Decoded

Paid to Be a Child: ‘Full-Time Children’ and the Reversal of Care in Contemporary China

Decoded analysis cover: Paid to Be a Child: 'Full-Time Children' and the Reversal of Care in Contemporary China
Anthropology of Contemporary China | Article 2 of 10

Abstract

Since late 2022, young Chinese adults have described themselves online as quanzhi ernü (全职儿女), “full-time sons and daughters”: graduates who return to the parental home and receive a monthly sum in exchange for cooking, cleaning, running errands and keeping their parents company. Press coverage has treated the phenomenon as a colourful symptom of youth unemployment. This article argues that it is better understood as a ritual and semantic innovation: a way of re-describing a transfer of money from parents to children so that it can be lived without shame.

Drawing on Viviana Zelizer’s sociology of money, Charles Stafford’s analysis of the Chinese “cycle of yang“, Yan Yunxiang’s concept of descending familism, Victor Turner’s work on liminality and Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of misrecognition, the article develops five arguments. First, the full-time child’s “salary” performs an inverse misrecognition: where domestic economies usually disguise labour as love, this one disguises support as wages. Second, the arrangement compresses the Chinese cycle of reciprocity between generations, turning filial repayment, normally owed in old age, into a service purchased in advance, which I call prepaid filiality. Third, the vocabulary of employment that full-time children adopt amounts to a mimetic firm built inside the family. Fourth, full-time childhood is a suspended rite of passage, a voluntary and named liminality between school and work. Fifth, the phenomenon is a contest over naming: the same young people are called unemployed by statisticians, filial by state media and employed by themselves.

Keywords: kinship, money, filial piety, reciprocity, liminality, youth unemployment, urban China

1. Introduction: a salary for being a daughter

In 2023, NBC News interviewed a young woman in Hangzhou who had left her job to work for her parents. Her new position, as she described it, was simply to be their daughter. In return, they paid her 8,000 yuan a month, roughly the national average wage (NBC News). Other cases reported at the time varied widely: a daughter paid 5,000 yuan a month to do the laundry and cook for her parents (Cardiff Journalism), a woman paid 15,000 yuan to accompany her parents on walks and watch over their health, and, more typically, sums of 3,000 to 4,000 yuan (Sixth Tone).

The figure of the paid child provoked equal parts amusement, envy and scorn. It seemed to condense, in a single image, everything that had gone wrong for China’s graduates: a labour market that could not absorb them, a property market that had put independent housing out of reach, and a work culture whose long hours many no longer wished to accept. Economists read the phenomenon as hidden unemployment. Moralists read it as idleness. State media, according to critics quoted at the time, tried to present it as a renewal of filial piety.

All three readings share an assumption: that the important thing about full-time children is what they are, unemployed, idle or filial. This article starts instead from what they say. The striking feature of the phenomenon is not that adult children live with their parents and are supported by them. That is common across the world and has long been common in China. It is that the support is called a salary, the chores are called a job, and the online community that gathered around the label calls itself a “work communication centre”. The innovation is linguistic before it is economic.

Anthropology is well equipped for such innovations. It has long studied how societies classify money, how they keep the gift apart from the commodity, and how they mark the passage from one stage of life to the next. The following sections use those tools to ask what the language of employment does for the young people who adopt it, for their parents, and for a society that is struggling to give a name to its own surplus of educated youth.

A note on method

The article is interpretive and documentary, not ethnographic. It draws on press reporting in English and Chinese, on the self-presentation of full-time children quoted in that reporting and on social media, and on official labour statistics. It reads these materials against the anthropological literature on Chinese kinship, reciprocity and ritual. The available evidence has clear limits. Nobody knows how many young Chinese live as full-time children, the online community is small and self-selected, and the media gravitate towards unusual cases with high salaries. Claims about prevalence, class and gender are therefore stated as hypotheses, and the conclusion lists the questions fieldwork would need to answer.

