, uninsured homeowners turn to federal disaster aid, which is limited; to charitable organisations and churches; to family; and, increasingly, to crowdfunding, the economy of grace described in the second article of this series. The uninsured home is protected not by a contract but by the hope that, if it burns, someone will help.

4.4 The tether of debt

There is a structural reason why going bare is concentrated among older owners: the mortgage. Lenders require borrowers to insure the property that secures the loan; if a borrower’s policy lapses, the lender may purchase “force-placed” insurance on the borrower’s behalf, usually at a much higher price, and add the cost to the loan. For the mortgaged household, insurance is not a choice but a condition of debt. The insurance policy and the mortgage are tethered together: the community of risk is entered through the obligations of credit.

The household that has paid off its mortgage is released from this tether. It recovers, along with full ownership, the freedom to decide whether to insure. In the postwar period, few owners exercised this freedom; insurance was cheap relative to the value it protected, and the habit of insuring persisted after the loan was repaid. As premiums rise, the calculation changes, and the freedom to go bare becomes a real option. It is exercised disproportionately by those who have owned longest: elderly owners on fixed incomes, often in modest houses whose value has not kept pace with premiums.

This produces a generational geography of risk. In many communities exposed to fire or storm, the newest owners, burdened by mortgages, are insured at high cost, while the oldest owners, free of debt, may be uninsured. The former are bound to the community of risk by their lenders; the latter have stepped outside it. When disaster strikes, the two groups face very different futures. The insured can rebuild, though often with gaps between payouts and costs. The uninsured may lose the one asset they intended to pass to their children, and with it the inheritance that, for many American families of modest means, the paid-off house represents.

This is the third claim of this article: going bare marks a return to a pre-actuarial relation to misfortune, in which providence, luck, self-reliance and the help of kin and community replace the insurance policy. It reopens the gap between knowledge and danger that, in Malinowski’s analysis, magic once filled and insurance later occupied.

5. Rituals of hardening

5.1 Defensible space

In the wildfire zones of the American West, a new vocabulary has entered household life: “defensible space”, “home hardening”, “ember-resistant vents”, “Class A roofs”, “Zone Zero”. Homeowners are urged, and increasingly required, to clear vegetation within a hundred feet of their houses, to remove flammable materials from the five feet immediately surrounding them, to replace wooden shingles with fire-resistant roofing, to install mesh over vents, to enclose eaves and to use non-combustible decking. In hurricane zones, the equivalent vocabulary includes “fortified roofs”, “impact windows”, “hurricane straps” and “storm shutters”. Insurers offer discounts for such measures; some states, such as Alabama, have run programmes subsidising “fortified” roofs; and California’s 2025 regulations required insurers to recognise mitigation in their pricing.

Communities have also organised collectively. The national Firewise USA programme, run by the National Fire Protection Association, recognises neighbourhoods that develop wildfire risk-reduction plans and hold annual mitigation events: brush-clearing days, chipper days, education sessions. Thousands of communities have joined. In some areas, insurers have begun to offer discounts for membership.

5.2 Apotropaic architecture

Anthropologists use the term apotropaic, from the Greek for “turning away”, for practices and objects intended to ward off evil or misfortune: the amulet, the protective inscription over a door, the horseshoe nailed above the threshold, the hand of Fatima, the eye that deflects envy. Apotropaic objects mark the boundary of the household and defend it against dangers from outside. They are, in Mary Douglas’s terms, technologies of boundary maintenance.

The hardened house is, in a sense, a modern apotropaic architecture. Its defences are technical rather than magical, grounded in fire science and engineering rather than in belief. But their social logic is similar. They mark and defend the boundary of the household against an external danger; they are visible signs of the owner’s vigilance; and they are maintained through periodic ritual activity, the annual clearing of brush, the inspection before fire season, the installation of shutters when a hurricane approaches. The ring of cleared ground around a house in the wildland-urban interface is, among other things, a boundary drawn between the domestic and the wild.

5.3 The ritual of compliance

The hardening of homes also has a ritual dimension in a stricter sense. Insurers and regulators increasingly require inspections, certifications and documentation of mitigation measures. The homeowner must demonstrate, through photographs, receipts and inspections, that the house has been properly protected. These procedures resemble rituals of purification, in which the household must be certified as clean before it can be readmitted to the community. A house that has been hardened and certified may be readmitted to the community of risk from which it was excluded, or admitted at a lower price.

The burden of these rituals is unevenly distributed. Hardening a house can cost tens of thousands of dollars; replacing a roof or installing impact windows is beyond the means of many owners. Clearing defensible space requires physical labour or the money to pay for it. Elderly and low-income owners, precisely those most likely to be uninsured, are least able to perform the rituals that would restore their insurability. Collective programmes such as Firewise partly mitigate this inequality, by mobilising neighbours and volunteers to help, and in doing so they create something insurance never did: a visible, face-to-face community of mutual protection.

