Decoded

Paying to Go to Work: Simulated Offices and the Ritual Value of Employment in China

Decoded analysis cover: Paying to Go to Work: Simulated Offices and the Ritual Value of Employment in China
Anthropology of Contemporary China | Article 3 of 10

Abstract

Since late 2024, businesses calling themselves “pretend-to-work companies” (假装上班公司) have opened in Chinese cities from Beijing and Shanghai to Dongguan, Hangzhou and Changsha. For 20 to 50 yuan a day, customers rent a desk, Wi-Fi, tea and the company of “colleagues”. Some arrive at nine and leave at six; some come only to take a photograph to send home. Most commentary has treated these spaces as cheap coworking or as a symptom of youth unemployment. This article reads them instead as a market in the non-monetary goods of employment, and as a stage on which the unemployed rehearse, conceal and parody the condition of the worker.

Drawing on Marie Jahoda’s theory of the latent functions of work, Erving Goffman’s dramaturgy, E. P. Thompson’s history of time-discipline, David Graeber’s critique of meaningless jobs and Mikhail Bakhtin’s carnival, the article makes five arguments. First, the pretend office unbundles the job: it sells time structure, company, purpose and status while removing the wage, the boss and the output. Second, it serves as a front stage for a distant audience, above all parents, which makes it the mirror image of the “full-time child”: one strategy conceals unemployment, the other renames it. Third, it turns time-discipline from an imposition of employers into a commodity bought by the disciplined. Fourth, by asking people to pay for a job without purpose, it inverts Graeber’s “bullshit jobs” and reveals that the ritual value of work has detached from its product. Fifth, its jokes, mock interviews and licence to slack make it a small carnival of office life, at once rehearsal and parody.

Keywords: work, unemployment, ritual, performance, time, status, urban China

1. Introduction: “the dignity of not being a useless person”

In Dongguan, an industrial city north of Hong Kong, a 30-year-old entrepreneur using the pseudonym Feiyu opened a business in April 2025 under the name Pretend To Work Company. Within a month every desk was taken and newcomers had to apply. Asked by the BBC what he was selling, he did not mention desks or Wi-Fi. “What I’m selling isn’t a workstation,” he said, “but the dignity of not being a useless person” (BBC, via TBS Graduates).

The sentence is a small piece of theory. It states, more precisely than much academic writing, what a job provides beyond a salary, and it implies that this something can be separated from the job and sold on its own. The customers of such businesses are not buying the chance to earn. They pay to spend the day in a place that looks and feels like work.

This article takes Feiyu at his word. It treats the “pretend-to-work company” not as a quirky form of coworking but as a market in which the ritual, social and moral goods of employment are detached from the wage and priced by the day. It asks what exactly is being bought, who the performance is for, and what it reveals about the place of work in the moral imagination of urban China.

The article continues a series. The first article examined an app that sold a witness to one’s death; the second examined young adults paid by their parents to be “full-time children”. Both described a process of unbundling: functions once carried silently by the family were separated, named and priced. The pretend office extends the same process from kinship to work. Here it is the job that is taken apart, and its pieces that are sold.

A note on method

The analysis is interpretive and documentary. It draws on Chinese and international press reporting from late 2024 to 2025, including site visits by Chinese journalists in Hangzhou, Changsha and Chengdu, interviews with operators and customers, and operators’ own recruitment posts. It reads these materials against the anthropology and sociology of work, ritual and performance. The evidence is uneven. Operators have an interest in presenting their businesses as full and meaningful, journalists favour striking cases, and no one knows how many such spaces exist or how long they survive. Where the argument goes beyond what the sources show, it says so.

2. The phenomenon: from comedy sketch to registered company

The idea began as a joke. In December 2024, a sketch on the variety show Feichang Ganxiang Dui (非常敢想队) imagined employees who paid their company for the privilege of pretending to work (Digitaling). Within weeks the joke had been taken literally. By mid-January 2025, journalists from Cover News were visiting spare offices in commercial buildings that had been rebranded as “pretend-to-work companies”, charging 30 yuan a day for a desk, internet access and tea (Cover News via Yangcheng Evening News). According to the business registry service Qichacha, several new companies with “pretend to work” in their names were registered across China in 2025 (Jiemian).

