Pricing the Future
Abstract
Since the Supreme Court struck down the federal ban on state-authorised sports betting in 2018, legal wagering has spread to 39 American jurisdictions. In 2025 Americans legally bet nearly 167 billion dollars on sports, according to the American Gaming Association, and sportsbooks kept almost 17 billion. A second, faster wave followed: prediction markets, federally regulated exchanges such as Kalshi and the American arm of Polymarket, on which users buy and sell contracts on the outcome of almost any future event, from football games and elections to Federal Reserve decisions, weather and award ceremonies. Combined monthly trading on the two largest platforms rose from under 5 billion dollars in September 2025 to about 24 billion in April 2026 and nearly 45 billion in June 2026, during the football World Cup. Sports account for the great majority of the volume. In December 2025 CNN became the first major television network to integrate a prediction market’s real-time odds into its news coverage. At least eleven states have sent cease-and-desist orders to prediction market operators, and courts are divided over whether their sports contracts are lawful financial derivatives or unlicensed gambling.
This article reads the spread of betting and prediction markets as a transformation of the American relationship to the future. Drawing on Clifford Geertz on “deep play”, Roger Caillois on the forms of play, E. E. Evans-Pritchard on oracles, Jackson Lears on the American culture of chance, Jens Beckert on imagined futures, Mary Douglas on classification and Émile Durkheim on the sacred, it makes five claims. First, prediction markets turn the future into a priced object and function, for their users and increasingly for the media, as a secular oracle. Second, they dissolve the long-policed boundary between gambling and finance, a boundary whose legal contest expresses an older moral struggle between the cultures of chance and control. Third, among young men above all, the bet has become a ritual of fellowship and a means of making spectatorship meaningful, a form of Geertzian deep play. Fourth, live and combination betting create a new temporality of continuous anticipation, in which time itself is fragmented into wagerable moments. Fifth, the fight over who may regulate and tax betting reveals the American state’s double role as moral guardian and fiscal beneficiary of chance, while recurring scandals show how betting threatens the sacred integrity of sport.
Keywords: gambling, play, risk, prediction markets, divination, finance, masculinity, United States
1. Introduction: everything has a price
Open the app and the future is for sale. Will the Federal Reserve cut rates at its next meeting? Will it snow in New York on Christmas Day? Who will win the Best Picture award? Will a particular bill pass the Senate this month? How many points will a given player score tonight? Will the home team win the first quarter, and the second, and the game? Each question appears with a price between one cent and ninety-nine cents, which moves in real time as buyers and sellers trade. A contract that pays a dollar if the event happens, priced at 63 cents, implies a 63 percent probability. Users can buy, sell before the event, or hold until it resolves.
This is the interface of a prediction market. The idea is not new. Economists have long argued that markets aggregate dispersed information, and academic prediction markets, such as the Iowa Electronic Markets, were used for decades to forecast elections. But for most of that time, American law confined such markets to small, experimental settings. That changed in the mid-2020s. Kalshi, a company regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a designated contract market, won a court battle in 2024 allowing it to list contracts on elections, then expanded in 2025 into sports. Polymarket, which had operated offshore using cryptocurrency, acquired a regulated American exchange and relaunched for American users in late 2025. Brokerages and sportsbook companies followed with their own event contracts.
Growth was explosive. According to a Pew Research Center analysis of data from The Block, combined monthly trading volume on Kalshi and Polymarket rose from less than 5 billion dollars in September 2025 to about 24 billion in April 2026. During the football World Cup, hosted partly in the United States in June and July 2026, combined volume reached nearly 45 billion dollars in a single month. Sports dominated: roughly 80 percent of Kalshi’s volume came from sports contracts, often in the form of combinations that resemble the parlays of sportsbooks. Politics, cryptocurrency, economics and culture made up the rest.