This is the fourth claim of this article: the hardening of homes against fire and storm is producing a new household ritual of protection, an apotropaic architecture that defends the boundary of the household against external danger. Its procedures of inspection and certification function as rituals of purification that may restore admission to the community of risk, but their cost excludes many of those most in need.

6. Rootedness or safety

6.1 Three paths

Faced with an uninsurable or unaffordable home, an American household has, broadly, three paths. It can stay and accept the risk, with or without insurance. It can stay and harden, investing in protection. Or it can leave. Each path has a different meaning, and the choice among them involves not only financial calculation but values, attachments and identities.

The first article of this series argued that Americans are moving less than ever, and that the decline of mobility is producing a new attachment to place, along with new forms of stuckedness. The insurance crisis adds a further dimension to this picture. For some households, rising premiums and non-renewals are a reason to leave: surveys of Californians and Floridians have found many considering moving out of state because of insurance costs. For others, the same pressures produce a stubborn determination to stay. The house is not only an asset but a home, the place where children were raised, where the family’s history is anchored, where neighbours and church and community are. Leaving would mean losing not only a property but a world.

6.2 Collective trauma and disaster communities

The sociologist Kai Erikson, in his study of the Buffalo Creek flood in West Virginia in 1972, Everything in Its Path (1976), described the “collective trauma” that follows disasters: not only the individual trauma of loss, but the destruction of the community itself, the web of relationships that had sustained people’s sense of identity and security. After the flood, survivors were relocated into trailer camps without regard to their former neighbourhoods, and the dispersal of the community compounded the loss of their homes.

Rebecca Solnit, in A Paradise Built in Hell (2009), documented a contrasting phenomenon: the remarkable solidarity, altruism and improvised mutual aid that often emerge in the immediate aftermath of disasters, as strangers help one another and communities organise themselves. Disaster, she argued, can reveal a capacity for community that ordinary life suppresses.

The insurance crisis shapes which of these outcomes prevails after a disaster. Insured communities can rebuild together, with the resources to restore their homes and their social world. Uninsured or underinsured communities face the prospect of Erikson’s dispersal: those who cannot afford to rebuild must leave, and the community is broken. After the Los Angeles fires of 2025, a recurring concern in Altadena, a historically diverse community with a substantial population of long-established Black homeowners, was that underinsured families would be forced to sell their lots to developers and investors, dissolving a community that had taken generations to build. The insurance gap becomes a mechanism of displacement.

6.3 Managed retreat

The most radical response to uninsurable land is managed retreat: the planned relocation of communities away from places too dangerous to inhabit. The federal government has long operated programmes to buy out homes in flood-prone areas and return the land to open space. In 2016 the Department of Housing and Urban Development awarded funds to relocate the residents of Isle de Jean Charles, a disappearing island in coastal Louisiana inhabited by members of a Native American tribe, in what was widely described as the first federally funded climate resettlement of an entire community. The project, which moved residents to a new inland site, was marked by conflict over who would decide, who would be included and whether the tribe’s identity could survive separation from its land.

The anthropologist Elizabeth Marino, in her study of Shishmaref, an Iñupiat village in Alaska threatened by coastal erosion, showed how relocation involves not only physical movement but questions of sovereignty, identity and justice. For communities whose identity is bound to a particular place, relocation can mean the loss of the very thing that makes them a community. The decision to retreat is therefore never purely technical. It involves judgements about which places are worth defending, which communities can be moved, and who has the authority to decide.

As insurance withdraws from a growing share of American land, the question of managed retreat is likely to become more pressing. The withdrawal of private insurance is, in effect, a market judgement that certain places are too dangerous to inhabit at current prices. When the state steps in, through residual insurance pools, disaster aid or buyouts, it becomes the arbiter of where society may live, and on what terms. This is a role that American governments, committed to property rights and local autonomy, have been reluctant to assume. It is also one they may be unable to avoid.

6.4 The house as patrimony

Behind all these choices lies the special status of the house in American life. For most middle-class families, the home is the largest single component of household wealth, and for many of modest means it is practically the only one. It is the asset through which savings are accumulated, retirement is financed and wealth is transmitted to the next generation. The paid-off house, left to children, has been one of the principal mechanisms of intergenerational wealth transfer in the American middle and working classes.

In anthropological terms, the house functions as patrimony: an inheritance that links generations and anchors a family’s continuity. The first article of this series analysed the low-rate mortgage as an inalienable possession; the house itself, in many families, has a similar status. It is not merely an investment to be sold when the price is right, but a family seat, the place to which children return and which they expect to inherit.