2. The phenomenon: origins, scale and context

The label first spread on the forum site Douban in late 2022, when a group calling itself the “Full-Time Children’s Work Communication Centre” (全职儿女工作交流中心) began to attract members. By mid-2023 it had around 4,000 members, and a more recent Chinese scholarly commentary put the figure at more than 5,000 (Huanqiu). The hashtag spread more widely on Xiaohongshu and other platforms, where posts drew millions of views. These numbers measure visibility, not prevalence. There is no survey of how many young Chinese live in such arrangements, and there may never be one, since most of them would be indistinguishable in official data from any other young adult living at home.

What full-time children say they do

The duties described in reporting are strikingly concrete. One widely circulated case from 2023, reported by Zhengguan News, involved a young person who had quit a job and received 4,000 yuan a month from their parents. In return, they were expected to dance with them for an hour every morning, go grocery shopping with them, accompany them occasionally on outings, handle everything electronic in the house, and cook dinner with the father every evening (China Youth Daily commentary). Other cases involved caring for an ailing parent after surgery, looking after younger siblings, or simply keeping elderly relatives company.

The sums reported range from a few hundred yuan of pocket money to five-figure monthly amounts. Most full-time children interviewed by Sixth Tone said they received 3,000 to 4,000 yuan. A state radio report in 2023 described a 40-year-old man who had given up a Shanghai job paying 20,000 yuan a month to care for his parents, in return for a “salary” of 5,500 yuan (cited in Huanqiu). Most of those quoted described the arrangement as temporary, often a way of preparing for the postgraduate or civil-service entrance examinations.

The labour-market backdrop

The phenomenon emerged during a period of acute youth unemployment. In June 2023, the official urban unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds reached a record 21.3%, after which the National Bureau of Statistics suspended publication for six months and resumed it in January 2024 with a revised method that excludes students. On that new basis, the rate was still 18.9% in August 2026, its highest level in a year, before easing to 18.0% in September; for 25- to 29-year-olds it stood at 7.5% in August (Trading Economics, from NBS data).

These figures explain why the label resonated, but they do not explain the label itself. Unemployment produces dependence everywhere. It does not, by itself, produce a vocabulary of salaries, duties and “work communication centres”. That vocabulary is the subject of what follows.

3. Wage or allowance? The problem of paying kin

Four names for one transfer

Chinese commentary on the phenomenon uses at least four words for the money that passes from parents to full-time children. It is a gongzi (工资), a salary. It is linghuaqian (零花钱), pocket money. It is shenghuofei (生活费), living expenses, the term used for a student’s monthly allowance. And in some accounts it is a zhaoliao butie (照料补贴), a “care subsidy”, borrowing the language of social policy (Huxiu). The sum of money may be identical in each case. The relationship it describes is not.

Viviana Zelizer showed that money is never simply fungible. People “earmark” it, sorting identical sums into distinct categories according to their source, their purpose and the relationship they express: housekeeping money, pin money, a child’s allowance, a gift. In her later work she called the effort that goes into this sorting “relational work”: the constant matching of a type of transaction, a type of payment and a type of tie, so that intimacy and money can coexist without one corrupting the other.

Read with Zelizer, the four Chinese names are four different answers to the same question: who is this young person to the people paying them? Pocket money makes them a child. Living expenses make them a student. A care subsidy makes them a carer, almost a client of welfare. Only a salary makes them an adult who has earned what they receive. The choice of “salary” is therefore not a joke or a euphemism. It is a claim to a status.

One full-time son interviewed by Sixth Tone made the claim explicit. He believed his work was worth the sum his parents paid him, he said, because otherwise his mother would have had to pay even more for the tutoring that he now provided to his younger sister (Sixth Tone). The reasoning is that of a contractor pricing a service against the market rate. It transforms a dependent into a supplier.

The wound of the unreturned gift

Why should this transformation matter so much? Marcel Mauss argued that a gift which cannot be returned places the receiver in an inferior position. Mary Douglas, introducing the English translation of his essay, condensed the point into the phrase that there are no free gifts: a gift that seeks no return wounds the person who receives it.