Prediction markets entered a landscape already transformed by sports betting. Since the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association struck down the federal law that had confined sports betting largely to Nevada, states rushed to legalise it. By 2026, 39 jurisdictions had legal sports betting, most with online wagering, and almost all wagers were placed on mobile phones. In 2025, the American Gaming Association reported, legal sportsbooks took nearly 167 billion dollars in bets, an 11 percent increase over the previous year, and generated about 17 billion dollars in revenue and more than 3.7 billion dollars in state taxes. Betting advertisements saturated sports broadcasts; leagues, once opposed to gambling, signed lucrative partnerships with sportsbooks; and betting odds became a standard feature of sports media.
The debate over these developments has focused on familiar questions. Supporters argue that legal, regulated markets are better than illegal ones, that adults should be free to bet, that prediction markets produce valuable information and that they offer an alternative to traditional gambling with fairer terms. Critics point to rising rates of problem gambling, especially among young men; to the targeting of vulnerable users; to the integrity of sports, threatened by betting-related scandals; to the risks of insider trading on prediction markets; and to the diversion of tax revenue from regulated sportsbooks to federally regulated exchanges that pay no state gambling taxes. These questions are important, and policymakers will continue to debate them.
This article approaches the phenomenon from a different angle. It asks what the spread of betting and prediction markets reveals about the American relationship to the future, to chance, to play and to the sacred. Anthropology has long studied gambling and divination, the two oldest human techniques for engaging with uncertainty. It has much to say about what happens when a society turns the future into an object of wagering on a mass scale.
The article proceeds in six steps. Section 2 examines prediction markets as oracles. Section 3 analyses the collapse of the boundary between gambling and finance. Section 4 turns to betting as a ritual of male fellowship. Section 5 considers the temporality of continuous anticipation. Section 6 examines the state and the sacred. Section 7 concludes.
2. The market as oracle
2.1 Pricing the future
The sociologist Jens Beckert, in Imagined Futures (2016), argued that capitalist economies depend on “fictional expectations”: shared imaginings of the future that guide investment, consumption and innovation, though the future itself is fundamentally uncertain. Prices of financial assets, in this view, are not simply reflections of objective values but crystallised expectations about futures no one can know.
Prediction markets push this logic to its limit. They turn not only economic futures but any uncertain future into a tradable object with a price. The outcome of an election, the weather on a given day, the winner of an award, the decision of a central bank, the number of points scored in a game: each becomes a contract, and the contract’s price becomes a public, continuously updated estimate of probability. The future, which in most human cultures has been the domain of prophecy, hope and fear, becomes a market.
2.2 Oracles
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, in his classic study Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (1937), described how the Azande of central Africa consulted oracles to make decisions and explain misfortune. The most important was the poison oracle, benge: a small dose of poison was administered to a chicken, and the question was answered according to whether the chicken lived or died. The Azande consulted the oracle on matters great and small, from journeys and marriages to accusations of witchcraft. Evans-Pritchard showed that the oracle’s authority rested not on proof but on a coherent system of beliefs that explained away apparent failures and reinforced trust.
Oracles exist in some form in most human societies: the Greek oracle at Delphi, Chinese divination with the Yijing, Roman augury from the flight of birds, the reading of entrails, tarot, astrology. They share several features. They address questions about uncertain futures. They produce answers through a procedure that is not under the control of the questioner. And their authority rests on the belief that the procedure accesses knowledge unavailable to ordinary reason.
The prediction market resembles an oracle in these respects. Users ask questions about uncertain futures. The answer is produced by a procedure, the aggregation of trades, that no individual controls. And its authority rests on a belief, articulated by economists as the “wisdom of crowds” or the efficient aggregation of dispersed information, that the market knows more than any individual. The market price is presented as the best available estimate of the future, superior to polls, pundits and experts.
2.3 The oracle on the news
The oracular function became explicit in December 2025, when CNN announced a partnership with Kalshi, the first between a major television news network and a prediction market. Under the agreement, CNN would display Kalshi’s real-time probabilities on politics, news, culture and weather in its broadcasts and digital coverage, including a live ticker. Other financial media had already integrated prediction market data into their platforms. Supporters presented the partnership as an innovation in data journalism, bringing market-based forecasts alongside polls and analysis. Critics, including some members of Congress, objected that it turned news into a promotion for gambling and created incentives for manipulation.
