Decoded

Incense for Uncertain Times: Young Chinese, Temples and the Re-enchantment of Precarity

Decoded analysis cover: Incense for Uncertain Times: Young Chinese, Temples and the Re-enchantment of Precarity
Anthropology of Contemporary China | Article 7 of 10

Abstract

In early 2023, as youth unemployment approached record levels, bookings for temple visits on China’s largest travel platform rose by 310% year on year, and nearly half were made by people born in the 1990s and 2000s. Beijing’s Lama Temple received around 40,000 visitors a day. A slogan spread online: between going to work and striving, I chose burning incense. Since then, temple bracelets, temple coffee, “electronic wooden fish” apps and the habit of reciting one’s identity-card number to the Buddha have become fixtures of Chinese youth culture.

This article argues that the phenomenon is neither a religious revival in the conventional sense nor a mere fashion. Drawing on Bronisław Malinowski’s theory of magic and uncertainty, Adam Yuet Chau’s work on efficacy (ling) in Chinese popular religion, Stephan Feuchtwang and Emily Ahern on the “imperial metaphor”, Stanley Tambiah on amulets, and Grace Davie’s “believing without belonging”, it makes five claims. First, young people use temples as Malinowski’s Trobrianders used magic: for the domains of life where skill no longer guarantees results. Second, what they seek is not doctrine but ling, efficacy, in continuity with Chinese popular religion. Third, the recitation of identity numbers reveals a bureaucratic imagination of the gods, an imperial metaphor updated for the digital state. Fourth, the commodified sacred, bracelets and coffee, works as portable efficacy. Fifth, the ironic tone of the practice is not a sign of unbelief but a protective frame that allows hope to be expressed without being exposed.

Keywords: religion, magic, uncertainty, efficacy, Buddhism, youth, commodification, China

1. Introduction: “I chose incense”

In the spring of 2023, a pun travelled across Chinese social media. Zai shangban he shangjin zhijian, wo xuanze le shangxiang (在上班和上进之间,我选择了上香): between going to work and striving to advance, I chose burning incense. The joke works on three verbs that share the syllable shang: to go up to work, to go up in the world, to go up with incense. A companion line followed: between asking others and asking myself, I chose asking the Buddha (Our China Story).

The joke described a real movement. According to Trip.com, bookings for temple-related scenic sites in the first weeks of 2023 rose by 310% year on year, and nearly half of those booking since February were born after 1990 (The Paper). Beijing’s Lama Temple (Yonghegong) received over 40,000 visitors a day (Sixth Tone). Its prayer bracelets became, in an online joke, one of Beijing’s three great specialities, alongside roast duck and pastries. A survey of young people born after 1990 found that nearly eight in ten had burned incense at a temple, mainly to relieve stress or anxiety (Our China Story, citing Nandu Big Data Research Institute).

The trend has outlasted the first wave of coverage. Long overnight queues for the first incense of the Lunar New Year at the Lama Temple have continued in later years (China Christian Daily). The question is what it means. Chinese commentators have been divided between those who see a healthy search for calm, those who see superstition, and those who see a consumer fad. This article proposes that anthropology offers a fourth reading, in which the practice is a rational response to a specific kind of uncertainty, expressed through the oldest grammar of Chinese religion.

A note on method

The article is interpretive and documentary. It draws on Chinese and international reporting, platform data as reported in the press, and survey findings cited by Chinese media, read against the anthropology of Chinese religion and of magic. It does not rest on fieldwork in temples. The scale of the trend is measured mostly by commercial platforms with an interest in publicising it, and the figures should be read as indications rather than precise measures.

2. The phenomenon: a repertoire of practices

The “incense-burning youth” (上香青年) became, by one industry survey, the leading catchphrase of China’s tourism year in 2023 (CNN via Yahoo News). Behind the phrase lies a varied repertoire.