A sample of reported cases

CityOperator or venuePrice reportedNotable featuresSource
Changsha“Pretend-to-Work Company” in a downtown office tower20 to 30 yuan a dayNo KPIs, no clocking in; hiking, ball games and cooking as community activitiesChangsha Evening News (Aug 2025)
Hangzhou“Pretend to Work Unlimited Company” (假装上班无限公司), owner Chen Yingjian30 yuan a day30 to 40 customers in two months; a few came only to take a photo for their family, paying 50 yuanChina Youth Daily via Yangtse Evening Post (Jul 2025)
DongguanPretend To Work Company, owner “Feiyu”30 yuan a day; one customer paid 500 yuan a monthFull within a month; about 40% of customers recent graduates photographing “internships”BBC, via TBS Graduates (2025)
Beijing (Wangjing)“Wangjing Pretend-to-Work Division”, founder Queenienot reported30 to 40 inquiries on the day the recruitment post appearedJiemian (2025)
ShanghaiUnnamed pretend-work spacedaily feeGraduate used it to send photos to her university as proof of an internshipBBC, via Class FM (2025)

Other reports placed similar businesses in Shenzhen, Nanjing, Wuhan, Chengdu and Kunming, at prices generally between 30 and 50 yuan a day. Some operators added touches of realism: “pretend interviews” before admission and office rules such as a ban on office romance (SAYS).

Who comes, and why

The customer base is mixed. Operators and journalists describe at least four groups: unemployed graduates and laid-off workers; freelancers and people running side businesses who find it hard to work at home; graduates who need evidence of an internship; and, more rarely, people who want a few hours away from housework and childcare. The Beijing founder’s recruitment post addressed all of them at once. It asked whether readers were afraid that their unemployed selves would be “seen through” by friends and family, whether working freelance at home felt inefficient and in need of supervision, whether a side business lacked space, or whether housework and children made them long for some quiet (Jiemian).

That list is the best summary of the phenomenon. It names, in a single breath, four distinct goods that a workplace provides: cover from social judgement, discipline, space, and escape. None of them is a wage.

3. What a job gives besides money: Jahoda in Dongguan

Marienthal, 1931

In 1931, a team of researchers led by Marie Jahoda, Paul Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel studied Marienthal, an Austrian village where the closure of the textile mill had left most families without work. Their findings became a classic of social science. Unemployment did not produce revolt. It produced apathy, and above all a collapse of time. The researchers timed people walking through the village and found that unemployed men moved slowly, stopped often and seemed to have nowhere to be. Days lost their shape.

Decades later Jahoda turned these observations into a general theory. Employment, she argued, has one manifest function, income, and several latent functions that people rarely notice until they lose them. A job imposes a structure on time. It provides regular contact with people outside the family. It links the individual to goals larger than herself. It confers status and identity. And it enforces regular activity. Jahoda’s point was that unemployment harms people not only by making them poor, but by depriving them of these latent goods.

The latent functions, priced by the day

The pretend office looks as if it had been designed from Jahoda’s list. It provides every latent function of employment and removes the manifest one.

Jahoda’s latent functionWhat the pretend office providesVoices from reporting
Time structureFixed opening hours, “nine to five” or “nine to six”, a reason to get up and leave homeA Dongguan customer said going to an office every day was better for his self-discipline than staying at home
Social contact“Colleagues”, shared lunches, tea breaks, in some places hiking or ball gamesThe same customer: “It’s like we’re working together as a group”
Collective purposeWeak: each person pursues a separate task, but within a shared workplaceCommunity activities organised by operators in Changsha
Status and identityA desk, an address, photographs that can be shown to others“The dignity of not being a useless person”
Regular activityJob applications, online courses, side businesses, examination preparationOne Shanghai customer wrote online novels at her rented desk

The weakest line in the table is collective purpose. That gap is revealing. Of all the goods of employment, a shared goal is the one that cannot be simulated by renting a room, because it depends on the work itself. The pretend office can reproduce the form of a workplace, but not the joint project that gives a real workplace its point. Jahoda would have predicted exactly this.