From an anthropological perspective, the partnership represents the incorporation of a commercial oracle into the public information system. When a news network displays the market price of an election outcome, it presents that price as knowledge about the future, carrying the authority of the crowd. The audience is invited to treat the market, rather than the reporter or the expert, as the source of truth about what will happen. The market becomes, in a sense, a public diviner.
Like all oracles, the prediction market has its explanations for failure. When a market assigns a 70 percent probability to an outcome that does not occur, defenders note that a 30 percent event happens three times in ten. Over many predictions, the market’s calibration can be assessed, and research suggests that prediction markets are often well calibrated. But any single failure can be explained away, and the authority of the market rests, as the Azande oracle’s did, on a broader system of belief: in this case, faith in markets as aggregators of truth.
2.4 From providence to probability
The sociologist Gerda Reith, in The Age of Chance (1999), traced the cultural history of gambling in the West alongside the history of probability. In the medieval world, she argued, chance was understood as an expression of divine will or of fortune, the capricious goddess whose wheel raised and lowered human lives. Games of chance were often forms of divination: the casting of lots was a way of asking God to decide. The mathematical theory of probability, developed from the seventeenth century by Pascal, Fermat and their successors, partly in response to questions posed by gamblers, transformed chance into a calculable quantity. Uncertainty became risk, and risk could be measured, priced and insured.
Prediction markets are, in one sense, the culmination of this history: the extension of probabilistic pricing to every domain of uncertainty. But they also, paradoxically, revive something of its beginning. When a news audience is shown the market’s probability of an election result as though it were a revelation about the future, the price takes on the authority once accorded to the lot or the oracle. The modern faith in calculation and the ancient desire for foreknowledge meet in the ticker on the screen. Probability, which was meant to disenchant chance, has acquired its own enchantment.
There is a further continuity. In many divinatory systems, the act of consulting the oracle was itself a social and ritual event, performed before witnesses, with stakes for the community. The prediction market, too, is a public consultation: millions of participants contribute to the price, and millions more watch it. The difference is that the modern oracle requires a stake. To participate in its divination, one must bet.
This is the first claim of this article: prediction markets turn the future into a priced object and function, for their users and increasingly for the media, as a secular oracle. Their authority rests on a belief in the wisdom of markets that plays the role, in a market society, that belief in the poison oracle played among the Azande.
3. Gambling or finance?
3.1 The contested classification
The central legal battle over prediction markets turns on a question of classification. Are sports event contracts swaps, financial derivatives under the Commodity Exchange Act, regulated exclusively by the CFTC? Or are they wagers on sporting events, subject to state gambling laws, which require licences and impose taxes? The companies and the CFTC argue the former; many states argue the latter. By 2026, at least eleven states had issued cease-and-desist orders to prediction market operators, and litigation was active in at least eight. Courts had divided: a federal appeals court affirmed an injunction barring New Jersey from enforcing its gambling laws against Kalshi; a federal court in Tennessee granted a similar injunction; a Massachusetts state court ruled that Kalshi’s sports contracts were subject to state gaming law; and the Ninth Circuit allowed Nevada’s regulator to proceed against the company, after which Nevada sued. The CFTC, under new leadership, asserted its exclusive jurisdiction and sued some states. The question seemed likely to reach the Supreme Court or prompt congressional action.
Mary Douglas taught that classifications are never merely technical. They sort the world into categories that carry moral meanings, and disputes over classification are disputes over the moral order. The question whether a sports event contract is a swap or a wager is, at one level, a legal question about the scope of federal law. At another, it is a question about the moral status of the activity: is it investment, which American culture values, or gambling, which it has long regarded with suspicion?