Chinese has a vivid term for the adult who receives without returning: kenlao (啃老), “gnawing on the old”. It names a moral failure and a generational inversion. The kenlao child eats what should flow the other way. Much of the hostile online reaction to full-time children turned precisely on this charge: critics called the phenomenon kenlao in new clothing (换了马甲的”啃老”), a refined form of living off one’s parents (China Youth Daily commentary).

The salary is the defence against that charge. By attaching a list of duties to the transfer, full-time children convert an unreturnable gift into a balanced exchange. The account is closed every month. No debt accumulates, and with no debt there is no humiliation. What Mauss described as a wound is dressed as a contract.

Inverse misrecognition

Pierre Bourdieu argued that the domestic economy depends on misrecognition. Within the family, he observed, economic exchanges are systematically denied: labour is presented as love, transfers as generosity, calculation as duty. The family is the place where the economy is euphemised.

Full-time childhood reverses this. Here it is love that is euphemised as economy. The real content of the arrangement, parents supporting a child they love and worry about, is presented as a labour contract. One might call this an inverse misrecognition. Its function mirrors Bourdieu’s. Where classic misrecognition protects the dignity of the family by hiding interest, inverse misrecognition protects the dignity of the child by hiding dependence.

The anthropology of money offers a further clue to why this disguise is needed. Paul Bohannan found among the Tiv of Nigeria distinct “spheres of exchange”, and showed that moving value from one sphere to another was morally charged. A wage belongs to the sphere of the market; support belongs to the sphere of kinship. Full-time children perform a deliberate crossing of spheres. They import the morality of the market, in which payment is deserved, into the household, in which support had come to look like charity.

4. The cycle of yang reversed: prepaid filiality

Feeding and feeding back

Charles Stafford’s ethnography of Taiwan and rural mainland China identified two great cycles of reciprocity in Chinese social life. The first is laiwang (来往), the “coming and going” of gifts, visits and favours between households, friends and neighbours. The second, which concerns us here, is the cycle of yang (养). The word means to raise, nourish, feed and support. Parents yang their children when they are young; children yang their parents when they are old, a duty expressed in the term yanglao (养老), supporting the aged. Popular speech condenses the image in the crow that feeds its parents in return, fanbu (反哺), and in the old proverb yang er fang lao (养儿防老), “raise children as a guard against old age”.

Two features of this cycle matter. It is deferred: the return comes decades after the original gift. And it is aligned: at each stage, money, food and care move in the same direction. Young parents give all three to their children. Later, adult children give all three to their ageing parents. The flow reverses once, at the turning point of the life course, and when it does, everything reverses together.

Splitting the flow

Full-time childhood breaks both features. The return is no longer deferred. Care, companionship and household labour flow to parents who are, in some reported cases, only in their fifties and in good health, decades before the age at which yanglao would normally begin. And the flow is no longer aligned. Money moves downwards, from parents to child, while care moves upwards, from child to parents, at the same time and within the same household.

This split is the structural novelty of the phenomenon. It cannot be described as kenlao, since care is returned, nor as classic yanglao, since the money runs the wrong way. It is something new: a simultaneous, two-way exchange between generations, settled monthly, in which each side pays the other in a different currency.

I propose to call this arrangement prepaid filiality. The parents are, in effect, purchasing in advance a share of the filial return that the cycle of yang would otherwise deliver only in their old age, and paying for it with the very resources they would once have saved for that old age.

Why prepay?

The motive becomes clearer once we recall the demographic position of today’s parents. Many have a single child. The proverb yang er fang lao assumed several children and a strong expectation that at least one would remain nearby. For the parents of only children, the future return is uncertain. The child may migrate to a distant city, marry into another family’s obligations, or simply fail to earn enough to support anyone.

Seen from this angle, paying an unemployed child to stay at home is not only an act of generosity towards the child. It is also a hedge. It secures, for a few years at least, the companionship and care that the parents may not be able to count on later. The vocabulary that commentators use is revealing: full-time children are said to provide their parents with qingxu jiazhi (情绪价值), “emotional value”, a term borrowed from marketing that has become ubiquitous in Chinese online speech (China Youth Daily commentary). Emotional value can be priced. That it can now be priced within the family is the most telling sign of how far the cycle of yang has been reworked.