A negative wage

Jahoda treated the latent functions as by-products that came bundled with the wage. The Chinese case shows that the bundle can be broken. The latent goods of work can be separated from the wage and sold as a service. Customers pay what amounts to a negative wage: instead of being paid to come to the office, they pay to come.

That price, 20 to 50 yuan a day, is a rough market measure of how much the non-monetary goods of work are worth to people who have lost them. It is modest in absolute terms but significant for someone without income. The willingness to pay it is perhaps the clearest confirmation of Jahoda’s theory ever produced. What Marienthal showed through the slow walk of idle men, Dongguan shows through a daily fee.

4. A front stage for a distant audience

Photographs as proof

Erving Goffman described social life as a series of performances given in front regions, before an audience, and prepared in back regions, where performers can drop their roles. Successful performance depends on “audience segregation”: the people who see one performance must not see another that contradicts it.

The pretend office is a front region whose audience is not in the room. The most consistent detail in reporting is the photograph. A Dongguan customer sent pictures of the office to his parents, and said they felt much more at ease about his lack of a job. A 25-year-old in Jiangsu said that sending his parents photos of himself “working” gave him a sense of security (Upworthy, summarising BBC). A Shanghai graduate sent photos of her rented desk to her university as proof of an internship (BBC, via Class FM). The Dongguan operator estimated that about 40% of his customers were recent graduates who came to take such photos for their former tutors (BBC, via TBS Graduates).

The photograph is the ritual token of the performance. It travels from the front region to an audience that cannot see the back region: the parents in another city, the tutor in a university office. Audience segregation is guaranteed by distance.

When the sign costs more than the practice

One detail from Hangzhou deserves particular attention. The owner reported that a few customers came only to take a photograph to send to their families and then left, and that they paid 50 yuan for the visit, against 30 yuan for a full day; the report does not say whether this was a set price or a customer’s choice (Yangtse Evening Post).

Whatever the reason for the price difference, its effect is striking. In this small market, the pure image of work costs more than the practice of sitting at a desk all day. The brief visit has no back region at all: it consists entirely of the moment of display. That the market prices this moment above the whole day is a precise expression of what is being sold. The core product is not the experience of work but its evidence.

Concealment and its mirror

The pretend office can be set beside the “full-time children” examined in the second article of this series. Both respond to the same social pressure: the shame of a young adult without work, and the dreaded question from relatives about what the child is doing now. But they respond in opposite ways.

Full-time childrenPretend-office workers
StrategyRename the situationConceal the situation
Who knowsParents know and take partParents often do not know
Direction of moneyParents pay the childThe young person pays a business
StageThe family home, redescribed as a workplaceA rented office, presented as a real workplace
Key propThe “salary”The photograph
RiskBeing called kenlao (gnawing on the old)Being “seen through” (被看穿)

The two strategies are complementary rather than contradictory. The first works when parents can afford, and are willing, to join the performance. The second works when they cannot, or when the young person cannot bear to tell them. In both, the family remains the decisive audience for the young adult’s status, and in both, the means of satisfying that audience is borrowed from the world of employment.

5. Buying a timetable: time-discipline as a service

From the factory bell to the rented desk

In a celebrated essay of 1967, the historian E. P. Thompson traced how industrial capitalism transformed the experience of time. Pre-industrial work, he argued, was largely task-oriented: people worked until the harvest was in or the cloth was woven, and the boundary between work and life was loose. Industrial work was timed. Employers introduced clocks, bells, fines for lateness and rules against idleness. Over generations, schools, churches and factories taught workers to internalise the clock until it felt natural.