  • Pilgrimage to specialised temples. Different temples are known for different kinds of efficacy. The Lama Temple in Beijing is associated with career and wealth. Beijing’s Wofo Temple, the Temple of the Reclining Buddha, became popular with students and job seekers because its name, wofo, sounds like the English word “offer”, as in a job or admission offer (Sixth Tone).
  • Prayer for passage. Young visitors pray above all for examination success, admission, jobs and promotion; a widely repeated phrase advised “burn incense before you reach the shore” (上岸前先上香) (Digitaling).
  • Bracelets and objects. Temple bracelets became coveted goods. At Hangzhou’s Lingyin Temple, people queued from six in the morning in 40°C heat for “eighteen-seed” bodhi bracelets, until sales were paused; the Lama Temple’s official online shop sold bracelets at an average of 200 to 500 yuan (The Paper). The Lama Temple itself issued a statement that it had not authorised third-party platforms to sell its bracelets (WION).
  • Temple consumption. Temple coffee shops multiplied. At Hangzhou’s Yongfu Temple, the “Cibei” café, a pun on cibei, compassion, gives its drinks names such as “Washing away worries” for an Americano and offers a “Whatever fate brings” blind-box coffee (CBNData). Vegetarian temple meals, temple-themed guesthouses and short retreats followed.
  • Digital devotion. Before and alongside physical visits, apps offering an “electronic wooden fish” to tap for merit and “electronic prayer beads” spread widely (The Paper).
  • Self-identification before the deity. Social media posts describe crowds of young worshippers reciting their identity-card numbers in front of Buddha images, so that the deity knows exactly who is asking (NetEase).

This repertoire combines very old practices, pilgrimage, incense, vows and amulets, with very new ones, apps, branded coffee and online shops. It is the combination, not any single element, that requires explanation.

3. Magic and uncertainty: the Trobriand lagoon and the job market

Malinowski’s fishermen

In Magic, Science and Religion, Bronisław Malinowski reported an observation from the Trobriand Islands that has become one of the most quoted in anthropology. In the inner lagoon, where fishing was easy and safe, islanders used no magic; they relied on skill and knowledge. On the open sea, where fishing was dangerous and its results uncertain, they performed elaborate magical rites. Magic, Malinowski concluded, is not a confused form of science. It is used precisely where knowledge and technique reach their limits, where outcomes matter greatly and cannot be controlled.

When skill stops guaranteeing results

The life course of a Chinese graduate in the 2020s has moved, in Malinowski’s terms, from the lagoon to the open sea. A generation raised on the promise that effort produces results, that study leads to examinations, examinations to admission, admission to a job, now faces domains where effort no longer guarantees anything. Previous articles in this series have documented the scale of that uncertainty: civil-service examinations with nearly a hundred qualified candidates per post, youth unemployment near one in five, and private sectors subject to sudden collapse.

It is exactly in these domains that the temple practices concentrate. Young visitors do not pray for skill or knowledge; they have those, often in abundance. They pray for outcomes: the offer, the admission, the landing on the shore. The specialisation of temples, Wofo for offers, the Lama Temple for careers, maps the sacred geography onto the zones of maximum uncertainty in the life course.

Magic as rational

Malinowski’s insight protects the phenomenon against two common misreadings. It is not irrational backsliding into superstition, since those who burn incense also study, apply and network. And it is not simply a fad, since it responds to a real and widely shared condition. Magic, in his account, has a psychological function: it allows people to act when action is otherwise impossible, to transform anxiety into a ritual of hope. Chinese survey findings that most young temple visitors go to relieve stress and anxiety fit this function closely (Our China Story).

There is, however, one difference from the Trobriand case. Trobriand fishermen faced the uncertainty of nature. Chinese graduates face the uncertainty of institutions: labour markets, examination quotas, corporate decisions. Their magic is aimed not at the wind and the waves but at the social machinery that decides their fates. This difference shapes the form of their devotion, as the next section shows.

4. Efficacy without doctrine: ling and the bureaucratic gods

Not a Buddhist revival

Reporting on the trend has repeatedly noted that most young temple visitors are not Buddhists in any doctrinal sense. A Global Times investigation concluded that the trend was “not about Buddhist beliefs” but driven by mixed motivations (The Standard). Visitors rarely study scriptures, take refuge or join a community. Grace Davie’s phrase for post-war Britain, “believing without belonging”, captures part of this. But in the Chinese case even “believing” may be too strong. What the young seek is something else.

The logic of ling

The anthropology of Chinese popular religion has long insisted that its central category is not belief but ling (灵), efficacy: the demonstrated capacity of a deity or a place to respond to requests. Adam Yuet Chau’s ethnography of a temple in northern Shaanxi showed how a deity’s reputation rose and fell with its “miraculous responses” (灵应), and how crowds gathered where efficacy was proven. People went to the god that worked, not to the god whose doctrine they accepted.