5. The household as a simulated firm

A job description for a child

Read again the duties of the young person paid 4,000 yuan a month: one hour of dancing every morning, grocery shopping, occasional outings, responsibility for everything electronic in the house, and dinner with the father each evening. The list has the form of a job description. It specifies tasks, a schedule and a domain of competence. It is, in a small way, an organisational chart of a family.

The same form recurs throughout the phenomenon. Its founding online community is not a “group” or a “forum” but a gongzuo jiaoliu zhongxin, a “work communication centre”, the sort of name a professional association might choose. Participants speak of their “work”, their “salary” and their “position”. Some profiles describe the move into full-time childhood as a change of employer, following a resignation, often a luoci (裸辞), the “naked resignation” of quitting without another job lined up. Sixth Tone observed that adopting the title and the pay helped young people feel better about their situation.

Mimesis and keying

Two concepts help to interpret this borrowing. Michael Taussig argued that mimesis, the act of copying, is never a neutral reproduction. To imitate something is to draw on its power, to gain a hold over what is imitated. Full-time children imitate the firm, the institution that has rejected them or exhausted them, and by imitating it they appropriate its most valuable asset: the capacity to confer the status of a working adult.

Erving Goffman offers a second, complementary reading. He described “keying” as the process by which an activity already meaningful in one frame is transformed into something patterned on it but seen by participants as something else, as when play-fighting is keyed from a real fight. Full-time childhood keys family life as employment. Everyone involved knows that the daughter is not really an employee. The frame is shared, half-ironic and yet effective. It allows a family to live a situation it might otherwise experience as a failure.

Wages for housework, privately paid

There is a third, more political reading. In the 1970s, the feminist campaign known as Wages for Housework, associated with Silvia Federici and others, argued that domestic labour was real work, hidden by its unpaid status, and should be remunerated. The demand was addressed to the state and, through it, to capital.

Full-time children have, in a sense, implemented this demand, but privately, inside the family and paid by the family. Cooking, cleaning, accompanying and caring become visible as work precisely because they are paid. Chinese scholarly commentary has made a related observation: much of what full-time children do is genuine household, care and emotional labour, valuable yet unrecognised by markets and institutions (Huanqiu). The irony is sharp. The labour market undervalues care; a young person who cannot sell her labour on that market finds that care is the one form of labour her family will buy.

The simulated firm is therefore not mere play. It is a local revaluation of care work, carried out under the pressure of a labour market that offers educated young people too few positions of the kind they were trained to expect.

6. Suspended passage: waiting to reach the shore

A rite of passage without an exit

Arnold van Gennep showed in 1909 that rites of passage share a common structure: separation from a former status, a marginal or liminal phase, and incorporation into a new status. Victor Turner later focused on the middle phase. Liminal persons, he wrote, are “betwixt and between”: no longer what they were, not yet what they will be. They are often stripped of ordinary markers of status, sometimes regarded as polluting, and frequently bound to one another by an intense fellowship he called communitas.

In contemporary China the passage from education to work is among the most heavily ritualised transitions of the life course. It is marked by examinations, from the gaokao to the postgraduate entrance examination and the civil-service examinations, by graduation ceremonies, and, for the most fortunate, by entry into a secure post within the system (编制). Full-time children, as reporting describes them, are mostly people caught in the middle of this passage. Several of those quoted were preparing for an entrance examination; one young woman in Dalian had failed the postgraduate examination three years running.

“Reaching the shore”

The vocabulary of young Chinese makes the liminal structure explicit. To pass the civil-service or postgraduate examination is to shang’an (上岸), to “reach the shore” or “land”. The metaphor implies its opposite: the period of preparation is a time at sea, unstable, exposed and uncertain. Those who have not yet landed are, literally, in between.