3.2 Two cultures of chance
The historian Jackson Lears, in Something for Nothing: Luck in America (2003), traced a long tension in American culture between two attitudes to chance. On one side, a culture of control, rooted in Protestant moralism and later in managerial capitalism, which valued discipline, foresight and the rational mastery of fortune, and condemned gambling as an attempt to get something for nothing. On the other side, a culture of chance, rooted in the gambling of the frontier, the riverboat and the African American and immigrant communities, which accepted luck as a force in human life and found in gambling a form of pleasure, sociability and even grace. American history, Lears argued, has been shaped by the alternation and interweaving of these two cultures.
The boundary between gambling and finance has been one of the principal sites of this tension. In the late nineteenth century, “bucket shops”, where customers bet on the movement of stock prices without buying the stocks, were condemned and eventually outlawed as gambling, while trading on the exchanges was defended as legitimate speculation. The distinction was not always clear in substance: both involved wagering on uncertain future prices. But it was maintained, in law and in culture, because it separated respectable activity from disreputable activity. In Board of Trade v. Christie Grain (1905), the Supreme Court sided with the Chicago exchange against a bucket-shop operator, accepting that futures trading on the exchange served a legitimate economic purpose.
3.3 The collapse of the boundary
Prediction markets dissolve this boundary. They use the forms and legal categories of finance, exchanges, contracts, derivatives, regulation by a financial agency, to offer what many users experience as betting. Their interfaces resemble those of sportsbooks, and their most popular products, combination contracts on sports outcomes, resemble parlays. Yet they are regulated as financial markets, their users may describe themselves as traders rather than bettors, and their promoters emphasise information and price discovery rather than entertainment.
The dissolution works in both directions. While prediction markets bring the forms of finance to betting, retail finance has taken on the forms of gambling. Trading apps have adopted features familiar from games: confetti animations, push notifications, streaks, the instant gratification of mobile transactions. Options trading by retail investors, especially in short-dated contracts that expire within a day, has grown enormously, and resembles betting in its time horizon and risk profile. Cryptocurrency markets, open around the clock and driven by speculation, blur the line further. The economist and the gambler, the investor and the bettor, increasingly use the same devices and the same gestures.
The legal battle over classification can thus be read as a struggle over whether the boundary between gambling and finance can be maintained at all. The states that call event contracts gambling are defending the old classification, and with it their jurisdiction and their tax revenue. The companies and the CFTC that call them swaps are, in effect, arguing that the boundary has become meaningless, or should be redrawn so that the activity falls on the respectable side.
3.4 The case for the market
The defenders of prediction markets have serious arguments, rooted in a long tradition of economic thought. Friedrich Hayek argued in 1945 that the central problem of economic organisation is the use of knowledge dispersed among many individuals, none of whom possesses it all, and that prices are a mechanism for aggregating and communicating that knowledge. The economist Robin Hanson extended this argument to prediction markets, proposing that markets on future events could inform public decisions better than experts or votes. Research on election markets has often found them to be at least as accurate as polls. Supporters argue that well-designed prediction markets produce public goods, information about likely futures, that would not otherwise exist, and that they allow people to hedge real risks, as a farmer might hedge against weather or a business against a policy change.
Supporters also argue that the moral suspicion of gambling is paternalistic, and that adults should be free to wager their own money on outcomes they care about, within regulated markets that protect them from fraud. They note that prediction markets often charge lower margins than sportsbooks and that users trade against one another rather than against the house.
The anthropological perspective does not settle this debate, but it clarifies what is at stake. The argument from information treats the prediction market as an instrument of knowledge; the argument from liberty treats it as a form of consumption; the critics treat it as gambling. All three descriptions capture something real. The difficulty is that the same market performs all three functions at once, for different users, and that its dominant use, by volume, is sports betting. A society deciding how to regulate it must decide which of these meanings to privilege, and that decision is, as Douglas would insist, a moral one.
This is the second claim of this article: prediction markets dissolve the long-policed boundary between gambling and finance, a boundary that has expressed, since the nineteenth century, the tension between American cultures of chance and control. The legal contest over whether event contracts are swaps or wagers is a contest over a moral classification, and its outcome will determine whether American society continues to distinguish speculation from gambling.