The contemporary youth trend follows this logic exactly. The Lama Temple’s fame among job seekers spread through social-media stories of former worshippers who obtained jobs after visiting it (Dao Insights). Wofo’s reputation rests on a pun, but a pun that “works” is efficacious enough. The specialisation of temples by domain, career, exams, love, is the classic structure of a popular religion organised around ling. What is new is only the medium through which efficacy is reported: Xiaohongshu posts rather than village rumour.

The imperial metaphor, updated

The most revealing practice is the recitation of identity-card numbers before the Buddha. It sounds like a joke, and it is partly one. But it repeats with uncanny precision a structure that anthropologists identified decades ago.

Stephan Feuchtwang and Emily Ahern showed that Chinese popular religion often imagines the other world on the model of the imperial bureaucracy. Gods hold ranks and offices; petitions are written in bureaucratic form; offerings resemble fees; the underworld keeps registers of the living and the dead. Feuchtwang called this the imperial metaphor. To approach a god was to approach an official, with the right documents and the right identification.

The contemporary Chinese state identifies its citizens above all through the eighteen-digit identity number, which is required for everything from train tickets to job applications and examination registration. To recite that number to the Buddha is to treat the deity as an official who must locate the petitioner in a register before acting on the request. The imperial metaphor has become a digital-state metaphor. The young worshipper approaches the god exactly as she approaches the examination authority: by entering her ID.

This is the deepest sense in which the magic of the young is aimed at institutions rather than nature. Their gods are imagined as a higher bureaucracy, one that might intervene in the lower bureaucracies of examinations and employment. The petition is, in effect, an appeal to a superior office.

5. The commodified sacred: bracelets, coffee and portable efficacy

Amulets and their markets

The commercial side of the trend has attracted much criticism, from Buddhist clergy, state media and online commentators alike. Bracelets sold for hundreds of yuan, coffee named after Buddhist virtues and temple-branded souvenirs seem to many a profanation of the sacred. Anthropology suggests a more nuanced reading.

Stanley Tambiah’s study of the cult of amulets in Thailand showed that the sale and circulation of sacred objects is not a corruption of Buddhism but one of its oldest and most widespread forms. Amulets blessed by charismatic monks carry the monk’s power into the everyday lives of their owners. Their market value reflects their perceived efficacy. Commerce and devotion are intertwined, not opposed.

Chinese temple bracelets work in the same way. A bracelet from the Lama Temple or Lingyin carries the temple’s ling away from the site and onto the wrist. It is portable efficacy: a small, wearable piece of the sacred that accompanies its owner to the examination hall, the interview and the office. The queues at dawn and the price of a bracelet are measures of how much efficacy the young believe a particular temple holds. The Lama Temple’s public warning against unauthorised sellers is, in this light, a defence of the authenticity of its ling, the equivalent of a brand protecting its trademark (WION).

Temple coffee as liminal space

Temple coffee works differently. The “Cibei” café’s menu turns drinks into blessings: an Americano that washes away worries, a mocha that brings joy, a blind-box drink called “Whatever fate brings” (CBNData). The coffee shop sits at the threshold of the temple, between the city and the sacred precinct. It offers a familiar urban ritual, the coffee break, slightly transformed by proximity to the sacred.

In this sense, temple coffee is a translation device. It allows young urbanites to approach the temple through a practice they already know, to enter the sacred without fully leaving the secular. The blind-box drink is particularly revealing: it fuses a fashionable consumer format, the surprise purchase, with the Buddhist idea of accepting what fate brings. The consumer’s gamble and the believer’s resignation meet in a single cup.

When commerce becomes scandal

The line between devotion and exploitation is real, and the state has drawn it sharply. In July 2025, Shi Yongxin, the abbot of the Shaolin Temple who had turned it into a vast commercial enterprise, was placed under investigation for misappropriating temple assets and violating Buddhist precepts, according to Chinese reporting (NetEase). Chinese authorities have for years sought to curb the commercialisation of Buddhist and Taoist sites. The youth trend thus unfolds in a space where the market for efficacy is both encouraged as cultural tourism and policed as potential abuse.