The insurance crisis threatens this patrimony in two ways. Directly, a disaster that destroys an uninsured or underinsured house can wipe out a family’s wealth in a day. Indirectly, the reclassification of land by risk and the rising cost of insurance can depress the value of houses in exposed areas, eroding the patrimony even without a disaster. Economists have warned that a broad repricing of climate-exposed property could reduce home values substantially in some regions. For families whose wealth is concentrated in a single house in such a region, the consequences would be severe. The question of who bears the risk of living in dangerous places is thus also a question of who will inherit, and what.

This is the fifth claim of this article: the uninsurable home forces a choice between rootedness and safety. It transforms the attachment to place, which the decline of mobility has intensified, into a source of vulnerability; it shapes whether disasters produce dispersal or solidarity; and it pushes the state towards the role of arbiter of where society may live, through residual insurance, buyouts and managed retreat.

7. Conclusion: the house without a shield

For the American middle class of the postwar era, the house was the central asset, the principal form of savings and the symbol of security. It was protected by a shield of insurance so universal that most owners hardly thought about it. The erosion of that shield, in the coastal and wildfire zones where the crisis is most acute and increasingly beyond them, is one of the most consequential social changes of the 2020s.

The anthropological perspective developed here shows that this change is not only financial. The non-renewal of policies expels households from an invisible community of risk, as the granularity of risk pricing dissolves the averaging on which insurance solidarity rested. Climate risk scores create a new cosmology of purity and danger, attaching stigma to land and contested fiercely by those whose homes are reclassified. Going bare returns households to pre-actuarial forms of confidence: providence, luck, self-reliance and kin. The hardening of homes produces a new apotropaic architecture and new rituals of purification. And the uninsurable home forces a choice between rootedness and safety that pushes the state towards decisions it has long avoided.

Whatever weight one assigns to climate change, construction costs, litigation or regulation in explaining the crisis, its social consequences are real. A society in which a growing share of homes are uninsured, or insured only through residual pools of the excluded, is a society in which misfortune is less shared and more individual, in which the value of land is more volatile and contested, and in which the bonds between people and places are under new strain. Restoring insurability, through mitigation, building codes, market reforms or public reinsurance, is a technical challenge. It is also a challenge of solidarity: of deciding how much of the risk of living in a dangerous world Americans are willing to share with one another.

References

Consumer Federation of America. 2024. Exposed: A Report on 1.6 Trillion Dollars of Uninsured American Homes. Washington, DC: CFA.

Douglas, Mary. 1966. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Douglas, Mary and Aaron Wildavsky. 1982. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Erikson, Kai T. 1976. Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Ewald, François. 1986. L’État providence. Paris: Grasset.

Ewald, François. 1991. “Insurance and Risk.” In The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, 197-210. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Malinowski, Bronisław. 1948. Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays. Boston: Beacon Press.

Marino, Elizabeth. 2015. Fierce Climate, Sacred Ground: An Ethnography of Climate Change in Shishmaref, Alaska. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press.

Solnit, Rebecca. 2009. A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster. New York: Viking.

United States Senate Committee on the Budget. 2024. Next to Fall: The Climate-Driven Insurance Crisis Is Here, and Getting Worse. Staff Report. Washington, DC.

Zelizer, Viviana A. Rotman. 1979. Morals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press.

About this series. This article belongs to a ten-part series on the anthropology of contemporary America published by Global Strategy Files. Each study reads a recent social phenomenon in the United States through the tools of anthropology: ritual, kinship, exchange, the body and the sacred.

Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files

Free preview
The Q4 2026 Global Outlook

The opening pages of our four country reports: United States, United Kingdom, Japan and China. A free PDF, sent to your inbox.

You will also receive occasional analysis from Global Strategy Files. Unsubscribe in one click, at any time.

author-avatar

About Driss Effina

Dr. Driss Effina is a distinguished economist, prolific author, and geopolitical strategist ‎whose work explores the intersections of power, economics, governance, and global ‎transformation. Holder of a PhD in Economic Sciences, an Engineering Degree in ‎Statistics, and a Master's in Capital Markets, he has dedicated more than two ‎decades to advancing economic research, shaping public policy, and producing works ‎of strategic analysis that have reached readers in over 40 countries.‎ As the founder of Global Strategy Files LLC an independent American publishing ‎house headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico Dr. Effina has built one of the ‎most ambitious multilingual geopolitical publishing catalogs of the 2020s, with titles in ‎English, French, Spanish, and German spanning topics from the Gulf monarchies and ‎the Kennedy assassination files to the future of the American economy.‎