4. Deep play and male fellowship
4.1 Geertz in Bali
In 1958 Clifford Geertz and his wife arrived in a Balinese village to begin fieldwork, and were ignored by the villagers until a police raid on a cockfight sent everyone running, the anthropologists included. Their flight with the villagers earned them acceptance, and Geertz’s subsequent essay, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight” (1973), became one of the most influential texts in anthropology.
Geertz borrowed the term “deep play” from Jeremy Bentham, who used it for gambling in which the stakes are so high that it is irrational to participate. Geertz observed that in the Balinese cockfight, the most important bets, the central bets between the owners of the cocks and their allies, were often made at even money between closely matched birds, so that the expected financial return was close to zero. What was at stake was not money but status: the prestige of the men and their kin groups, which was affirmed or lost through the fight. The cockfight, Geertz argued, was “a Balinese reading of Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves about themselves”. It dramatised, in a contained form, the status rivalries and passions of Balinese social life.
4.2 The group chat and the parlay
American sports betting, as it has developed since 2018, has acquired some of the features of deep play. Survey research consistently shows that sports betting is most common among young men. Betting is often a social activity: friends place bets together, share their picks in group chats, follow games together while “sweating” their bets, celebrate wins and commiserate over losses. The parlay, a combination bet that pays a large sum only if every leg wins, is especially popular among young bettors and is shared as a kind of social object: a screenshot of a nearly successful parlay, with one leg failing, is a staple of online sports culture.
In these practices, the bet functions less as a financial transaction than as a medium of male fellowship. It provides a reason to watch games together, a topic of conversation, a basis for rivalry and banter, and a test of knowledge and judgement. The bettor who correctly predicts an outcome gains status among his peers; the one who loses is teased. As in Geertz’s cockfight, the bets are “a story they tell themselves about themselves”: about their knowledge of the game, their nerve and their judgement, and their place in the group.
4.3 Making spectatorship matter
Roger Caillois, in Man, Play and Games (1958), classified games by four principles: agon, competition; alea, chance; mimicry, simulation; and ilinx, vertigo. Sports are primarily agonistic; gambling is primarily aleatory. Sports betting fuses the two: it adds chance to competition, and gives the spectator a stake in the contest. The spectator who has bet on a game is no longer a passive observer; he participates, through his wager, in the agon.
This fusion helps explain the appeal of betting in an era when spectatorship has fragmented. A young fan watching on a phone, with hundreds of games available, may find that a bet gives meaning to a game that would otherwise not matter to him: a mid-season contest between two teams he does not support, a foreign league, an obscure college game. The bet makes every game matter. It creates, in Geertz’s sense, depth where there was none.
The cost of this depth can be high. Clinicians and researchers have documented increases in problem gambling since legalisation, with young men disproportionately affected, and helplines in many states report rising calls. The same features that make betting a medium of fellowship, its sociability, its constant availability, its integration into the experience of watching sport, can make it difficult to control. Deep play, as Bentham warned, can be ruinous.
4.4 When play becomes work
Johan Huizinga, in Homo Ludens (1938), argued that play is a free activity, standing outside ordinary life, “not serious” yet absorbing, bounded in time and space, governed by its own rules and pursued for its own sake, without material interest. Play, he believed, was at the root of culture: of ritual, poetry, law and war. But he also warned that play could be corrupted when it was penetrated by material interest and professional seriousness. When the game becomes a means to profit, it loses its play-character.
The integration of betting into sport raises Huizinga’s concern in a new form. For the spectator who bets, the game is no longer pursued for its own sake; it is a means to a financial end, or at least a stake in one. The bettor’s relation to the game shifts from the free absorption of play to something closer to work: research, analysis, the monitoring of odds and injuries, the management of a bankroll. Many serious sports bettors describe their activity in exactly these terms, as a discipline requiring study and self-control.
There is an irony here. Sports betting gives depth to spectatorship, as argued above, but it may also drain spectatorship of its play-character. The fan who loved a team for its own sake, regardless of profit, watched in Huizinga’s spirit. The bettor who watches a game in which he has no allegiance, solely because he has money on it, watches in a different spirit. Whether American sports culture can preserve the first while accommodating the second is one of the cultural questions the betting boom poses.