6. Irony and devotion: the half-serious rite

The tone of the practice

Almost everything young Chinese say about their temple visits is wrapped in irony. The founding slogan is a pun. Bracelets are joked about as Beijing’s local speciality. Visitors post photographs with captions mocking their own devotion; a commentary observed that this generation “burns incense more competitively than it goes to work” (NetEase). Temple souvenirs carry deliberately incongruous slogans, such as a Nanjing temple’s “You’re so great, the Buddha must like you” (Winshang).

To many observers, this tone proves that the practice is not “really” religious. The anthropology of ritual suggests the opposite conclusion.

Irony as a protective frame

The first article in this series analysed the crude name of the “Are You Dead?” app as a modern form of apotropaic speech, a way of keeping a dangerous subject at a distance by mocking it. The irony surrounding temple visits performs a similar function. To ask the gods sincerely for a job is to expose one’s hope, and therefore one’s vulnerability. If the job does not come, the sincere petitioner has been humiliated twice: by the market and by the gods. The ironic petitioner is protected. She was only joking.

Gregory Bateson’s analysis of play applies here. A frame that signals “this is not serious” allows actions that would be too risky, or too revealing, if performed in earnest. Irony is such a frame. Within it, young people can do exactly what their grandparents did, kneel, burn incense, vow, while preserving the self-image of educated moderns who know better. The frame does not cancel the devotion. It makes the devotion possible.

Between rationalism and hope

There is a specifically Chinese history behind this need for a frame. For most of the twentieth century, official ideology treated popular religion as “feudal superstition” (封建迷信), and the education received by today’s young people remains strongly secular and scientistic. A university graduate who prays for an offer stands in tension with the worldview she was taught. Irony resolves the tension without forcing a choice. It allows the coexistence of a rationalist self-presentation and a hopeful practice.

The Malinowskian reading of section 3 and the ironic frame described here are therefore complementary. Magic responds to uncertainty; irony protects the magician. Together they produce the distinctive register of the trend: a half-serious rite, performed with full seriousness of gesture and partial seriousness of speech.

7. The state, religion and the limits of tolerance

A tolerated revival

The Chinese state regulates religion closely. Five religions are officially recognised, places of worship must be registered, Communist Party members are required to be atheists, and the policy of “sinicisation” of religion seeks to align religious life with the party’s priorities. Against this background, the official response to the youth temple trend has been notably mild.

The reason lies partly in the forms the trend takes. It is concentrated in registered Buddhist and Taoist sites with a long history of state supervision. It involves no new organisations, no proselytising and no communal identity that could compete with the party. And it is easily absorbed into categories the state actively promotes: traditional culture, domestic tourism and the “national trend” (国潮) in consumption. A temple visit can be classified as heritage, leisure or consumption before it is classified as religion.

Media ambivalence

Official and mainstream media have nonetheless expressed ambivalence. In 2023, a hashtag about Chinese media commenting on young people preferring temples to classes drew more than 130 million views on Weibo (Jing Daily). Commentators have alternated between sympathy for young people’s pressures, gentle mockery of their “mysticism” (玄学), and warnings against superstition and commercial exploitation.

The line: belonging, not believing

The pattern resembles the one identified for nostalgia in the fourth article of this series. There, aesthetic nostalgia was tolerated while comparative nostalgia was watched. Here, a similar line appears. Individual, consumer and ironic religiosity, believing without belonging, is tolerated. What would be watched is the transformation of this diffuse religiosity into belonging: into new communities, charismatic leaders or networks beyond official control.

The youth trend sits, for the moment, on the safe side of that line. Its very features, irony, consumption, individualism and the focus on personal success, make it compatible with the official order. A generation that asks the Buddha for a civil-service post is not challenging the state; it is asking a higher bureaucracy for help in entering the lower one.

8. Comparisons: power spots, fortune cafés and the spiritual-but-not-religious

SocietyPracticeTypical usersWhat it shares with ChinaWhat differs
Japan“Power spots” (パワースポット), shrine charms (omamori) and the collecting of shrine seal stamps (goshūin)Young adults, especially women, since the 2000sIndividual, consumer-oriented, focused on efficacy and luck; mixes tourism and devotionLong tradition of commercial charms at shrines; little state concern
South KoreaSaju (four pillars) fortune-telling cafés and apps; consultations with shamansYoung adults facing job and marriage uncertaintyUse of divination at moments of life-course uncertainty; ironic toneRooted in shamanic and divinatory rather than temple traditions
Western Europe and North AmericaAstrology apps, tarot, meditation retreats; “spiritual but not religious” identitiesYoung urban adultsDetachment from institutions; therapeutic framing; commodificationUsually framed as self-care rather than as petition for outcomes

The comparison reveals what is distinctive about the Chinese case. In Japan, the commercial sale of charms at shrines is centuries old and barely controversial. In the West, contemporary spirituality is mostly therapeutic: it seeks inner calm rather than external results. Chinese youth religiosity combines both and adds a third element: it is overwhelmingly petitionary and outcome-oriented, and its petitions are addressed to gods imagined in bureaucratic form.