Thompson’s story is a story of imposition. Time-discipline was something employers did to workers. The pretend office reverses the direction. Here the discipline is bought by the person who will be disciplined. A Dongguan customer explained that the office made him more self-disciplined and more effective than staying at home (BBC, via Business Spotlight). Freelancers interviewed by Chinese journalists said much the same: at home they lay down, scrolled their phones and lost the day.

In Thompson’s terms, the home has reverted to a space of task-orientation, porous, distracting and shapeless, and the pretend office sells back the clock. Time-discipline, once a cost imposed on workers by capital, has become a service that the unemployed and the self-employed purchase for themselves.

The soft clock

The clock on sale is a gentle one. The Changsha operator advertised a fixed desk with no KPIs and no clocking in, where customers arranged their own time (Changsha Evening News). Customers do not want a supervisor. They want the shape of a working day without its sanctions. Michel Foucault might have described the remaining discipline as the light pressure of mutual visibility: one works because others, also working, can see.

Nine to five as a utopia

The Hangzhou business advertised itself as offering a “nine to five” (朝九晚五) working day. The phrase is worth pausing over. For many Chinese white-collar workers, nine to five is not the reality of office life. Public debate over the past decade has been dominated by critiques of “996”, the expectation of working from nine in the morning to nine at night, six days a week, and of “involution” (内卷), competition so intense that it exhausts everyone without benefiting anyone.

The pretend office therefore does not simply imitate the Chinese office as it is. It imitates an idealised office: bounded hours, friendly colleagues, no boss, no overtime, a lunch break and, in Changsha, hiking on the weekend. What is sold is less the memory of a real job than a modest utopia of employment, the job as it ought to have been. This may be why freelancers who have left real jobs are among its most enthusiastic customers. They are buying back the good parts of office life without the parts that made them leave.

6. Paying for a pointless job: Graeber inverted

Bullshit jobs and their opposite

In Bullshit Jobs (2018), the anthropologist David Graeber argued that a large share of paid employment in rich economies is pointless even in the eyes of those who do it. Corporate box-tickers, flunkies and duct-tapers spend their days performing tasks they believe contribute nothing. Graeber’s puzzle was why people suffer so acutely in such jobs, even when well paid. His answer was that humans need to feel that their actions have effects in the world. Being paid to do nothing useful, he wrote, produces a peculiar kind of spiritual violence.

The pretend office is Graeber’s case turned inside out. Its customers are not paid to do nothing useful; they pay to do something that has no output for anyone else. And far from suffering, many describe relief, even pleasure. A 25-year-old customer in Jiangsu attributed the trend to a society that does not tolerate rest (Upworthy, summarising BBC). On this view, sitting at a desk is not a substitute for production. It is a substitute for being seen to rest.

What the inversion reveals

The two cases together isolate something that neither shows on its own. Graeber’s paid but pointless workers suffer because the form of work is present while its meaning is absent. Pretend-office customers feel better because the form of work is present, even though both the meaning and the pay are absent. The difference suggests that, for the unemployed, the form itself carries moral weight. To be at a desk during working hours is to be a certain kind of person, regardless of what one does there.

Max Weber traced the modern “spirit of capitalism” to a religious ethic that made methodical labour a sign of grace. Contemporary China has its own secular ethic of work, expressed in the official celebration of “striving” (奋斗) and, more ambivalently, in the self-mocking identity of the dagongren (打工人), the wage-toiler. In both, being at work is a moral condition, not just an economic one. The pretend office shows how deep this condition runs. Even with the wage and the product removed, the moral form of work still has value, and people will pay to inhabit it.

Slacking as a luxury

There is a further irony. Chinese operators advertise the freedom to moyu (摸鱼), literally “to feel for fish”, the slang term for slacking at work. A commentary in early 2025 summarised the promise of some spaces: for 30 yuan a day one could “enjoy the happiness of slacking at a desk”, arrive late, leave early, refuse all assignments, even scold the client and bang the table at the boss (Digitaling). In a real job, slacking is a small theft of time from an employer. In a pretend job, it is part of the product. The customer pays for the right to steal from no one.