In this imagery, the parental home of the full-time child is the vessel that keeps the candidate afloat while she swims towards the shore. The salary is the provisioning of the boat. The online community is a communitas of the not-yet-landed, where people in the same suspended condition share routines, jokes and reassurance.

Liminal or liminoid?

Turner distinguished between the liminal, the obligatory and collective margins of tribal ritual, and the liminoid, the optional, individual and often playful margins of modern leisure and art. Full-time childhood sits uncomfortably between the two. It looks liminoid: it is chosen, individual, half-ironic, and its participants present it as a pause or a self-development project. But its causes are structural and collective: a cohort of graduates larger than the supply of positions they were promised. One might call it a compelled liminoid: a margin experienced as a choice but produced by constraint.

The risk of such a margin is that it does not end. A rite of passage requires a final stage of incorporation. If the shore keeps receding, the passage becomes a condition. Western commentators raised exactly this fear when they warned that prolonged youth unemployment could leave many young Chinese never becoming full-time adult workers (Fortune). The salary, the title and the job description are, among other things, attempts to give structure and dignity to a margin that may last longer than anyone intended.

7. Filial piety as contract: descending familism in filial dress

Two directions, one costume

Yan Yunxiang’s fieldwork in rural northern China led him to a concept that turns the conventional image of Chinese families upside down. In what he called descending familism, resources, attention and hopes flow overwhelmingly downwards, from grandparents and parents to children and grandchildren. Parents work, save, buy apartments and care for grandchildren in order to secure the success of the younger generation. The classical Confucian family, organised around the ascending duty of the young to the old, survives as an ideal, but daily practice runs the other way.

Full-time childhood is a vivid case of descending familism, since the money runs from old to young. Yet it is presented in the costume of ascending filial piety. The child serves the parents, keeps them company, cooks for them and cares for them. According to one commentator interviewed by NBC News, some state media tried to “rationalise” and “glorify” the phenomenon as filial piety (NBC News). Chinese online commentary has asked the same question in plainer words: is this a new form of filial devotion (新型尽孝) or a new form of gnawing on the old (新型啃老)? (Bilibili).

The anthropological answer is that it is both at once, and that this duality is its function. The arrangement allows a downward transfer, which contemporary families practise but find hard to justify for an adult child, to be narrated in the ascending language that the moral tradition still honours.

Filial piety with terms

Something else changes in the process. In the classical tradition, xiao (孝) was unconditional. The Classic of Filial Piety made it the root of all virtue, owed regardless of circumstance and certainly not in exchange for payment. A child did not serve parents because they paid; a child served because they were parents.

The full-time child’s xiao has terms. It specifies duties, hours and a monthly sum. It can, in principle, be renegotiated or terminated, and most participants expect it to end when they find “a real job”. This is filial piety reorganised as a contract between adults. It fits the broader shift that Yan and others have documented, from a hierarchy of obedience to a relationship of negotiated intergenerational intimacy, in which affection, autonomy and bargaining coexist.

Face on both sides

The contract protects not only the child. Reporting on full-time children notes that some parents feel ashamed of having a jobless child, and that some cannot accept that a child who studied for so many years should end up doing housework at home (Cardiff Journalism). In the Chinese social world, such shame is a matter of mianzi (面子), face: the social standing a family holds in the eyes of relatives, neighbours and colleagues.

The language of employment gives the parents an answer to the dreaded question at the New Year dinner or in the residential compound: what is your child doing now? “She is working for us” is a different answer from “she is unemployed”. The title is shared property. It saves the face of the child before her peers and the face of the parents before theirs.

8. Who can afford it: class, gender and geography

A middle-class form

The full-time child is an urban, middle-class figure. As Fortune noted at the height of the coverage, most Chinese families cannot afford to pay an adult child a wage; many rely instead on their adult children to supplement household income (Fortune). Paying a child requires parents with stable salaries or pensions, usually an owned apartment large enough to share, and enough savings to forgo the child’s potential earnings.