This is the third claim of this article: among young men above all, sports betting has become a ritual of fellowship and a means of making spectatorship meaningful, a form of Geertzian deep play in which the stakes are status and belonging as much as money. Fusing Caillois’s agon and alea, it gives every game a stake for the bettor, at a cost that, for some, becomes ruinous.
5. The temporality of continuous anticipation
5.1 From the event to the moment
Traditional betting was organised around events. One bet on a race, a fight, a game or an election, and waited for the outcome. The bet structured time into a period of anticipation followed by a moment of resolution. Between bets, ordinary life resumed.
Mobile sports betting and prediction markets have transformed this temporality. “Live” or “in-game” betting allows wagers to be placed continuously during a game, on the outcome of the next play, the next possession, the next pitch. “Micro-betting” offers markets on ever smaller units of time. Prediction markets offer contracts that resolve within hours or minutes, on everything from a quarter’s score to the movement of a cryptocurrency price within the hour. Combination contracts, which Kalshi calls “exotics”, link multiple outcomes into a single wager. The unit of betting has shrunk from the event to the moment.
5.2 The zone
The anthropologist Natasha Dow Schüll, in Addiction by Design (2012), studied the players of electronic gambling machines in Las Vegas. She found that the machines were designed to produce what players called “the zone”: a state of absorption in continuous play, in which time, space and the self seemed to dissolve. Players sought not to win but to remain in the zone, and the machines were engineered, through rapid play, near misses and continuous reward schedules, to keep them there.
Live and micro-betting bring something of this temporality into the experience of sport. The bettor is not waiting for a single outcome but engaged in a continuous sequence of small wagers, each resolving quickly and leading to the next. The game is experienced not as a narrative with a beginning, middle and end, but as a stream of wagerable moments. Attention is fixed on the next play, the next price, the next resolution. The rhythm of the bet, rather than the rhythm of the game, structures time.
5.3 The perpetual near future
The temporality of continuous anticipation extends beyond sport. Prediction markets on news, politics, weather and culture invite users to experience the news itself as a sequence of wagerable outcomes. Each development, a statement by a politician, a weather forecast, an economic data release, moves prices, and the user who holds positions experiences the news as gain or loss. The future is no longer a distant horizon but a perpetual near future, always about to resolve.
Anthropologists have long been interested in how societies structure time: the cyclical time of agricultural and ritual calendars, the linear time of progress and history, the punctuated time of crisis and revolution. The temporality of continuous anticipation is a distinctive form, in which time is fragmented into a stream of small uncertainties, each with a price. It resonates with other features of contemporary digital culture: the feed that never ends, the notification that always promises something new, the attention economy that monetises each moment of engagement. The betting app is, in this sense, an intensified version of the smartphone itself.
This is the fourth claim of this article: live betting, micro-betting and short-dated prediction contracts create a new temporality of continuous anticipation, in which time is fragmented into wagerable moments and the future becomes a perpetual near future, always about to resolve. This temporality, close to the “zone” that Schüll described among machine gamblers, extends from sport to the news and resonates with the broader attention economy of digital life.
6. The state and the sacred
6.1 The state as croupier
The American state’s relationship to gambling has long been ambivalent. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most forms of gambling were illegal in most states, and moral reformers campaigned against lotteries, gambling halls and betting. Yet states also depended on gambling for revenue: lotteries financed public works in the colonial and early national periods, and from New Hampshire in 1964 onward states revived lotteries as a source of revenue, promoting them through advertising. By the twenty-first century, nearly every state ran a lottery, and many had legalised casinos.
Sports betting extended this pattern. States that legalised it after 2018 did so in large part for revenue: in 2025, sports betting generated more than 3.7 billion dollars in state taxes. The state became, in effect, a partner in the betting business, licensing operators, setting tax rates and benefiting from the losses of bettors. At the same time, states retained their role as moral guardians, funding programmes for problem gambling, imposing advertising restrictions and enforcing age limits.