7. The office as ritual space: rehearsal, mask and carnival

A space set apart

Émile Durkheim defined the sacred as that which is set apart from ordinary life and surrounded by rules of separation. The concept need not be confined to religion. In secular societies, certain spaces work as zones of transformation: one enters them as one person and acts within them as another. The office is one such space. Crossing its threshold turns a private individual into a worker, with a role, a desk and a set of expected behaviours.

The pretend office makes this transformation visible because it performs it without any of the economic content that usually hides it. Customers dress, commute, greet their “colleagues” and sit down at a fixed desk, as in a real job. A Changsha journalist described one regular arriving at nine with a laptop bag, nodding to colleagues and taking his seat, and summed up the scene in a striking image: he had “rented a stage to perform the play of going to work” (租了个”戏台”来演上班这出戏) (Changsha Evening News). The Chinese press reached spontaneously for the vocabulary of theatre.

Three modes at once

The performance on this stage takes at least three forms, often at the same time and by the same person.

  1. Rehearsal. For job seekers, the office is a place to practise being a worker: to keep regular hours, prepare applications and examinations, and avoid the decay of habit that Marienthal documented. The performance studies scholar Richard Schechner called this “restored behaviour”: actions practised and repeated so that they can be performed again in earnest.
  2. Mask. For those concealing unemployment, the office is a front region that produces evidence for an absent audience, as section 4 showed.
  3. Carnival. For many, the office is also a joke. Mock interviews, rules against office romance, the licence to slack and to “bang the table at the boss” all parody the real workplace.

Mikhail Bakhtin described the medieval carnival as a time when official hierarchies were suspended and inverted through laughter, parody and the crowning of mock kings. Carnival, he argued, both mocks and renews the order it parodies. The pretend office is a small, permanent carnival of office life. It mocks the boss, the KPI and the interview. Yet it also renews the desire for the office, since its customers keep coming back to a parody of the very institution that has failed them.

Serious play

Gregory Bateson observed that play depends on a frame that signals “this is play”: a nip is understood as not a bite. What makes the pretend office anthropologically interesting is that its frame is deliberately unstable. The same desk can be a rehearsal space in the morning, a stage for a photograph at noon and the site of an ironic joke in the afternoon.

This instability is not a weakness but a strength. It allows customers to move between earnestness and irony as their mood and situation require. One Shanghai graduate captured the attitude perfectly when she explained her choice: “If you’re going to fake it, just fake it to the end” (BBC, via Class FM). The sentence is both a confession and a philosophy. It acknowledges the pretence, and then commits to it fully. That is what serious play looks like.

8. Comparisons: the fiction of employment elsewhere

The impulse to keep up the appearance of work after losing it is not uniquely Chinese. Comparison helps to isolate what is specific to the Chinese case.

The salaryman in the park

During Japan’s long downturn after the bursting of its asset bubble in the early 1990s, Japanese and foreign media repeatedly reported on laid-off middle-aged men who continued to leave home every morning in a suit, spending the day in parks, libraries or coffee shops rather than telling their families they had lost their jobs. French cinema gave the figure its classic portrait in Laurent Cantet’s film L’Emploi du temps (2001), in which a dismissed executive invents an imaginary job and spends his days driving and waiting.

The structure of these cases differs from the Chinese one in two ways. The performer is typically a middle-aged man, and the audience is his wife and children. What is protected is the status of the breadwinner. In China, the performer is typically young and the audience is the parents, and what is protected is the status of a child who has been raised and educated to succeed. The Japanese salaryman hides a fall; the Chinese graduate hides a failure to rise.

The fake commute

A second comparison comes from the pandemic years. When office workers in Europe and North America were sent home in 2020 and 2021, many reported missing the commute itself, and some deliberately walked around the block before and after work to mark the boundaries of the working day. The phrase “fake commute” entered the vocabulary, and at least one large software company built a “virtual commute” feature into its workplace tools.