This gives the phenomenon a hidden geography. In much of rural China, the direction of support between the generations is the reverse of what full-time childhood displays. Young adults migrate to cities, send remittances home, and leave elderly parents, and sometimes their own children, behind in the village. The rural counterpart of the full-time child is not a child paid to stay. It is the parent left alone while the child goes away to earn. The two figures are produced by the same economy, at opposite ends of the same chain of resources.

The daughter who stayed

The press profiles of full-time children are disproportionately of daughters. That may partly reflect the preferences of journalists. But Chinese scholarship has also identified a gendered dimension. He Yu, a researcher at the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences, writing in China Youth Study in 2024, argued that the “full-time daughter” is shaped by a double difficulty, in employment and in marriage. Society, the author observed, is far more tolerant of a full-time housewife than of a full-time daughter, since the housewife cares for a family while the daughter is still cared for by one (The Paper).

That observation is itself an anthropological datum. It shows that a woman’s unpaid domestic labour remains acceptable when performed for a husband’s household, but suspect when performed for her parents. The old saying held that a married daughter is “spilled water” (嫁出去的女儿泼出去的水): once married, she belongs to another family. The full-time daughter is water that has not been spilled. Her presence at home is treated as a problem not because she is idle but because she is not where the patrilineal script says she should be.

The salary changes the meaning of that presence. It recasts the unmarried daughter at home as a worker rather than a residue. In this sense, full-time childhood extends a trend that Vanessa Fong identified among the first generation of urban only children: when a daughter is the only child, parents invest in her as fully as they would have in a son, and she becomes both their heir and their future carer. The full-time daughter is the logical endpoint of that shift, a daughter who is neither married off nor sent away, and whose care for her own parents is acknowledged, and paid for, as work.

These gendered patterns remain hypotheses. No survey yet shows whether daughters actually outnumber sons among full-time children, and sons appear in the record too, from the young man tutoring his sister to the 40-year-old who left a Shanghai job to care for his parents.

9. Not parasite singles: who names the dependent child?

Adult children living with and supported by their parents are a familiar figure across the rich and middle-income world. Each society has named them, and the names are instructive.

SocietyLabelCoined or popularised byWhat the label stresses
Japanparasaito shinguru (parasite single), late 1990sSociologist Yamada MasahiroConsumption at parents’ expense
Japanhikikomori (withdrawal), late 1990sPsychiatrist Saitō TamakiPathology and isolation
South Koreakangaroo-jok (kangaroo tribe)Media and commentatorsDependence, being carried
Italybamboccioni (big babies), 2007Finance minister Tommaso Padoa-SchioppaImmaturity
UK and USboomerang generationMedia and demographersReturn after leaving
Chinakenlao zu (啃老族, those who gnaw on the old)Media and public opinionMoral debt, exploitation of parents
Chinaquanzhi ernü (full-time sons and daughters), 2022The young people themselvesWork, duty, salary

The table reveals the distinctive feature of the Chinese case. Almost every other label was coined about dependent young adults by someone else: a sociologist, a psychiatrist, a minister, the press. Each describes a deficit, whether of independence, health, maturity or morality. Even the older Chinese term, kenlao, belongs to this family.

“Full-time children” is different. It was coined by those it describes, and it describes not a deficit but an occupation. Where Yamada’s parasite singles were criticised for spending their parents’ money on consumption, full-time children present themselves as producing something for their parents. The label shifts the focus from what the young take to what they give.

The category also seems to travel. Chinese-language media have since reported that a similar figure of “full-time children” had emerged in South Korea, where high housing costs and a difficult job market have likewise led adult children to exchange housework and care for parental support (World Journal). If the Chinese label is indeed being adopted elsewhere in East Asia, it suggests that its success lies in a semantic solution to a shared problem: how to remain dependent without becoming a parasite.

The self-naming is, in the end, an act of what anthropologists sometimes call reclaiming: taking a stigmatised condition and re-describing it from within, in terms that confer dignity. Like other such reclamations, it does not change the material facts. It changes who has the authority to describe them.