The rise of prediction markets threatens both roles. Because prediction markets are regulated federally and pay no state gambling taxes, they divert revenue from state-licensed sportsbooks; the American Gaming Association estimated that they had already cost states more than half a billion dollars in potential tax revenue. And because they operate outside state gambling regulation, they escape the age limits, advertising rules and responsible gambling requirements that states impose. The states’ legal challenges to prediction markets can thus be read as defences of both their fiscal interest and their moral jurisdiction. The two are inseparable: the state that profits from gambling also claims the right to regulate it.
6.2 The sacred integrity of sport
Émile Durkheim defined the sacred as that which is set apart and protected by prohibitions. In modern secular societies, sport has acquired some of the qualities of the sacred: it is set apart from ordinary life, surrounded by rituals and emotions, and protected by rules whose violation provokes outrage. The integrity of competition, the assurance that the contest is genuine and its outcome uncertain, is the central sacred value of sport. The fixing of games is its gravest profanation.
The spread of betting puts this sacred value under pressure. When every play can be wagered on, every participant, player, referee, coach, becomes a potential source of profanation. American sport has known betting scandals since the Chicago “Black Sox” fixing of the 1919 World Series. The legalisation of betting has brought new ones. In 2024 and 2025, several professional athletes were suspended or banned for betting violations, including a Major League Baseball player banned for life for betting on games. In October 2025, federal prosecutors announced charges against a number of people, including a current National Basketball Association player and a head coach, in investigations involving illegal betting and alleged manipulation tied to sports wagering and rigged card games. The leagues, which had embraced betting partnerships, found themselves defending the integrity on which their value depends.
Prediction markets add a further dimension: the risk of insider trading on non-sporting events. A contract on whether a company will announce a product, whether an official will resign, or whether a policy will be adopted, can be profitably traded by those with advance knowledge. Proposed legislation in 2026 would impose penalties for such insider trading. The sacred in this case is not the integrity of sport but the integrity of public life itself: the assurance that those who make decisions do not profit from betting on them.
This is the fifth claim of this article: the contest over who may regulate and tax betting reveals the American state’s double role as moral guardian and fiscal beneficiary of chance, a role that prediction markets threaten on both fronts. And the recurring scandals of the betting era show how the spread of wagering puts under pressure the sacred integrity of sport, and potentially of public life, on which the value of the contest depends.
7. Conclusion: a society that bets on itself
The spread of sports betting and prediction markets is one of the most rapid transformations in American social life in recent decades. In less than ten years, betting has moved from the margins of legality to the centre of sports media, and prediction markets have grown from academic experiments into exchanges handling tens of billions of dollars a month and supplying odds to a major news network.
The anthropological perspective developed here shows that this transformation concerns more than gambling. Prediction markets turn the future into a priced object and serve as secular oracles. They dissolve the boundary between gambling and finance that has expressed, for more than a century, the American tension between cultures of chance and control. Sports betting has become a ritual of male fellowship and a form of deep play that gives meaning to spectatorship. Live betting and short-dated contracts create a temporality of continuous anticipation. And the contest over regulation reveals the state’s double role and the pressure on the sacred integrity of sport.
Geertz wrote that the Balinese cockfight was a story the Balinese told themselves about themselves. The American betting boom can be read in the same way. It tells a story about a society that has come to see the future as a market, that trusts prices more than experts, that seeks meaning and fellowship in shared risk, that lives in a perpetual near future of small uncertainties, and that has not decided whether chance is a vice to be controlled or a pleasure to be licensed. Whether that story ends in a richer culture of play or in a costly epidemic of losses depends on choices that legislators, courts, regulators and bettors are making now.
What is clear is that a society that bets on everything is also, in a sense, betting on itself: on its capacity to enjoy chance without being consumed by it, to use markets for knowledge without surrendering judgement to them, and to protect the integrity of its contests, sporting and civic, from the profits that can be made by corrupting them.
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Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files
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