The fake commute and the pretend office answer the same need identified by Jahoda and Thompson: the need for a time structure and a spatial threshold that separate work from the rest of life. But the Western fake commute was performed by people who still had jobs. The Chinese pretend office is used mainly by people who do not. It reveals that the rituals of work are wanted even, and perhaps especially, when the work is gone.

Coworking and its shadow

Finally, the pretend office looks superficially like the coworking spaces that spread across the world in the 2010s, and some Chinese commentators have described it as nothing more than cheap shared office space. The resemblance is real, but the meanings diverge. Coworking was marketed to the self-employed and the start-up founder as a community of productive, ambitious individuals. The pretend office is marketed, at least in part, to those who are not producing anything and need to look as though they were. It is coworking’s shadow: the same furniture, sold to the other side of the labour market.

What is specific to China, then, is the combination: a mass of educated young people without work, a family that remains the decisive audience for their status, institutions such as universities that demand proof of employment, and an entrepreneurial culture quick to turn a joke into a registered company.

9. Market, fraud and audit: who else needs the performance?

The university as audience

The most institutionally revealing customers of pretend offices are graduates producing proof of internships. The Shanghai graduate interviewed by the BBC explained that her university had an unwritten rule: students had to sign an employment contract or provide proof of an internship within a year of graduating, or they would not receive their diploma (BBC, via Class FM). The Dongguan operator put such customers at about 40% of his clientele.

This detail extends the analysis beyond the family. Universities in China are evaluated in part on the employment outcomes of their graduates, and the pressure to show high employment rates has long been a subject of public criticism, to the point that the education authorities have issued rules against forcing graduates to sign employment agreements. Where such pressure persists, the student’s photograph of a rented desk does not only deceive the university. It may also help the university produce a number that it, in turn, must present to its own superiors.

The anthropologist Marilyn Strathern called this kind of system an audit culture: a society in which institutions are governed through indicators, and in which the indicators, once they become targets, generate the very performances they were meant to measure. The pretend office is a tiny node in such a chain. A student performs employment for a university, which may perform employment rates for an evaluator. At each level, the form of evidence matters more than the substance behind it.

A market at the edge of legality

The pretend-office market also attracts more troubling services. As early as January 2025, lawyers interviewed by Cover News warned that some businesses trading on the “pretend to work” label were offering to pay social insurance contributions on customers’ behalf, an arrangement that can amount to fraud when no real employment exists (Cover News via Yangcheng Evening News). China Youth Daily published similar legal warnings in July 2025 (Yangtse Evening Post). Long before the pretend office, Chinese media had reported a market in fake internship certificates sold online (China Daily).

These adjacent markets show where the logic of the pretend office leads when it is pushed. The photograph is a soft proof, a sign that persuades without certifying. A forged certificate or a fictitious social-insurance record is a hard proof, one that enters official files. The difference between them is the line between a social performance and a legal fraud. Most pretend offices stay on the soft side of that line. Their existence, however, shows that the demand for proof of employment is strong enough to sustain a gradient of products, from the harmless to the criminal.

The official tone

Chinese official and mainstream media have treated the phenomenon with a mixture of curiosity, sympathy and caution. Local evening papers ran sympathetic features about young people using the spaces to “stay in shape” (保持状态) for their next job (Changsha Evening News). National outlets added legal warnings. None, in the reporting reviewed here, treated the pretend office as a scandal. It was framed instead as a transitional arrangement, which is also how the academic expert quoted by the BBC described it (Fortune). That tolerance is itself telling. A performance of employment, however fictional, fits comfortably within an official culture that values striving. What would be harder to accept is the open admission of idleness.

10. Conclusion: the job without the job

The pretend office is small, cheap and easily dismissed as a fad. Its customers number in the dozens per site, its prices are a few dollars a day, and many of the businesses may already have closed. Yet it offers an unusually clear view of something that is normally hidden: what a job means to people apart from what it pays.