The Chinese practice is also unusually concentrated on a single type of outcome: passage through institutional gates, examinations, admissions, hiring. In this sense, it is the religious counterpart of the civil-service fever examined in the previous article. The same generation that queues by the million for examination places also queues at dawn for temple bracelets, often for the same reason.

9. Conclusion: the open sea

The young Chinese who choose incense between work and striving are not abandoning modernity. They are responding to a specific form of it: one in which the institutions that structured their lives have become unpredictable, and in which effort no longer guarantees results.

  • Like Malinowski’s fishermen, they reserve magic for the open sea: the examinations, interviews and job markets where skill is necessary but not sufficient.
  • They seek efficacy rather than doctrine (ling), in direct continuity with Chinese popular religion, with social media replacing village rumour as the channel through which efficacy is proven.
  • They imagine the gods as a higher bureaucracy, reciting their identity numbers as the imperial metaphor is updated for the digital state.
  • They carry efficacy away in portable sacred objects, bracelets that work as amulets, while temple coffee offers a threshold between city and sanctuary.
  • They wrap their devotion in irony, a protective frame that allows hope to be expressed without exposing the hoper to humiliation.
  • And they do all this within limits of tolerance set by a state that accepts individual, consumer religiosity but would watch any move from believing to belonging.

Read with the rest of this series, the temple trend shows the inner side of the uncertainty that the other articles approached from outside. The pretend office, the civil-service fever and the full-time child are institutional responses to a stalled transition into adulthood. The incense is the response of hope. It does not change the odds. It changes what it feels like to face them.

Questions for fieldwork

  • How do young temple visitors describe the relation between their prayers and their efforts: as supplement, insurance, joke or genuine belief?
  • Do petitions concentrate around examination and recruitment calendars?
  • How do monks and temple staff perceive the young visitors, and have temples changed their rituals to accommodate them?
  • Does the practice lead to any lasting religious involvement, or does it remain episodic and individual?
  • How do parents of young visitors, raised in an era of official hostility to “superstition”, regard their children’s devotion?

References

Theoretical and ethnographic works

  • Ahern, Emily Martin. 1981. Chinese Ritual and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Bateson, Gregory. 1955. “A Theory of Play and Fantasy.” Psychiatric Research Reports 2.
  • Chau, Adam Yuet. 2006. Miraculous Response: Doing Popular Religion in Contemporary China. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  • Davie, Grace. 1994. Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Feuchtwang, Stephan. 1992. The Imperial Metaphor: Popular Religion in China. London: Routledge.
  • Malinowski, Bronisław. 1948. Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays. Boston: Beacon Press.
  • Tambiah, Stanley J. 1984. The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Yang, C. K. 1961. Religion in Chinese Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Press, commentary and data sources

About this series. This article belongs to a ten-part series on the anthropology of contemporary China published by Global Strategy Files. Each study reads a recent social phenomenon through the tools of anthropology: ritual, kinship, exchange, the body and the sacred.

Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files

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About Driss Effina

Dr. Driss Effina is a distinguished economist, prolific author, and geopolitical strategist ‎whose work explores the intersections of power, economics, governance, and global ‎transformation. Holder of a PhD in Economic Sciences, an Engineering Degree in ‎Statistics, and a Master's in Capital Markets, he has dedicated more than two ‎decades to advancing economic research, shaping public policy, and producing works ‎of strategic analysis that have reached readers in over 40 countries.‎ As the founder of Global Strategy Files LLC an independent American publishing ‎house headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico Dr. Effina has built one of the ‎most ambitious multilingual geopolitical publishing catalogs of the 2020s, with titles in ‎English, French, Spanish, and German spanning topics from the Gulf monarchies and ‎the Kennedy assassination files to the future of the American economy.‎