10. Three names for one person: the state and the classification of youth

Pierre Bourdieu described the state as the holder of a monopoly over legitimate symbolic power, above all the power to name: to classify people officially, to certify what they are. The full-time child sits at the intersection of three competing acts of naming, each with its own authority.

The statistician’s name: unemployed

For the statistical system, a full-time child is not employed. Depending on whether she is looking for work, she is either unemployed or outside the labour force. Statistical naming is not neutral in China. When youth unemployment reached its record in mid-2023, the National Bureau of Statistics suspended the series, and resumed it only in January 2024 with a narrower definition that excludes students (RAND Forecasting Initiative). Whatever the technical reasons, the episode showed that the number of young people without work had become a politically sensitive figure.

The moralist’s name: filial

Official and semi-official discourse has tended to frame the problem of youth in moral rather than structural terms. In May 2023, as the unemployment figures climbed towards their peak, Xi Jinping replied to a letter from students engaged in rural revitalisation by invoking the idiom “seek out hardship” (自找苦吃), and a People’s Daily commentary that July urged the young to cultivate that spirit (People’s Daily). Foreign media widely read this as telling unemployed graduates to “eat bitterness”; defenders replied that the phrase was meant as encouragement to endure setbacks, not as a labour-market policy (SCMP). Within this frame, a young person at home is acceptable if she can be described as filial, and suspect if she is described as idle. Some state media coverage, as noted above, reached for the language of filial piety. More recent commentary in outlets close to official views has gone further, treating full-time children as a problem of “social reproduction” and “family governance” that calls for coordinated public services (Huanqiu).

The self’s name: employed

The third name is the one examined throughout this article: the young person’s own claim to be working, with a salary, a job description and a professional community. It has no official standing. It cannot be entered on a form, it does not count towards a pension, and it would not satisfy an employer reviewing a gap in a CV. Its authority is purely social. It works only among those who accept the frame, family, peers and online community.

What the competition reveals

The interest of the case lies in the coexistence of these names. The same young woman cooking her mother’s favourite dish in a provincial city is, at once, an unemployment statistic, a model of filial devotion and a self-declared employee. None of these names is false. Each serves a different audience.

This multiplicity is itself a sign of the times. A society in which educated youth move smoothly from school to work has little need for such ingenuity. When that passage stalls, every actor, the state, the family and the young themselves, reaches for a vocabulary that makes the stall bearable. The full-time child is what the stall looks like when the family’s vocabulary wins.

11. Conclusion: the dignity of a name

Full-time children are few, visible and easy to mock. They are a small, urban, middle-class minority among China’s young adults, and many will move on within a year or two. Yet the phenomenon repays close attention, because it shows how a society improvises new meanings when its established passages break down.

The article has argued that the essence of the phenomenon is semantic. Nothing about adult children living with and supported by their parents is new. What is new is the decision to call that support a salary, the chores a job and the online community a work centre. Read with the tools of anthropology, that decision does several kinds of work at once:

  • it converts an unreturnable gift into a balanced exchange, sparing the child the wound of dependence and the charge of kenlao;
  • it performs an inverse misrecognition, disguising love as economy where the family usually disguises economy as love;
  • it splits the Chinese cycle of yang, sending money down and care up at the same time, in a form of prepaid filiality that lets parents of only children secure in advance the care they fear they may not receive later;
  • it builds a mimetic firm inside the household and, in doing so, privately revalues care work that the labour market undervalues;
  • it gives structure and a name to a compelled liminoid phase between school and work, the long swim towards a shore that keeps receding;
  • and it protects the face of parents as well as children, by offering both a respectable answer to the question of what the child is doing.

Two wider conclusions follow. The first concerns kinship. Like the witness-kin examined in the first article of this series, full-time childhood shows Chinese families unbundling and pricing functions that were once carried silently by the family as a whole. Care, company and “emotional value” are being itemised, scheduled and paid for, not by strangers but within the household.