The article has argued that the pretend office does five things:

  • it unbundles employment, selling Jahoda’s latent functions, time structure, company, activity and status, at a negative wage, while failing, revealingly, to reproduce the one function that depends on real work, a shared purpose;
  • it serves as a front stage for distant audiences, parents and universities, with the photograph as its ritual token, and in this it mirrors the full-time child: one strategy conceals unemployment, the other renames it;
  • it turns time-discipline into a service, bought by the disciplined themselves, and sells not the real Chinese office of 996 and involution but an idealised, bounded nine-to-five;
  • it inverts Graeber’s bullshit jobs: people pay for work without output and feel better for it, which shows that the moral form of work has value even when its product and its wage are gone;
  • and it operates as a small carnival, a space of rehearsal, mask and parody whose unstable frame lets customers move freely between earnestness and irony.

Read alongside the earlier articles in this series, the pretend office completes a pattern. The first article found kinship being unbundled into a single mortuary function, the witness. The second found the parent-child bond itemised and paid for as a job. The third finds the job itself broken into parts and sold without its core. Across all three, Chinese urban society appears to be doing the same thing in different domains: separating, naming and pricing the goods that institutions once delivered as a package, because the institutions, the extended family, the work unit, the secure graduate job, no longer deliver them reliably.

The Dongguan operator who sold “the dignity of not being a useless person” understood this better than many analysts. Dignity was once a by-product of having a place in society. In the pretend office, it has become a product in its own right, available at 30 yuan a day.

Questions for fieldwork

  • How long do customers stay, and what proportion move into paid work, self-employment or further study?
  • How do parents react when they discover the pretence, and does the discovery change the family’s handling of the child’s unemployment?
  • How widespread are university requirements for proof of employment, and how do career offices treat photographs and rented-desk evidence?
  • How do the economics of the businesses work, and how many have survived beyond the period of media attention?
  • Do customers who use the spaces for rehearsal, for concealment and for irony form distinct groups, or do the same people move between all three?

References

Theoretical and ethnographic works

  • Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1965 [1984]. Rabelais and His World. Trans. H. Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
  • Bateson, Gregory. 1955. “A Theory of Play and Fantasy.” Psychiatric Research Reports 2.
  • Durkheim, Émile. 1912. Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: Alcan.
  • Foucault, Michel. 1975. Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison. Paris: Gallimard.
  • Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday.
  • Graeber, David. 2018. Bullshit Jobs: A Theory. New York: Simon & Schuster.
  • Jahoda, Marie. 1982. Employment and Unemployment: A Social-Psychological Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Jahoda, Marie, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel. 1933. Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal. Leipzig: Hirzel.
  • Schechner, Richard. 1985. Between Theater and Anthropology. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
  • Strathern, Marilyn (ed.). 2000. Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy. London: Routledge.
  • Thompson, E. P. 1967. “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism.” Past & Present 38.
  • Weber, Max. 1905. Die protestantische Ethik und der “Geist” des Kapitalismus. Tübingen: Mohr.

Film

  • Cantet, Laurent (dir.). 2001. L’Emploi du temps. France.

Press, commentary and data sources

About this series. This article belongs to a ten-part series on the anthropology of contemporary China published by Global Strategy Files. Each study reads a recent social phenomenon through the tools of anthropology: ritual, kinship, exchange, the body and the sacred.

Driss EFFINA, PhD
Independent Researcher, Global Strategy Files

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About Driss Effina

Dr. Driss Effina is a distinguished economist, prolific author, and geopolitical strategist ‎whose work explores the intersections of power, economics, governance, and global ‎transformation. Holder of a PhD in Economic Sciences, an Engineering Degree in ‎Statistics, and a Master's in Capital Markets, he has dedicated more than two ‎decades to advancing economic research, shaping public policy, and producing works ‎of strategic analysis that have reached readers in over 40 countries.‎ As the founder of Global Strategy Files LLC an independent American publishing ‎house headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico Dr. Effina has built one of the ‎most ambitious multilingual geopolitical publishing catalogs of the 2020s, with titles in ‎English, French, Spanish, and German spanning topics from the Gulf monarchies and ‎the Kennedy assassination files to the future of the American economy.‎