The second concerns power. The full-time child sits under three names, unemployed, filial and employed, each backed by a different authority. That three names are needed is itself the clearest sign of strain. When a society’s young move easily into adult work, they need no special vocabulary. The invention of the full-time child is the measure of how much ingenuity families must now expend to keep a stalled transition bearable, and of how much dignity the young are willing to construct for themselves when institutions do not provide it.

Questions for fieldwork

  • How many young adults live as full-time children, and how do they differ by class, region and gender from other young adults living at home?
  • Is the “salary” actually paid, deposited or simply notional, and how do families account for it alongside household expenses?
  • How do parents describe the arrangement to relatives and neighbours, and does the language of employment change their own sense of face?
  • What happens at the exit: do full-time children move into employment, marriage or further study, or does the arrangement become permanent?
  • Is the Korean case a borrowing of the Chinese label or an independent invention, and does the label circulate in other East Asian societies?

References

Theoretical and ethnographic works

  • Bohannan, Paul. 1955. “Some Principles of Exchange and Investment among the Tiv.” American Anthropologist 57 (1).
  • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field.” Sociological Theory 12 (1).
  • Douglas, Mary. 1990. “No Free Gifts.” Foreword to Marcel Mauss, The Gift. London: Routledge.
  • Federici, Silvia. 1975. Wages Against Housework. Bristol: Falling Wall Press.
  • Fong, Vanessa L. 2002. “China’s One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters.” American Anthropologist 104 (4).
  • Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. New York: Harper & Row.
  • He Yu (何雨). 2024. “‘全职儿女’:是暂时现象还是持续趋势?从代际发展不平衡的角度进行审视” [“Full-time children”: temporary phenomenon or lasting trend?]. 中国青年研究 [China Youth Study], September.
  • Hu, Hsien Chin. 1944. “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face’.” American Anthropologist 46 (1).
  • Mauss, Marcel. 1925. “Essai sur le don.” L’Année sociologique, n.s. 1.
  • Stafford, Charles. 2000. “Chinese Patriliny and the Cycles of Yang and Laiwang.” In J. Carsten (ed.), Cultures of Relatedness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Stafford, Charles. 2000. Separation and Reunion in Modern China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Taussig, Michael. 1993. Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses. New York: Routledge.
  • Turner, Victor. 1967. “Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage.” In The Forest of Symbols. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  • Turner, Victor. 1974. “Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual.” Rice University Studies 60 (3).
  • Van Gennep, Arnold. 1909. Les rites de passage. Paris: Émile Nourry.
  • Yamada, Masahiro. 1999. Parasaito shinguru no jidai [The Age of Parasite Singles]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō.
  • Yan Yunxiang. 2016. “Intergenerational Intimacy and Descending Familism in Rural North China.” American Anthropologist 118 (2).
  • Yan Yunxiang (ed.). 2021. Chinese Families Upside Down: Intergenerational Dynamics and Neo-Familism in the Early 21st Century. Leiden: Brill.
  • Zelizer, Viviana A. 1994. The Social Meaning of Money. New York: Basic Books.
  • Zelizer, Viviana A. 2005. The Purchase of Intimacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Press, commentary and data sources

About this series. This article belongs to a ten-part series on the anthropology of contemporary China published by Global Strategy Files. Each study reads a recent social phenomenon through the tools of anthropology: ritual, kinship, exchange, the body and the sacred.

Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files

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About Driss Effina

Dr. Driss Effina is a distinguished economist, prolific author, and geopolitical strategist ‎whose work explores the intersections of power, economics, governance, and global ‎transformation. Holder of a PhD in Economic Sciences, an Engineering Degree in ‎Statistics, and a Master's in Capital Markets, he has dedicated more than two ‎decades to advancing economic research, shaping public policy, and producing works ‎of strategic analysis that have reached readers in over 40 countries.‎ As the founder of Global Strategy Files LLC an independent American publishing ‎house headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico Dr. Effina has built one of the ‎most ambitious multilingual geopolitical publishing catalogs of the 2020s, with titles in ‎English, French, Spanish, and German spanning topics from the Gulf monarchies and ‎the Kennedy assassination files to the future of the American economy.‎